Aristotle vs. Daniel Gilbert on Happiness: A Comparison

Introduction: Defining Happiness

What is happiness? Both the classical philosopher Aristotle and the psychologist Daniel Gilbert agree that it is not an easy concept to define. In fact, Gilbert goes so far as to argue that happiness cannot be defined. Instead, he argues that trying to define happiness is akin to trying to describe the color yellow to an alien that has never seen it. When describing either, we would not be able to provide a dictionary definition; we would instead point to different objects that are yellow or to the feelings that yellow inspires. The same is true of happiness. Asked to describe it, people might mention what makes them happy, or note that they experience other feelings — such as joy — alongside happiness. Gilbert thus treats happiness as highly subjective to every individual. He does, however, divide it into three types: "The word happiness is used to indicate at least three related things, which we might roughly call emotional happiness, moral happiness, and judgmental happiness" (31).

According to Gilbert, moral happiness corresponds to Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia. Gilbert writes that this form of happiness could be achieved because "for Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and even Epicurus, the only thing that could induce that kind of happiness was the virtuous performance of one's duties" (36). Gilbert also identifies a judgmental happiness, which he describes as "the happiness one gets from eating banana-cream pie" (39). Throughout the relevant chapter, however, Gilbert focuses primarily on emotional happiness, which he considers the most important and most difficult to grasp. As he notes, "Emotional happiness is a phrase for a feeling, an experience, a subjective state, and thus it has no objective referent in the physical world" (31).

In addition to being difficult to define and different for every person, Gilbert argues that a person's judgment of his or her own happiness can be distorted by the limits of human cognition. For instance, he contends that human memory makes it nearly impossible for a person to say with certainty that he or she is happier in one situation than another, because the person is almost always recalling at least one of those situations from memory, which is inherently fallible. Yet Gilbert still recognizes that certain prerequisites for happiness exist. He remarks that "happiness refers to feelings, virtue refers to actions, and those actions can cause those feelings. But not necessarily and not exclusively" (37). What Gilbert means is that people can be happy even if they have committed an immoral action — that action can still produce happiness in the person who commits it. Gilbert uses the following sentence as an illustration: "After a day spent killing his parents, Frank was happy" (37). While Gilbert acknowledges the repugnance of this statement, he also calls it "grammatical, well formed, and easily understood" (37), and asks whether, if Frank "says he is happy and looks happy, is there a principled reason to doubt him?" (37). On the other hand, Gilbert maintains that happiness cannot be attributed to those who are unconscious or to inanimate objects. His overall hypothesis is therefore that happiness is an individual experience understood only through a description of feelings and the events or objects that produce them; that it varies from person to person; that people can be mistaken about their own states of happiness due to the fallibility of memory; and that certain prerequisites must be in place for happiness to be possible at all.

Aristotle's Concept of Happiness

Aristotle, by contrast, finds happiness somewhat easier to characterize. For Aristotle, happiness is fundamentally a virtuous activity of the soul. As he writes, "Or is not this quite absurd, especially for us who say that happiness is an activity?" (19). He also frames happiness as the final goal of action: "Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action" (12). He discusses happiness as a mode of flourishing, writing that "we have practically defined happiness as a sort of living and faring well" (15). Aristotle's happiness is therefore virtuous in character and less connected to a person's emotions than to his or her actions. In his view, happiness is noble, and true happiness is closely associated with right and wrong. To be truly happy, one must be working for the greater good and performing virtuous actions. Happiness will result, at the conclusion of a person's life and deeds, if those actions have been good and right.

This elevated conception of happiness is, according to Aristotle, accessible primarily to the wise. While he writes that happiness is generally associated with "living well and doing well," those of "superior refinement" hold a different definition than those of lesser wisdom (Book I, 4). Those without this superior distinction see happiness as "some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or honour" (Book I, 4). These people — whom Aristotle calls "vulgar" — associate happiness with pleasure and therefore "love the life of enjoyment" (Book I, 4). The happiness pursued by "the refined," on the other hand, is the pursuit of honor. Yet Aristotle himself questions whether even this qualifies as true happiness. He acknowledges that the pursuit of honor can be superficial, since some seek it only to have grand honors bestowed upon them by powerful figures. Because Aristotle uses happiness and good interchangeably, this kind of honor-seeking does not seem to meet his standard for genuine happiness. He further notes that a life of honor-seeking can be associated with "lifelong inactivity" — a person can possess honor while asleep, or, as Gilbert would later argue, while in a coma. Aristotle ultimately reconsiders even his own definition when he acknowledges that someone pursuing virtue and the greater good might actually be living a life "so no one would call happy," one filled with "the greatest sufferings and misfortunes" (Book I, 5).

