Boston's Big Dig: Cost, Controversy, and Impact

Introduction: The Most Expensive Highway Project in the U.S.

Boston's Big Dig project is best known as the most expensive and arguably the most controversial highway project in the United States. The "Big Dig" describes the Central Artery/Tunnel Project (CA/T), a massive undertaking that rerouted the Central Artery (Interstate 93) — the main highway running through Boston — into a 3.5-mile tunnel beneath the city (Wikipedia, 2008). While the project was originally estimated to cost $2.8 billion when first proposed in 1985, it ended up costing over $14.6 billion according to 2006 estimates.

The Big Dig project included the construction of the Ted Williams Tunnel, the Leonard P. Zakim Bunker Hill Memorial Bridge, and the Rose Kennedy Greenway in the space vacated by the previous I-93 elevated roadway.

An article in the Boston Globe (2008) noted: "In all, the project will cost an additional $7 billion in interest, bringing the total to a staggering $22 billion, according to a Globe review of hundreds of pages of state documents. It will not be paid off until 2038."

By the time the project was handed off as "completed," it had resulted in exorbitant costs, criminal charges, injuries, and death (Wikipedia, 2008). The Massachusetts Attorney General ordered the contractors involved in the project to refund taxpayers $108 million for failing to deliver work of acceptable quality. On January 23, 2008, Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff, the company responsible for managing the project, agreed to pay $407 million in restitution for its poor oversight of subcontractors and accepted responsibility for the death of a motorist (Wikipedia, 2008).

Origins and Purpose of the Big Dig

The Big Dig project was designed to relieve Boston residents of the traffic problems caused by congestion on the Central Artery (I-93), an elevated six-lane highway that cut through downtown Boston (Wikipedia, 2008). When the highway was built in 1959, only 75,000 cars used the road on a daily basis. However, by 1990, this number had more than doubled. City planners predicted that by 2010, Boston residents would be subjected to up to 16 hours of daily traffic jams. Something needed to be done.

The Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), which did not feel sufficiently experienced to handle the scope and magnitude of the CA/T Project, hired Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff to provide preliminary designs, manage design consultants and construction contractors, oversee the project, and provide consulting services (LeBlanc, 2007). Some MTA employees were sent to work alongside Bechtel/Parsons employees in an integrated project organization.

The Big Dig replaced the city's elevated downtown expressway with a two-mile, twin-decked tunnel and opened over twenty-seven acres of previously inaccessible land to public use (Curtin and Witter, 2005). This helped reunite a city that had been divided by an aboveground highway system. While the public is the main beneficiary of the project, tangible and quantifiable benefits also extend to individuals and business entities.

For example, two cylindrical office towers — One and Two International Place — were constructed in Boston's financial district in the late 1980s (Curtin and Witter, 2005). Until the spring of 2004, these structures stood within forty feet of the elevated highway. The offices of several of Boston's most prominent firms overlooked congested traffic, and occupants below floor six had views of rusting steel beams. Today, those same firms overlook public parks, a greenway, botanical gardens, and open space featuring public art. The noise and ugliness of traffic has been moved underground.

This outcome reflects the project's roots in the givings theory, which argues that "instead of the government compensating the landowner for that which was taken, the landowner should pay the government for that which was given" (Curtin and Witter, 2005).

Political, Financial, and Engineering Obstacles

The Big Dig project faced significant political, financial, environmental, and engineering obstacles from the outset. According to Wikipedia (2008), "the downtown area through which the tunnels were to be dug was largely landfill, and included existing subway lines as well as innumerable pipes and utility lines that would have to be replaced or moved." To make matters worse, tunnel workers encountered several unexpected geological and archaeological barriers, ranging from glacial debris to sunken ships lying within the reclaimed land.

Despite these barriers, the project was approved in 1991, and federal environmental clearances were granted in 1994. In 2003 — five years late and billions over budget — the massive elevated Central Artery was replaced by a tunnel routing Interstate 93 under downtown Boston (Stern, 2003). However, the city was not exactly celebrating.

The economic plan for the project called for improved traffic flow in the central city, better access to the underutilized South Boston Seaport area, and improved urban design and quality of life in neighborhoods that had been cut off or overshadowed by the elevated highway structure. The excavation, tunneling, and road and bridge work was built through unstable landfill, nine railroad tracks, glass and steel office towers, and many fragile older brick buildings — all without destroying historical structures or significantly disrupting the city's business activity.