Weapons of Mass Destruction WMD Antifa

Weapons of Mass Destruction
1
An electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attack could crash the American economy and bring virtually every industry to a standstill—such is the reliance of modern business upon the digital infrastructure. Thus, considering an EMP attack is something that government should take very seriously. As more and more of the world becomes dependent upon cyber infrastructure for the maintenance of other systems, the complexity of the security services of a country grows and intensifies. Is it possible therefore that there is an overreliance upon technology and that this overreliance can actually compromise a country’s progress and increase its risk of falling into ruin should a sudden attack like an EMP attack hit where it hurts most? Absolutely—and both state and non-state actors know that, which is why either one could conduct a high altitude EMP attack upon the US. The consequences would be devastating.
Non-state actors are just as likely as state actors to strike at the US, especially considering the age of proxy wars that have begun since 9/11, with various groups of mercenaries essentially fighting wars for host nations. Cyberwarfare may thus be trigged by a wider war among nations; or it may occur as a result of retaliation—blowback for American “adventurism” abroad, as some foreign nations see it. Regardless, an EMP attack upon the US should not be considered an unlikely scenario. The recent killing of the top Iranian General, for instance, is unlikely to go without some sort of major retaliation. That retaliation could come in the form of a transnational cyber attack on the nation’s energy infrastructure. After all, Iran has many non-state actors that it patronizes and can outsource an attack to. Much of the Arab community in the Middle East appears to harbor resentment towards the U.S. after two decades of war.
One question that one might ask is this: would the threat of cyber terrorism and cyber war upon the nation’s energy infrastructure be as great or exist at all if the U.S. were not so insistent upon attacking the energy infrastructures of other nations, from Venezuela to Syria to Iraq and so on? It seems that perhaps the real cause of transnational threats to America’s energy infrastructure might start right at home, with America’s own foreign policies. It might be that were America to adopt less of an intrusive and interventionist foreign policy, its own domestic infrastructure might be safer in the long run.
The protection of energy infrastructure is vital to a nation because energy is the backbone of a nation. That is why an EMP attack could be catastrophic. Without a functioning electrical, oil and gas pipelines, etc., a nation can quickly become plunged in darkness and chaos. Energy keeps a nation’s businesses and activities operational and therefore the economic and social life of a nation depends upon having a functioning energy infrastructure (Maras, 2014). Making sure that the “generation, transmission, distribution, and system operations” of the energy infrastructure are secure is a top priority of every nation that aims to survive in an increasingly hostile world (Wilshusen, 2012, p. 2).
Energy has to be constantly generated and delivered for a nation to function healthily. Stability and continuity are essential to the nation’s vitality and if there is ever any disruption in the generation or delivery of energy, the nation’s progress can be halted and the way of life of its people disrupted. One need only look at the situation in Venezuela last year when it experienced immense blackouts all over the country to see the effect that a loss of the energy infrastructure has on a country. Venezuela experienced food shortages, businesses closed, and crime broke out with gangs roving from place to place to try to find resources for themselves.
Energy security is needed to support the lives of people who depend upon electricity for work and livelihood. Everyone from farmers to accountants will use electricity in some meaningful way. Protecting the energy infrastructure is necessary to protect people and society in its most basic forms. A military must not only think about fighting foes abroad but also maintaining secure systems at home—including a secure energy system.
Utilities are needed to keep the country running. Hospitals and schools require utilities to keep patients and students supported. If the energy system is compromised, hospitals are unable to provide adequate healthcare. If a country has no energy security, it cannot provide all the services required by people when they are most needed—i.e., in a time of attack.
Even though most of the energy infrastructure of the U.S. is privately owned, there is still a need for the government to provide security for it. The reason for this is that energy is a vital resource as it supports so many services in the land. The government must defend the borders of its country to protect the people within. Securing the nation’s private energy infrastructure is no different in essence: the security of the people of the nation is at stake.
A question to consider is this: with the reliance up cyber technology for maintaining energy infrastructure, what is the likelihood that cyber warfare could be used to attack America’s energy infrastructure in the event that an international conflict breaks out in the coming years? What can the U.S. do to protect its network given that cyber attackers are always developing innovative new ways to hack and take over systems of targets?
2
The National Guard is a military unit that is part of the CBRN Response Enterprise. Its mission and capabilities in response to a CBRN attack focus mainly on search and rescue operations. For instance, if a bomb is used in an urban area, the National Guard will conduct a search and rescue operation to find people who are trapped beneath piles of rubble and help bring survivors of the attack back to the surface where they can be treated.
