The Problem of the European Parliament

European Parliament, Democratic Legitimacy and the EU
Introduction
Background
The EU has three legislative aspects—the supranational aspect (the Commission), the intergovernmental aspect (the European Council and the Council of the EU), and the parliamentary aspects (the EP). Yet, only one of these bodies is directly elected in a democratic fashion (the EP), which means that the overwhelming majority of the EU’s legislative totality is specifically non-democratic in character. In other words, the only way the people of Europe can directly and democratically influence the shaping of EU policy is through the EP. This is undoubtedly why, as Ronald Holzhacker points out, “scholars, politicians and the public have bemoaned a lack of democratic legitimacy in the European Union (EU) for decades.”[footnoteRef:2] [2: Ronald Holzhacker, "Democratic legitimacy and the European Union." European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007), 257.]
The Central Question
The question this essay aims to answer is: To what extent does the European Parliament (EP) provide democratic legitimacy to the European Union?
Key Terms
Democratic legitimacy is defined as “citizen orientations toward the main principles of the political regime or the entire political system (i.e., democracy and not a particular administration, needs to be perceived as the best form of government or at least as the least evil).”[footnoteRef:3] In terms of the EU, democratic legitimacy refers to the character of the EU being democratic and representational of the will of the European people rather than as the will of a select group of individuals in powerful governmental positions who are not selected by European citizens. [3: Jorge Aragon, Political Legitimacy and Democracy, https://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/dccirp/pdfs/articlesforresourc/Article_-_Aragon_Trelles,_Jorge_2.pdf]
Purpose
This paper argues that the EP provides democratic legitimacy to the European Union mostly aspirationally and in theory: it is designed as and resembles an authentic democratic body and foil to the (unelected) majority of the EU governance structure; but as the EP holds insufficient power, and inadequately displays its democratic credentials to the people of Europe, it serves as a hollow institution in practice. This paper will explain the lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU by using Holzhacker and other theorists to explain how the EP works, comparing the EP to the UK’s parliament, and discussing the issue of legitimacy from both sides of the aisle—the side that says, yes, the EP does increase democratic legitimacy in the EU; and the side that argues that in spite of the increase, it does not do enough to put power in the hands of the people.
Argument
In a legitimate democracy, those in power are accountable to the people: “government of the people, by the people, for the people” is the way the Lincoln phrased it.[footnoteRef:4] Hage and Kaeding note that democratic legitimacy “can be assessed through a number of criteria.”[footnoteRef:5] Among the main principles of democratic theory are “the representativeness and accountability of political decision makers.”[footnoteRef:6] At the same time, legitimacy can be determined by the ends and not just the means—i.e., by the output of the political system. If the end of democracy is to ensure a set of features well-regarded among modern society as being characterized by freedom, security, equality and so on, one could argue that who makes legislative decisions is less important than the outcome of those decisions and whether or not they align with the features that modern society seeks to have established in its culture.[footnoteRef:7] However, the specific character of democratic legitimacy is the way in which power is distributed—and that character is dependent upon the people having a voice in selecting their leaders or representatives and in shaping directly the laws that will be used to govern them.[footnoteRef:8] [4: Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg Address,” 1863. http://rmc.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm] [5: Frank Hage and Michael Kaeding, “Reconsidering the European Parliament’s legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures." European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007), 341.] [6: Frank Hage and Michael Kaeding, “Reconsidering the European Parliament’s legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures." European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007), 341.] [7: Frank Hage and Michael Kaeding, “Reconsidering the European Parliament’s legislative influence: Formal vs. informal procedures." European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007), 342.] [8: Ronald Holzhacker, "Democratic legitimacy and the European Union." European Integration 29, no. 3 (2007), 260.]
The EP falls into this definition rather poorly. It is largely impotent in terms of real power and gives more the impression of democracy than a legitimate reflection of this governmental style. While effort has been made to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EP and thus of the EU, this seldom extends to sufficient power being exercisable by the EP on its own initiative. The EP is limited in terms of the extent to which it can shape legislation, as there are two trends in Europe at the moment—the populist trend (seen every from Italy to France to Germany and Hungary) to the globalist trend (also seen in every country but more on the side of establishment politicians and global capitalists). For the EU to truly be representative of the people of Europe, the EP would have more power within the political system—but it does not, because that would go against the very aim of the EU, which is to bring the member nations into conformity under one governing body so as to eliminate the risk of war, tension, strive, conflict and so on. The EP is there to give a bone to the populace but not much more: the real decisions are to be made by the technocrats who take a long-term view to the organization of Europe within a globalized context. The people of Europe, on the other hand, take a less macrocosmic view and focus more on their own nations and culture. Fossum describes the situation thus: “The problem facing representative bodies is that populists will challenge the very merit of catching up with executives and experts because they will argue that it will fail to connect to citizens.”[footnoteRef:9] Where powers are made available to the EP, these do not usually permit the EP to dictate any change in course of European policy. As a result, the EP is weak, particularly in comparison to the European Commission, and both democratic scrutiny and democratic accountability of the EU as a whole is threatened.[footnoteRef:10] [9: John Fossum, "Democracy and Legitimacy in the EU. Challenges and Options." ARENA Working Paper (2017), 6.] [10: Torsten Selck and Bernard Steunenberg, "Between power and luck: The European Parliament in the EU legislative process." European Union Politics 5, no. 1 (2004), 25.]
