Plato's Meno and Laches: Defining Virtue and Courage
This paper responds to a series of questions on Plato's Meno and Laches, tracing Socrates' methodological insistence that virtue must be defined before it can be taught. The paper examines why Meno's first definition is too scattered and his second too general, then explores why Plato believed inquiry into virtue must begin with a universal definition. It also considers how moral traditionalists might object to this approach, arguing that they prioritize observable deeds over abstract definitions, while Socrates' deductive method ultimately reaches an impasse because no single definition proves fully all-encompassing.
- Socrates on Why Virtue Cannot Be Taught: Socrates lacks a definition of virtue
- Meno's First Definition: Too Scattered: Meno's definition is too varied and fragmented
- Meno's Second Definition: Too General: Ruling as virtue fails for slaves and children
- Why Plato Begins with Definition: Both dialogues demand universal definitions first
- The Moral Traditionalist Objection: Traditionalists judge virtue by deeds not definitions
- Socrates' Deductive Method and Its Limits: Deductive approach ends in philosophical impasse
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What makes this paper effective
- Each short answer is precisely focused, identifying a specific logical flaw in Meno's definitions (too scattered, then too general) without over-explaining.
- The extended essay question (Q4) draws meaningfully on both dialogues, showing how the Laches reinforces Socrates' definitional method through the example of battlefield courage.
- The paper acknowledges the internal tension in Socrates' own approach — that the deductive search for definitions ends in aporia — giving the argument intellectual honesty.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper uses textual comparison across two Platonic dialogues to build a cumulative argument. Rather than treating Meno and Laches as separate works, the student shows how both texts illuminate Socrates' conviction that moral inquiry must begin with definition, and both reveal why that method faces resistance from those who judge virtue by action rather than understanding.
Structure breakdown
The paper is organized as a short-answer set followed by an extended essay response. The first three sections answer discrete comprehension questions, each identifying a precise problem with Meno's proposed definitions. The final extended section (Q4) synthesizes both dialogues to address broader philosophical and methodological questions, closing with a critique of the deductive approach itself. This structure moves from textual detail to philosophical analysis.
Socrates on Why Virtue Cannot Be Taught
When Meno opens by asking whether virtue is taught, Socrates declines to answer directly. His reason is that he cannot address the question because he does not know what virtue actually is — a condition he claims is equally true of everyone in Athens. Without a definition of virtue, any attempt to teach it would be groundless.
Meno's First Definition: Too Scattered
The first definition Meno offers is too scattered. He defines virtue as a variety of qualities that differ according to a person's role in society: for men, it is managing the city; for women, managing the home; and for children, it is obedience. Socrates objects that because all human beings are fundamentally human beings, there should be a single, unified definition of virtue applicable to all of them, not a collection of role-specific descriptions.
Meno's Second Definition: Too General
Meno's second attempt suffers from the opposite problem: it is too general. He proposes that virtue is "to rule," but Socrates finds this unacceptable because it cannot apply universally. It would not constitute virtue for a child or for a slave. Indeed, if a slave were "virtuous" under this definition — that is, if a slave ruled — he would by definition no longer be a slave. The definition therefore fails on its own terms.
Why Plato Begins with Definition
According to Socrates, virtue cannot be taught until we know what it is. This same concern runs through the Laches, where there is considerable debate about how to educate youth in what constitutes military valor. Definitions of courage drawn from commonly accepted wisdom tend to be too narrow and serve primarily the interests of the state — for example, the idea that standing one's ground in battle and showing valor in combat are the ultimate virtues.
In the Meno, Socrates similarly observes that different classes of society are assigned different tasks at which they are expected to excel, yet he does not believe these tasks constitute virtue in any meaningful universal sense. A general definition of virtue must be arrived at that holds for all people. In the same way, a general definition of valor must be found — one that is not valid only for soldiers.
The Laches dialogue reinforces this point by highlighting that people who demonstrably show courage often cannot produce a satisfactory definition of courage. Laches himself acknowledges that merely knowing something does not mean one can embody that virtue: many people who are good teachers are not brave on the battlefield. Laches states that he listens to Socrates precisely because Socrates has distinguished himself in battle as well as in argument.
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