The resources the National Guard brings to a WMD response consists of a specialized, trained Fatality Search and Recovery Team that can assist local medical examiners in handling and processing victims recovered in the field of debris. The Guard also brings a Search and Extraction Team that is trained to search structures that have collapsed. The National Guard also brings Decontamination Teams that help wash personnel and equipment that need to be cleaned. Vehicles for transportation are made available, as are the following resources:
· Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs)
· CBRN Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs / CBRN TFs)
· Homeland Response Forces (HRFs)
· Title 10 units
Logistics support can also be provided as well as work with Hazardous materials operators.
However, there are some limitations to what the National Guard can do. For instance, the National Guard and Title 10 units are deployed, while Title 32 (state responders) making up approximately 55% of the response force (with a total force of more than 10,000 responders) are used as well (Christenson, 2015). There is a great deal of activity that can become bogged down because there is confusion about who is in charge and who is expected to do what. This was one of the main problems that occurred in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. No one knew what was expected of them and no one was communicating.
Some of the limitations of the National Guard with respect a CBRN attack are that 1) the Guard is going to be dealing with first responders, and 2) FEMA guidelines will be in place that have to be reckoned with. First responders on the scene are not necessarily going to know that a CBRN attack has occurred, but the FEMA guidelines provide a protocol to follow when it appears from external signs and reports that a terrorist attack may have occurred. First responders, therefore, whether they are local police, medical representatives, or fire departments must be trained in CBRN to know what steps to take, what reports to make, and how to effectively address the scene while waiting for federal and state support from the various agencies involved. The National Guard will arrive and may find an environment that is lacking in central command and will have to communicate effectively. A potential improvement here could be having in place communication lines ahead of time so that there is already a strategy for using the National Guard in search and rescue that local authorities are aware of.
First responders to a CBRN attack must be trained in CBRN and also have HAZMAT certification. Their job is to gather, assess and disseminate information, manage the scene, save and protect life, and engage in highly specialized activity, such as establishing levels of contamination and containing it if possible, providing medical services, and communicating strategy. First responders are going to necessarily include a wide range of teams from the local to the federal level, including local police, fire departments, health services, hospital personnel, crisis management teams, and so on (NATO, 2014). The National Guard should also be part of the mechanism so that search and rescue operations can be conducted more efficiently.
It is also unclear what extent the National Guard can be of use in the event of an EMP attack. This would be different from a nuclear attack, which would require search and rescue teams. Thus, while work is in progress to make sure that the private industry understands the stakes and what cyber security risks exist, there needs to be more planning in terms of how the National Guard can assist in the wake of an attack on America’s energy and cyber infrastructure. The Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (2019) notes that it works “closely with representatives of the energy sector, companies that manufacture energy technologies, the National Laboratories, universities, other government agencies, and other stakeholders.” If the National Guard can be brought in on these collaborative efforts, it would be a boon for the organization and for America. With so many different stakeholders working together to raise knowledge and create policies and protocols for implementation, the desired outcome may be achieved.
3
A terrorist group that might attack the US could be Antifa, which has sprung up in the US as a domestic terror group that aims to oppose the authoritarianism of the state government. Because the Trump Administration has especially raised the ire of members of Antifa, it is also quite likely that this group would plot a WMD attack that would hurt the Administration where it hurts—in the economy. The economy for President Trump has been one of his strongest points, at least prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, and once this outbreak is under control, it is likely to be back up and running as it was in the past. Business is what matters most for this Administration, but for those who oppose the Trump presidency this emphasis on and support for big business is seen as a marginalization of the everyday American who sees none of the profits of this business. In fact, the bailouts that are now on their way to major industries affected by the COVID-19 outbreak show the degree to which the government supports corporate socialism in which the profits remain private while the loses are socialized. This arrangement is what many believe is unfair and everyone from Bernie Sanders supports to Ron Paul supporters to Antifa members believe it so.
Antifa being an extremist group prone to violence would likely target the US in a way that hurts business and brings trade and traffic to a halt. The way to do that would be to attack one of America’s major ports using either a biological weapon or an explosive WMD, if one could be procured. Considering that WMDs appear to be in transit throughout the destabilized Middle East it is quite possible that ISIS could be contacted by Antifa members using social media, which is the most popular platform for terrorist groups to use to communicate with one another (Chatfield, Reddick & Brajawidagda, 2015; Freberg, Graham, McGaughey & Freberg, 2011; Klein, 2016). ISIS does have access to WMDs and could sell them to the highest bidder (Garellek, 2016). And as Johnston (2016) notes, chemical and biological attacks are always possible, as there is a long history of them, and even in the Middle East chemical attacks are said to have occurred. Clearly the resources for chemical weapons are available and can be both obtained and used.
