This paper examines John Rawls's political philosophy of justice as developed in his major works, tracing its intellectual roots in Enlightenment social contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau. The paper explains Rawls's original position and the veil of ignorance as a framework for rational decision-making in a just society, then analyzes the Difference Principle and its relationship to distributive justice. It further contrasts utilitarian and deontological ethical frameworks as they relate to Rawls's two principles of justice, and concludes with a critical evaluation of whether the Difference Principle holds up against real-world evidence from welfare societies in the United States and Europe.
In his theory of justice, political philosopher John Rawls examines the idea of social justice and the individual rights of persons by redefining over 200 years of the American experience. In general, he considers the manner in which the Founding Fathers were correct in basing their views on previous social contract theorists like Locke and Rousseau. There is a clear linkage between John Locke and Rawls that validates the ideas of liberalism within American society. Rawls notes that the American experience extended the concept of justice far beyond what any of the Enlightenment philosophers ever hoped (Rawls, 1957).
Rawls (1921–2002), an American philosopher who focused on moral and political philosophy, believed that the principles of justice are the models that rational, free individuals would choose as the basic terms of cooperation within their society. He called this position the original position — the most favorable choice for an individual situation. This idea encompassed two overall principles of justice: (1) they must match what an informed individual requires in a free state regarding various circumstances, and (2) they would most likely be chosen in the original position by rational individuals. In effect, the original position should engender a moral stance on justice that is both workable and intuitive (Rawls, 2001).
Rawls's original position is a hypothetical presumption that deals with the way people view situations relevant to their circumstances. Groups set tasks to maximize agreements about the political and economic structure of their society so that they can live together in harmony — what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. This veil is not negative but informative: each person lacks certain knowledge about their own position. As Rawls states, "no one knows his place in society, his class, position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like" (Rawls, 1999, p. 118).
To illustrate with a relevant example: in an imaginary society, one may or may not be wealthy, intelligent, physically adept, or born into a preferred class. An individual may occupy any position in that society once the veil is lifted. The idea is that all parties must consider society from the perspective of all its members — from the better off, to the middle range, to the worst off. This thought experiment is designed to ensure that the principles chosen to govern society are genuinely fair, since no one can tailor rules to favor their own predetermined situation.
The Difference Principle is part of the broader idea of distributive justice. We know that the wealth of a nation is not fixed but can vary according to industrialization, work effort, expertise, and natural resources. The Difference Principle is grounded in Rawls's two principles of justice: (1) each individual has an equal claim to a set of basic rights and liberties — rights that, like Locke and Rousseau held, are natural and not granted by any authority; and (2) social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: they must be attached to positions open to all, and they must benefit the least advantaged members of society (Rawls, 1999).
The "difference" is that, theoretically, those with varying degrees of income will still work toward the overall benefit of society, because the greater the overall benefit to society, the greater the chance that everyone will share in it. This might be understood as a version of the trickle-down effect — the more wealth entering the top level eventually benefits the lower levels as well.
"Comparing utilitarian and deontological ethical frameworks"
"Welfare state evidence challenges Rawls's assumptions"
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