The objective of the EU has routinely been described as to preserve the sovereignty and dignity of its member nations. The Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the EP but it also weakened the voting power of the member states: on the one hand, it promoted the characteristic of democracy, and on the other weakened it. At the same time, it expanded the powers of the President of the European Council, and as Bonde has shown, the Treaty of Lisbon was essentially a move towards centralization rather than towards democratic legitimacy.[footnoteRef:11] The Treaty of Nice had been signed not even a decade prior but it had not succeeded in centralizing the powers of the EU in the way the Lisbon Treaty did. Church and Phinnemore point out that the Treaty of Nice represented more of a “drift towards intergovernmenatalism.”[footnoteRef:12] The Treaty of Lisbon was a consolidation of power for the EP, but also for the technocrats heading the EU—and more so for them than for the EP. The sources of the actual powers of the EP include approving the EU’s budget (i.e., the EP has right of approval), but at the same time the EP lacks the right of legislative initiative (i.e., the right to bring in their own proposal’s or introduce a bill the way the American Congress may do). The same power dynamic exists with respect to the relationship between the EP and the Council President, which is only partially remedied by their introduction of “Spitzenkandidaten.” [11: Bonde, J The Treaty of Lisbon: an impact assessment. London: Stationery Office, 2008.] [12: Clive Church and David Phinnemore, “The Rise and Fall of the Constitutional Treaty.” In European Union Politics, Ed. By Michelle Cini (UK: Oxford University Press, 2007), 41.]
As a result, as Kohler shows, the EP is in a weakened state with the respect to the authority provided the European Commission.[footnoteRef:13] There is neither a great deal of democratic scrutiny nor accountability throughout the EU as a result. The rise of populist parties throughout Europe reveals the extent to which the people are dissatisfied with the hegemonic government at the heart of the EU. Theoretically, the EU has provided a channel for populist ire via the EP. In reality, the EP, as part of the EU, fails to represent the voice of the diverse groups of people. Italians are not Germans are not French are not English are not Hungarian: though their sympathies may align, they each face their own set of obstacles. The populist parties do express dissatisfaction with the EU's (lack of) democratic legitimacy by utilising its most effective democratic mechanism—but this is in keeping with the fact that they are, for the time being, still members of the EU and have little alternative—other than to pursue the example set by the UK and go for a total exit. [13: Manfred Kohler, European Governance and the E uropean Parliament: From Talking Shop to Legislative Powerhouse." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 52, no. 3 (2014), 604.]
Compared to parliament in the UK, the EP has little authority. Though the EP has managed to increase its direct power over EU policy, its practical power is very limited. It substantially lacks the right of legislative initiative and its power is often limited to merely approving the commission's proposals. In other words, it is a "Yes" parliament, an EP whose sole function is to rubber stamp the Commission’s directives. There is little accountability to the people and the people sensing as much show little voter turnout.
In the UK parliament, there are two houses, one of which is directly elected and enjoys a high level of democratic legitimacy (although the government normally holds the majority in that house, which means scrutiny and effectiveness are relatively poor in terms of representing the will of the people over the will of the established power structure). The other house, by contrast, while being unelected, is able to effectively scrutinize and make substantive changes to government proposals, even though it has poor levels of perceived democratic legitimacy.  There is, in this sense, an inverse relationship between representative government and accountability: the democratically elected officials tend to vote the will of the established power structure while the unelected officials tend to be more challenging to the power structure. In either case, it is unclear whether the will of Englanders is actually represented.
The EP is like the House of Commons, which genuinely relies on democratic support/ mandate, but is relatively weak in challenging the government. Indeed, the EP has attempted in recent years (from 2014) to acquire the same level of power that the democratically legitimate House of Commons has, i.e. to make, or unmake, an Executive.
The “Spitzenkandidaten” concept is crucial to achieving this, where elected representatives choose who is really in charge. They still have no power to vote out a Commission, but they do have the power to advise on who the president should be.
Conclusion
Is the EU more democratically legitimate as the result of the EP? Its existence clearly increases the democratic legitimacy of the EU, certainly more so than the European Assembly which preceded it. But it does not necessarily follow that an increase in powers in the EP increases the democratic legitimacy of the EU—and expecting perceived legitimacy to increase will require much better engagement between MEPs and European institutions in general, and the people.  True democratic legitimacy is difficult to find anywhere in the world. The UK is a mixed-bag; and even the U.S. has succumbed to bureaucratic heft, which bogs down the ability of the people to truly hold their officials accountable, as a “deep state” (i.e., a continuation of unelected officials from one administration to the next) maintains a foothold within the power structure. In the EU, the EP gives the impression of democracy—but the foothold of power is wielded by a European “deep state”—and that is what makes all the difference. Understanding this “deep state” and its role in European government is where this topic should be explored in more detail. As The Economist has pointed out, “European elections will neither lend new credibility to the European Parliament nor give the European Union greater democratic legitimacy.”[footnoteRef:14] The reason is that the players deep within the state will nonetheless retain their power.
[14: The Economist, “Elected, Yet Strangely Unaccountable,” 2014. https://www.economist.com/briefing/2014/05/15/elected-yet-strangely-unaccountable]
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