Thus, if Antifa members wanted to attack the US, the best way for this group to do that would be to attack America’s business infrastructure. Because the infrastructure is trade dependent, attacking a major American port would be the best place to start. This would put America into a state of alert and bring trade to a halt. Hurting trade and disrupting the supply chain would set of a domino-like effect in which businesses can no longer produce or deliver goods, and the supply shock would then lead to a demand shock as lay-offs would result in consumption decreasing drastically. Thus, a random bombing of a city building is going to have a limited effect, but the bombing of a port that shuts down trade can have a destabilizing effect that brings down the much-hated Administration that Antifa agents are always denouncing.
The type of WMD could be biological, chemical or nuclear. Obtaining one of these WMDs is possible but the easiest to obtain is likely to be chemical, as that is what terrorist groups appear to have possession of in the Middle East. However, ISIS has numerous WMDs so if Antifa could obtain anything it would likely be effective. For the sake of argument, it could be suggested that Antifa might obtain a nuclear weapon that is brought into a port of entry, for example, into Miami Port in Florida. This nuclear weapon could then be detonated. The target is not only destroyed but the infrastructure is severely impaired around America as all ports are forced to go into lockdown and a state of high alert is called. Security measures would have to be developed and implemented but it would likely be months before a state of normalcy is restored. In that time, the economy could be destroyed and the Trump Administration sent packing in the upcoming election. This would be the ultimate goal of Antifa—the rejection of the current regime that is perceived as being too authoritarian and Fascistic. The bombing of a major port would secure that outcome because of the devastating effect it would have on trade, traffic, commerce, supply chains, demand, and the overall economy.
Thus, for Antifa to really attack the Trump Administration where it would most hurt the organization would have to hit industry and infrastructure and that means trade—showing that ports are vulnerable. If goods cannot be trafficked safely, the American economy would be hard hit. Already it is being seen what happens in the US when trade is disrupted thanks to the COVID-19 crisis. If that effect can be reproduced but on an even larger scale through the bombing of a major port, America would be thrown into a state of high alert.
4
Preventive measures that the US could implement to stop or mitigate the effects of this kind of attack would be to build up security at ports like the Miami port. Currently, the Port of Miami faces the same vulnerabilities as many other ports, mainly because of the increase in technological advancements that both improves maritime shipping and makes it more vulnerable to attack. Reliance upon networks creates systems that can be exploited by hackers, and the increase of travel because of better technology today means there are more opportunities for terror attacks. However, Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) provides real-time protection of coastal seaways and U.S. Seaports. Still, there are vulnerabilities and security strategies of the Port of Miami that can be discussed.
As Jennings (2006) points out, the Miami Point is the “cruise ship capital of the world” and for that reason it faces major terror threat risks. Security strategies employed by the Coast Guard include giving every cruise ship that arrives a Coast Guard escort, and divers search under ships for explosives while sea marshals on the bridge with the captain and pilot two sea marshals in the engine room and two more sea marshals aboard the ship provide additional security (Jennings, 2006).
Because the Port of Miami is a major port in the U.S. it represents a major target for terrorist attack. Anything that can cause a disruption to the way of life, to business, or to industry such as tourism is a potential target for terrorists and the Port of Miami represents each of those. Security strategies include using technology to examine cargo, tracking devices, and foreign port security protocols designed to prevent any containers from being put on board that might have hazardous materials.
The Port of Miami is also working with the Coast Guard to try out new technologies that can enhance safety. The Port of Miami and Port of Everglades have been piloting a CG-2 project entitled Project Hawkeye, for instance. Project Hawkeye focuses on using a system of sensors and cameras that can both track and identify vessels that are coming and leaving the port, that are in harbor and that are in coastal waters. The images captured from the cameras and analyzed at the Coast Guard command center and all anomalies whether from sensors or from the cameras are examined and assessed for threat or risk level. There is also an automatic identification system in place that is used to assess what constitutes normal port activities so that the Coast Guard can tell what is usual and what is unusual. All of this data allows the Coast Guard to provide added security for the port (Pate, Taylor & Kubu, 2007).
