This paper examines BP's strategic management and communication practices in the context of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Drawing on analyses by Borison and Hamm, Bright, Peel, and Tsoukas, the paper argues that BP's single-minded pursuit of competitive leadership and cost efficiency caused it to subordinate both risk management and stakeholder communication to its growth strategy. The paper explores Shell's earlier conflict with Greenpeace over the Brent Spar disposal as a comparative case, then details how BP mishandled claimant communications and failed to formally assess probabilistic risk. It concludes that the Deepwater Horizon disaster was a foreseeable "white swan" event, not a true black swan, and that strategic risk management must never be subordinated to growth ambition.
The paper demonstrates source synthesis: rather than summarizing each source separately, the author weaves Borison and Hamm's strategic risk framework, Bright's competitive strategy analysis, and Peel's communication critique into a single unified argument. This technique shows how multiple perspectives can reinforce one central claim — that BP's growth-first strategy crowded out all other management priorities.
The paper opens with a framing introduction that establishes the central debate (risk management vs. strategic management failure). It then moves chronologically and thematically: BP's pre-spill strategy, a comparative Shell/Greenpeace communication case, BP's post-spill communication failures, and a dedicated risk strategy section. The conclusion returns to the "white swan" metaphor to deliver the paper's core lesson for the broader business community. Each section builds on the last, maintaining logical momentum throughout.
Risk is probably one of the most important components of company management, especially in an industry where the potential for disaster — foreseen or otherwise — is high. This is particularly true for the oil industry, and especially in light of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, widely regarded as one of the worst environmental disasters in human history. While some consider this disaster the result of a risk management shortcoming, others have taken their inquiries deeper and concluded that, in truth, the issue concerns strategic management. As an oil company, BP's strategic management practices before the spill focused primarily on increasing profit while decreasing the investment required to reach that goal. Those who focus on this component argue that the company's strategic management should have been more clearly delineated in terms of risk, and that a basic lack of such focus most likely resulted in the disaster. Either way, BP's strategic focus both before and after the event — as well as its communication strategy with concerned parties and stakeholders — appears to be in need of modification if the company is serious about redeeming its image and profitability in the industry.
According to Bright (2011), BP's stated direction was to achieve "competitive leadership" by means of "cash costs, capital efficiency, and margin quality." The company pursued this goal relentlessly for five years, after which it established industry leadership with the lowest finding and development cost — $12 per barrel of oil equivalent — by 2009. Even during the recession, between 2007 and 2009, the company's production costs declined, and as a result it was able to pay higher dividends to its stakeholders. To maintain this performance, it was necessary for BP to maintain a strategic focus on stakeholder and results management.
According to Bright (2011), the specific form this strategy took involved a balance among proactive (P), reactive (R), and accommodative (A) strategies. A further significant role was also ascribed to BP's leveraging of its skills and resources, with a focus on corporate learning and an ability to channel that learning into its resources and capabilities effectively. Indeed, this focus could significantly influence BP's ability to mitigate disaster and its relationship with those affected, as well as with the rest of the world, from which the company received considerable criticism after the event. One strategic component that many critics believe received insufficient management attention from BP is its management of safety and compliance — a point that becomes particularly significant when examining the company's strategic focus after the oil spill.
It is little wonder that Borison and Hamm refer to the oil spill as a "white swan covered in crude oil" (Borison and Hamm, 2010, p. 7). With effective strategic risk management, the oil spill would likely not have occurred to the extent it did — less severe risks would have been identified and mitigated along the way.
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