Though Gareth Evans identifies a continued need or justification for the responsibility to protect (R2P) by citing the existence of mass atrocities around the world even to this day,[footnoteRef:2] there is a contrary perspective that indicates the political and imperial manner in which the R2P doctrine can be used as a cover for hegemonic aims.[footnoteRef:3] Humanitarian intervention has been used as the excuse of the West, for instance, in various invasions around the world since 9/11 (but well before that as well) on up to the current crisis in Venezuela, over which the U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo and Sen. Rubio along with Ambassador Bolton have been using social media to promote R2P and justify regime change in the South American country in order to drum up support (both domestically and internationally) for American military action in the southern hemisphere. There are, of course, ethical considerations to be made when considering the R2P doctrine that proponents of the doctrine would rather not be discussed: these include the very real risk that even when R2P appears justified, “humanitarian intervention has negative consequences which overrule its noble intentions”[footnoteRef:4]—case in point being the situation of Libya today now serving as a failed state following the Western campaign to end the reign of Gaddafi. [2: Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities (Brookings Institute, 2008), 2.] [3: Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: the CIA, the White House and the Bay of Pigs." Journal of Latin American Studies 27, no. 1 (1995), 3.] [4: Jennifer Welsh, "Taking consequences seriously: Objections to humanitarian intervention." Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (2003), 8.]
Evans argues, however, that R2P “was designed for pragmatists rather than purists, with full knowledge of the messy reality of real-world state motivations and behavior.”[footnoteRef:5] By acknowledging that negative consequences can occur, Evans attempts to justify humanitarian intervention and the deaths of multitudes, the destruction of infrastructure, and the displaced masses (as seen in the Syrian conflict, with hundreds of thousands of immigrants streaming into Europe and creating a socio-political crisis there as well) by defining this as collateral damage and to be expected. The decidedly idealized concept of protecting people abroad that underscores R2P vanishes in an instant in Evans’ “pragmatic” view of intervention (typically accompanied by aerial bombardment that has little to do with protecting innocent people on the ground). Evans notes that the UN was quick to adopt the R2P doctrine...…invasions and chaotic occupations” are common outcomes of R2P in action.[footnoteRef:10] [7: Gareth Evans, “R2P: The Next Ten Years,” Oxford Handbook on The Responsibility to Protect 2015, 4.] [8: Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Security Studies, 489.] [9: Justin Morris, "Libya and Syria: R2P and the spectre of the swinging pendulum." International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2013), 1267.] [10: Ramesh Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15,” International Affairs 92: 2 (2016), 422.]

In the final analysis, R2P may have some noble ideals and principles at its foundation, but the outcomes, as shown by Thakur and the motives as shown by Gleijeses, indicate that these noble ideals and principles fall prey to the rather pragmatic sentiment of those who, like Evans, are willing to accept more than a few casualties in the ultimate quest to alleviate the suffering of the innocent overall. There is, at root, a rather utilitarian philosophical position being used by the advocates of R2P. Those who oppose it or at least view it from another perspective (the perspective of outcome) may also employ the utilitarian or even the deontological position to make their point. Those who focus on the actual outcome of R2P tend to take the…