CG-2 provides real time protection of coastal seaways and U.S. seaports through numerous methods. First, it provides coordination among local and federal agencies so that joint operations can be conducted and intelligence and law enforcement shared and coordinated (Pate et al., 2007). Interagency operation centers are crucial to the provision of real-time security. This can be seen at the Port of Charleston, San Diego, the Port of Miami and the Port of Everglades among others.
Training, field exercises, models, simulations and games are also used in CG-2 to keep forces ready and able to execute on command. Training cannot be overstated as it equips personnel with the knowledge and experience necessary for making sure that ports and seaways are safe. Field exercises also allow for simulation exercises to take place that can keep systems strong and alert (Pate et al., 2007).
CG-2 also has a cyber strategy in place that aims to prevent cyber attacks on ports. Defending cyberspace and protecting infrastructure are vital ways in which the Coast Guard is seeking to protect seaports. Cyber vulnerabilities exist as a result of old infrastructure, poor education of end users, and lack of protocols to maintain a diligent and strong system. The U.S. Coast Guard has shown itself time and time again to be up for the task of responding to disasters. It showed it during Hurricane Katrina, and was the only agency to really have a true “spirit of mission” according to Samaan and Verneuil (2009).
Additional DHS agencies that CG-2 coordinates with include FEMA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Secret Service and the Transportation Security Administration. These groups should all be collaborating to stop or to reduce the risk of unsecured ports so that an attack by an organization like Antifa in collaboration with ISIS using a WMD could be reduced. Otherwise, the US risks facing a major catastrophe. Collaboration and communication are essential tools in the effort to prevent attacks on the US infrastructure, as so many stakeholders are included in the operation of a port and so many other stakeholders depend on ports being able to stay open and operational.
Securing America’s seaways and ports is a major job and the U.S. Coast Guard under the DHS helps to secure it by honing its monitoring and tracking capabilities with projects like Project Hawkeye implemented at the Port of Miami. It also coordinates between local, state and federal agencies to bring about a robust application of surveillance and oversight to ports and seaways. However, as technological advancements increase and more and more ports see more and more traffic, the risk of an attack or assault also increases. These attacks could come in the form of a hijacked ship controlled by remote as a result of a cyberattack; or they could come in the form of a container full of explosives. The U.S. Coast Guard works with sea marshals and divers to inspect ships, escort them to harbor, and keep order on the bridge and in the engine room should a physical threat occur. Keeping up these strategies and implementing them at other American ports would help to reduce the risk of a WMD attack that would destabilize American industry.
References
Chatfield, A. T., Reddick, C. G., & Brajawidagda, U. (2015, May). Tweeting propaganda, radicalization and recruitment: Islamic state supporters multi-sided twitter networks. In Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research (pp. 239-249).
Christenson, G. (2015). CBRN response. National Guard Bureau.
Freberg, K., Graham, K., McGaughey, K., & Freberg, L. A. (2011). Who are the social media influencers? A study of public perceptions of personality. Public Relations Review, 37(1), 90-92.
Garellek, A. (2016, March 4). The ISIS WMD Threat. The Cipher Brief. Retrieved from https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-east/isis-wmd-threat
Jennings, P. (2006). Miami port poses serious risks. Retrieved from https://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131634&page=1
Johnston, W.R. (2016, November 30). Summary of historical attacks using chemical or biological weapons. The Johnston Archive. Retrieved from http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/chembioattacks.html
Klein, A. (2019). From Twitter to Charlottesville: Analyzing the Fighting Words Between the Alt-Right and Antifa. International Journal of Communication, 13, 22.
Maras, M-H. (2014). Transnational Security. Florida: CRC Press.
NATO. (2014). Guidelines for first responders to a CBRN incident. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_08/20160802_140801-cep-first-responders-CBRN-eng.pdf
Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, And Emergency Response. (2019). Cybersecurity for Critical Energy Infrastructure. Retrieved from https://www.energy.gov/ceser/activities/cybersecurity-critical-energy-infrastructure
Pate, A., Taylor, B., & Kubu, B. (2007, November). Protecting America’s ports: promising practices. In A Final Report Submitted by the Police Executive Research Forum to the National Institute of Justice.
Samaan, J. L., & Verneuil, L. (2009). Civil–Military Relations in Hurricane Katrina: a case study on crisis management in natural disaster response. Humanitarian Assistance: Improving US-European Cooperation, Center for Transatlantic Relations/Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD/Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, 413-432.
Wilshusen, G. C. (2012). Cybersecurity: Challenges in Securing the Electricity Grid. Testimony Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate. Government Accountability Office, GAO-12-926T, http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592508.pdf