Like Aristotle, Gilbert acknowledges that happiness is a difficult term to define. But while Aristotle identifies two distinct perceptions of happiness — the superior mind's pursuit of honor or virtue, and the lesser mind's pursuit of pleasure — Gilbert argues that happiness is primarily an emotional state that is irreducibly individual. Gilbert does not locate happiness within a hierarchy of noble and base forms. For Gilbert, each person's happiness is equally valid, regardless of the moral quality of the actions that produced it. The person who feels happiness after performing a virtuous act experiences the same type of legitimate happiness as the person who feels happiness after a morally reprehensible one. The stimuli differ, but since happiness is a feeling rather than a virtue, the end result is the same.

Gilbert's Concept of Happiness

Gilbert also engages with the broader question of human purpose. As a psychologist, he turns not to Aristotle but to Freud, quoting Freud's suggestion that the question of man's function is likely unanswerable, and that one must instead look at what "men show in their behavior" to identify their ultimate goal. That goal, Gilbert argues, is happiness — everyone wants it (34). Yet this is precisely where his account diverges most sharply from Aristotle's. For Aristotle, happiness is a key by which to decipher the purpose of human life; for Gilbert, it is simply a behavioral phenomenon.

Gilbert illustrates the extreme subjectivity of happiness through a case study involving conjoined twins. From the perspective of Lori and Reba, they are happy despite — or perhaps simply independent of — their unusual condition. As Gilbert writes, "it does not mean that those who don't know what they're missing are less happy than those who have it" (50). He reinforces this point with a personal example involving his love of cigars: his wife's happiness without cigars stems from the fact that she has never tasted them and does not wish to. Her happiness is self-contained. This suggests that happiness is not an ideal standard against which individuals are measured, but rather a subjective experience each person defines for him or herself. Gilbert's research on happiness consistently emphasizes that it is "a subjective experience that is difficult to describe to ourselves and to others, thus evaluating people's claims about their own happiness is an exceptionally thorny business" (54).

Conclusion

Gilbert would therefore argue that Aristotle is mistaken not only about what happiness is but also about how one goes about attaining it. If happiness is not inherently linked to virtue or righteous living, then pursuing such a life would not produce happiness for everyone — only for those whose personal and emotional experience of happiness happens to respond to virtuous actions. By the same logic, Gilbert would argue that happiness cannot be taught. Because happiness is a personal, emotional experience, each person must discover for him or herself what produces it. Happiness may arise from moral actions, from pleasure, from recognition, from wealth, from health, or even — as Gilbert's more provocative examples suggest — from acts that others would find deeply troubling. Happiness is personal, and it can be achieved only through self-knowledge.

In summary, Aristotle and Gilbert arrive at fundamentally different accounts of happiness. Aristotle sees happiness as the highest virtue, the end of moral action, and the key to understanding human purpose. It is noble, connected to right and wrong, and possessed of an ideal form accessible to those of superior wisdom. Gilbert, by contrast, treats happiness as a subjective emotional experience that differs from person to person and that cannot be equated with virtue or morality. Both thinkers acknowledge weaknesses in their own positions — Aristotle admits that the pursuit of virtue can lead to suffering, while Gilbert recognizes that human memory makes reliable self-evaluation of happiness nearly impossible. Yet their fundamental conclusions remain far apart. Where Aristotle sees happiness as a result of virtuous activity, Gilbert sees it as a feeling produced by whatever events or objects a particular individual associates with that feeling. In essence, Aristotle sees happiness as a moral achievement, while Gilbert sees it as an irreducibly personal emotion.