Deontology vs. Consequentialism: What Makes Actions Right?

Introduction: Deontological and Teleological Ethics

Deontological ethics stems from the notion that one is obliged by duty to behave in a "moral" manner. There are a number of theories that range from moral absolutism to Divine Command theory that may be described as deontological, but each differs in its approach to "morality" even though each recognizes an "obligation" to attend to a set of rules. In contrast to deontological ethics are teleological ethics, which gauge the morality of one's actions by their consequences. A number of theories may be classified as teleological, such as utilitarianism, pragmatism, and consequentialism. This paper explores the ideas behind deontological and teleological ethics and argues that an approach to "morality" must observe at least some objective standard — and that it is this objective standard that makes an action "right," not merely the dutiful adherence to the standard or the "right" consequence of an action.

Jacob Ross argues from the standpoint of the classical intuitionist, who holds that moral truths are as real as mathematical truths: he asserts that both objectively exist and that neither can be changed simply because one's subjective will desires it to change. While this notion serves as a framework for the question of what makes actions "right," other considerations must be observed before "rightness" can truly be gauged. While a mathematical equation such as 2+2=4 is simple enough to understand, it is nothing compared to a complex mathematical equation. Similarly, moral law contains truths that might be simply stated, but understanding them requires understanding the simpler laws that surround them. Just as one cannot understand 2+2=4 without having a concept of addition, one cannot understand "rightness" without having a concept of transcendence. For this reason, Ross makes an appropriate starting point, since his school of thought stretches back to such classical intuitionists as Plato.

Applying Context: Ross and the Objective Standard

Ross argues that deontological theories provide more and better reasons for what constitutes "rightness" than teleological theories do. He asserts that consequentialism, for example, is simply a product of deontological ethics, and that without deontology, consequentialism simply cannot exist. Ross's point is rooted in an objective standpoint of ethics and morality. He views morality as an unchangeable law, something that is "imprinted" on the world, just as much as the law of gravity is.

Essentially, Ross asserts that "rightness" has an intrinsic value all its own. Such a notion agrees, conversely, with the idea that other actions can be intrinsically evil — evil in and of themselves. Furthermore, it is Ross's contention that these views of morality can be intuited. However, there is no narrowness to his argument, for he also asserts that an action's moral status depends upon a number of considerations, such as an action's consequences (its teleological dimension) as well as prior circumstances (its deontological dimension). In a sense, Ross reconciles deontological theory with teleological theory.

Ross suggests that without such deontological theories as Divine Command theory — a law of morality placed on human action by a law-giver — there can be no objectively real system of morality, much less a system that can be subjectively altered. If Divine Command theory judges "right" actions according to an objective standard stipulated by God, and a consequentialist judges "rightness" based on results, Ross raises the fundamental question: how does the consequentialist form an idea of "rightness" in the first place?

Does much of modern ethical theory approach the question of "rightness" without appeal to a higher, universal, transcendental, or objective notion of "rightness"? Not necessarily. The question of ideal "rightness" is still debated, as can be seen in the differences expressed by generalists and particularists, or in the hybrid theory of Scheffler. Still, what characterizes much of the debate is a lack of certainty — a reluctance to separate the subjective and objective and insist that the objective is knowable by the intellect. This lack of certainty may be, in historical terms, a result of the Hegelian dialectic. Whatever its causes in individual cases, however, this paper can make no broader claims. The point is that an objective essence appears to exist, but that subjective perception of that essence seems to make it impossible to know what it is. Such a conclusion would suggest that "rightness" is forever to be debated and cannot be known beyond what pragmatism or absolutism permits. But is this truly the case?

Plato explores the idea of "rightness" in the Phaedo and Meno, and so too does Scheffler in "The Defence of Agent-Centred Restrictions." Essentially, Scheffler asks whether there is "a principled rationale for agent-centred restrictions" (83). Without entering into a full discussion of what absolutists and non-absolutists suggest about agent-centred restrictions, one can at least assert that if Scheffler and Socrates are correct in asserting that intuition — or "recollection," as Plato calls it — is a valid faculty, then truth and "rightness" can objectively exist and must not be merely the result of subjective perceptions.

Intuition and Agent-Centred Restrictions

The agent-centred restrictionist, for instance, could argue as Plato does that the understanding or recognition of truth in reality is derived from the "recollection" of truth in the soul, upon which a moral code is imprinted, which in turn points to the existence of a code-giver or God. In other words, the recognition of truth points to the objective existence of "rightness." A teleological theorist, on the other hand, may reject this proposition by arguing that the recognition of truth is not dependent on "recollection" — which invites merely subjective analysis — but is rather "self-evident," as Locke illustrated in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding during the Age of Enlightenment, a period from which much of modern ethical theory flows, from Kant to Scheffler.

The modern question of "rightness" may therefore be approached from the rather ancient perspective of "intuition." The ability to intuit agent-centred restrictions, as Scheffler suggests, can be taken as a rationale for the existence of "rightness" beyond the subjective faculty of the mind. Such a conclusion is not irrational, as consequentialists might argue, but is actually quite rational when considered in the light of first causes.

Here, it is possible to suggest that for cultures to develop and progress, humanity must operate for the "common good," which stands in direct contrast to operation for the Self — the idea that underpins the subjectivist ethical theories of teleological systems. The "common good" points toward the acceptance of virtue ethics, but barring a full exploration of that system here, one can assert that "rightness" is a universal concept applicable to all of humanity. Such an assertion is not to suggest that there are no exceptions to the universal "rule," for experience shows that exceptions exist for nearly every rule. What is needed in this discussion is a sense of moderation — a reluctance to fly from one extreme, such as absolutism, to another, such as Kantianism.