This paper examines the relationship between American hegemony and the spread of liberal democratic norms in the international system. It argues that while the U.S. has historically anchored liberal institutions and values globally, the rise of non-liberal powers like China and emerging economies in the BRICS bloc does not necessarily threaten liberalism's endurance. The paper traces liberalism's definition, explores the concept of hegemony and American preponderance, and analyzes whether non-liberal states can coexist within or adapt to liberal frameworks. It concludes that a multipolar world need not abandon liberal norms, provided the U.S. shifts toward cooperative institutional strengthening rather than unilateral dominance.
The United States has held the reins of the global power structure for roughly half a century. After the end of World War II, the United States emerged as the world's sole superpower and used this position to foster its own self-interest, which was largely tied to the liberal values in which it was founded. From the result of the Cold War through today, the United States has been in the position to craft and guide the liberal institutions that operate the contemporary global system.
Yet a number of challenges loom for the U.S. hegemonic liberal system. Non-liberal powers are growing in population and monetary power. Alliances are being formed that stand to apply pressure for change in the current global order, such as the intense growth within countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and the unification of South and Central American countries, among other examples.
It is entirely possible that the U.S. liberal order will lose its hegemonic position in the global system. Some believe that this transition will end relative stability in world affairs, while others believe that the impacts of the transition will be smooth and inconsequential. This analysis will provide background information and attempt to frame these developments by first outlining what liberalism actually consists of. It will then argue that a liberal world order without the U.S. in the hegemonic position is not only possible, but given current circumstances, this result is probable.
Liberal theory poses one of the most formidable challenges to dominant realism theory and began to take hold after World War II and the birth of the United Nations (Dunne 2). Some intellectuals have provided vast theoretical justifications for why liberal values represent an ideal position for the international community. Yet the definition of liberalism seems to elude anything concrete. Still, it is apparent that the last few generations have seen the international community build institutions based on liberal principles that operate multilaterally throughout the Western world (Keohane).
Generally, liberalism is thought to contain a four-dimensional definition (Dunne 2): First, the population is thought to be judicially equal and have rights to education, a free press, and religious tolerance. Next, the legislative function of government must be representative and accountable to the people. Property rights are another component, and finally, the economic system should be based on a market system built upon individual choice. However, these dimensions are heavily debated, and no consensus on a definition of liberal values has emerged. In a 2012 conference questioning the future of liberal internationalism, most participants agreed that liberal internationalism consisted of, at minimum, an open system of rules designed to protect interests and secure equities (Friedman 3).
At the same time, the United States and the power it exercises on the world stage have not always followed liberal values. For example, some have stated that U.S. leaders, such as George W. Bush, have upset the system and contributed to a potential liberal-order-shattering "crisis of authority" (Betts 2). Yet transgressions that challenge the integrity of a liberal system do not necessarily represent the system as a whole. There is a wide range of competing perspectives ranging from social welfare and social democratic to laissez-faire (Doyle 207–208).
The distribution of power among states is hardly a static phenomenon. The unevenness of power on the world stage is apparent and dynamic. Some states rise steadily while others decline (Nye 157). The concept of hegemony is typically used when one superpower has enough power to act unilaterally and exercise its will. Yet this concept is actually rather vague and subjective. For example, there is no consensus on what level of inequality between the sole superpower and other nations constitutes hegemony.
Hegemony does not necessarily imply that the world is unipolar. A unipolar world with one superpower does not require competition with other significant major powers. A bipolar system would include two primary superpowers, such as Russia and the U.S. before the end of the Cold War. A multipolar system would include many nations or coalitions that must cooperate to resolve international issues. However, the current state of world power represents something of a hybrid in which the U.S. dominates but still contends with several major powers in a uni-multipolar system (Huntington 36).
