Rawls vs. Hampshire: Justice, Liberalism, and Conflict

Introduction: Two Visions of Political Justice

Very few alternatives to the prevalent utilitarianism dominant in most of the Western world have emerged and made any significant impact. The theories of John Rawls, however, have made an important contribution to political philosophy. Though not unanimously agreed upon, they have led to a revival in the academic study of the discipline. His work has provoked debate among economists, legal scholars, political scientists, sociologists, and theologians alike. His Theory of Justice and the subsequent additions and modifications to that hypothesis—in the form of Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples—constitute a comprehensive and detailed proposal that evolved over decades.

The Justice as Conflict theory put forward by another eminent scholar, Stuart Hampshire, deviates from Rawls's premise. His logically meticulous arguments are persuasive and thought-provoking.

Both views describe systems of political existence that their authors deem ideal. Both are grounded in concepts of democratic ideals, equality, and justice. Whereas Rawls sought to adapt his vision to reality by perfecting relations among opposing "peoples," Hampshire seeks to formulate ideal "social institutions that mediate between contending parties" (Hampshire, 2001).

Rawls's Theory of Justice and Its Core Principles

The Theory of Justice was developed by Rawls because he disagreed with the unquestioned utilitarian consensus that the rights of a minority could be forfeited if doing so led to a greater good. He put forward a theory according to which a "just social contract," or system of society, is one that forms judgments without the bias of personal interest (Rawls, 1993). This condition, according to Rawls, would be best achieved from "behind a veil of ignorance" as to the "original position"—that is, without knowledge of one's financial situation, creed, religion, state of health, or any other personal characteristic (Rawls, 1993).

Rawls's premise was that such a system would lead society to choose "justice as fairness." This would be apparent in the two main principles he felt embodied the Principles of Justice. The first was the Liberty Principle, which grants each person the most extensive system of rights and freedoms that can be accorded equally to everyone (Rawls, 1993). Rawls elaborated these basic human freedoms to include freedom of speech, conscience, peaceful assembly, and due process of law (Rawls, 1993). Most of them reflected—or were identical to—actual democratic ideals. According to Rawls, these rights were sacrosanct and could not be violated under any circumstances (Rawls, 1993). In his original proposal, Rawls declared that the Liberty Principle was absolute and of greater priority than his second formulated principle, the Difference Principle (Rawls, 1993).

He recognized the existence of pluralism in society, and the Difference Principle allowed for economic and social inequalities as long as they benefited all of society, especially its most disadvantaged members (Rawls, 1993). He further clarified that all economically and socially privileged positions must be open to all people equally (Rawls, 1993). Thus, unlike the utilitarian position, Rawls was unwilling to allow society to trample an individual's basic rights, even with the justification that doing so benefits the majority. He was not, however, opposed to granting extra benefits to individuals for the same purpose.

These two principles were intended to form the basis of the political and economic structure of Rawls's ideal society. In view of the pluralism and diversity of society, however, Rawls had to question whether a social structure built on his two principles of justice was feasible. In answering this question, he developed the idea of "overlapping consensus"—that is, agreement on justice as fairness among citizens who hold different religious, ethical, and philosophical views (Rawls, 1993).

Political Liberalism and the Concept of Public Reason

This overlapping consensus would stem from what Rawls believed was intrinsic to Political Liberalism: "public reason" (Rawls, 1993). In his Theory of Justice, he had elaborated a system encompassing issues of morality and justice generally but had failed to allow for a distinctly political conception of justice. The distinction between the two was worked out in his book Political Liberalism (Rawls, 1993). A general or comprehensive moral doctrine "includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct…" (Rawls, 1993, p. 175), whereas a political conception of justice encompasses the moral framework on which to base the structure of a democratic society. Political conception of justice is influenced by the "public political culture" of the society in question and does not necessarily reflect the general or comprehensive doctrines followed by its people (Rawls, 1993).

It is the code of behavior people follow in their role as citizens of a structured society, as opposed to free individuals (Rawls, 1993). In Political Liberalism, Rawls outlines a democratic society that advocates his principles of liberty, believing that all people in their social arrangement are equals who therefore practice tolerance and moderation in their attitudes toward their claims on society, toward how to live, and toward questions such as the existence of God (Rawls, 1993).