Some have described the period in the twenty-first century as a multipolar system in which various sources of power distributed among several actors are able to have a say in world affairs (Haas 44). The major powers in the world today—China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia, and the United States—collectively account for eighty percent of world military spending and about seventy-five percent of the world's economic activity. Furthermore, numerous private organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), individual cities, and regional power centers throughout the globe wield significant influence (Haas 44–45).
Despite the complexity in the current distribution of power, the United States is still considered to hold a hegemonic position. The United States maintains hundreds of active military bases worldwide. Some estimates indicate that the U.S. has over 737 active bases globally, worth an estimated $127 billion (Johnson). Furthermore, the United States spends almost as much money on defense as the total spending on intelligence and military operations from the rest of the world combined (Mataconis). From a military power perspective, the U.S. maintains a substantial advantage. It also possesses other advantages in culture, society, and technology, though it no longer has the world's largest economy in real terms.
After the end of World War II, the United States emerged as the world's sole superpower and used this position to advance interests largely tied to the liberal values in which it was founded. It was during this period that America's desire to create a congenial world order—open, stable, and friendly—transformed into an agenda for constructing a liberal hegemonic order (Ikenberry 79). After the Cold War and through today, the United States has been positioned to craft and guide the liberal institutions that operate the contemporary global system.
After World War II, the U.S. used its hegemonic preponderance to build a series of institutions based on liberal principles. It created a system that incorporated open markets, cooperative security, multilateral institutions, social bargains, and democratic community (Ikenberry 79). Such institutions include, but are not limited to, the Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and United Nations, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Langridge 2). Much of the advantage that allowed for the construction of these institutions was founded on geography and the fact that the United States has no bordering threats and could station military forces overseas without worrying about domestic attack (Kagan 13).
"China, India, Brazil emerging; some already embrace liberal democracy"
"Liberalism is Western-origin concept with varying regional interpretations"
Even in the United States, there is no consensus on what liberalism entails. It has become a derogatory term, causing those who believe in traditionally liberal values to identify with other titles such as progressive. Bill Clinton, for example, avoided being labeled as liberal during his presidential campaign by positioning himself closer to the political center (Hofrenning 82). The concept of liberalism is subjective at best, and there are many interpretations within the U.S. itself, let alone the rest of the world.
The liberal order is not dependent on U.S. hegemony and will likely endure in a multipolar world. Most countries in the BRICS bloc that have expanding populations and economies already incorporate many commonly conceived liberal values. Even China has incorporated many aspects of capitalism associated with liberalism. However, with foresight of a transition in global power distribution, the U.S. has several options.
The U.S. should cooperate and become a full participant in strengthening international institutions tasked with upholding liberal principles, such as the United Nations, and should use its current leverage to do so. By adopting this strategy, the U.S. would undoubtedly sacrifice some of its power in the short term and absolute autonomy through the creation of treaties and engagement in fairer trade. However, such a scenario could create a more concrete and enduring role in strengthened liberal institutions that supersede the current situation.
Although such a transition might accelerate the decline of the American "empire," its imperial holdings, and its absolute hegemony, this course of action would help secure the liberal order. Furthermore, cooperative behavior would restore much of the legitimacy the U.S. has lost in the eyes of the world, and legitimacy is essential to exert influence. The International Monetary Fund recently revealed that the U.S. is no longer the world's biggest economy, and the implications of a changing international sphere are evident (Arends).
The rise of non-state actors foreshadows the growing irrelevance of the concept of state hegemony. If a multipolar world is coming, in which the concentration of power is highly fragmented and the U.S. is no longer the leading power across all measures, it would behoove the U.S. to develop cooperative relationships with the global community and safeguard the liberal legacy by empowering global and regional institutions. Supporting the rise of emerging liberal norms—even if it costs some ability to make unilateral decisions with complete impunity—would strengthen the system. Empires rise and fall. Their legacies can endure. Global norms will continue to evolve, but the U.S. still has the influence to ensure that future institutions will represent the next generation of liberal values.
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