Macau's 1999 Transfer of Sovereignty to China: A History

Introduction

"There is no question that it harbors in its hidden places all the riffraff of the world, the drunken shipmasters; the flotsam of the sea, the derelicts, and more shameless, beautiful women than any port in the world. It is hell. But to those who whirl in its unending play, it is one haven where there is never a hand raised or a word said against the play of the beastliest emotions that ever blacken the human heart."
— Hendrik de Leeuw, who visited Macau in the 1930s and wrote Cities of Sin

The epigraph above reflects the dichotomous views that have persisted in the West concerning the tiny enclave of Macau over the years. Worldwide attention was focused on the United Kingdom when its lease on Hong Kong expired in 1997 and the territory reverted to the People's Republic of China (PRC), but far less attention was paid to the transfer of Macau's Portuguese sovereignty to the PRC two years later. To help determine what transpired during this transition and its implications for the people of Macau and the PRC, this paper provides a narrative account drawing on primary resources, followed by an analysis and interpretation of the transfer to Chinese control drawing on relevant secondary resources. A summary of the research and its significant findings are then presented in the conclusion.

Events, Trends, and Perceptions Prior to the Transition

Many people in the West had never even heard of Macau prior to its transition to the People's Republic of China in 1999. A report by Milton filed two years before the event suggests that this lack of awareness and financial success was partly the fault of the British themselves. Milton observes that, "Ever since Portuguese mariners landed on this tropical peninsula in the South China Sea some 400 years ago, Macau has struggled — and failed — to make its fortune. And whose fault is that? Yours and mine, I'm afraid. No sooner had the place begun to make money than the Brits pitched up (along with several dozen gunboats) in Hong Kong" (74).

Even the reversion to Chinese control received far less international attention than the transfer of Hong Kong to China two years earlier. Borton noted that, "In the world's eyes, the turnover ceremony will be low key compared with the festive 1997 gala in which Macao's frenetic neighbor, Hong Kong, reverted from British to Chinese rule. Yet the coming change for Macao will mark a milestone. Once it is complete, no part of Asia will be under European rule for the first time in nearly half a millennium" (15). In sharp contrast to Hong Kong's enormous success as a global financial hub, Macau had largely remained mired in its colonial past. Milton notes that, "Slowly but surely, Macau sank into the backwater it is today. This is part of its charm, for Macau has been caught in a time warp. As you battle your way through the soup-hot climate, your only problem is to work out which decade you are in" (74).

Such comparisons between Macau and Hong Kong were characteristic of the media coverage prior to the transition. According to Barnett:

"The Portuguese established a trading post at Macau as early as the mid-sixteenth century, primarily to facilitate a lucrative trade with Japan. Competition from the Dutch and British in Asia as a whole undermined Portuguese supremacy, and with the establishment of the larger British colony in Hong Kong in 1841, Macau steadily faded far from the trading limelight to become generally acknowledged as a slow-moving place of retreat from the pressures of Hong Kong, and a gambling centre" (5).

Notwithstanding these sharp contrasts between Hong Kong and Macau, Chinese officials at the time emphasized that the same "one country, two systems" approach used in the former would be applied to the latter following its reversion to China in 1999. According to Borton, "Like Hong Kong, Macau will become a special administrative region of China, run by locals with a high degree of autonomy for the next 50 years" (15). Despite a number of cautionary warnings that emerged in the Western media prior to the transition, the Chinese government remained true to its word regarding the autonomy it promised Macau. Bridges reports that, "Chinese and Hong Kong leaders argue that it is still 'business as usual' after the handover and, indeed, for most residents of Hong Kong everyday life continues almost exactly as before" (162).

While the official position adopted by the Chinese leadership toward the newly returned colony remained firmly in place, Bridges suggests that less discernible processes were at work in reshaping Macau in China's own image — though not in a particularly heavy-handed fashion. Apparently recognizing that there was something to be said for the style of capitalism that had helped fuel Hong Kong's economic success, the Chinese leadership approached the transition carefully. Even so, they did make some modest efforts to shift the political ideology of the territory. Bridges notes that, "Beneath the surface more subtle changes are at work, not least in the incremental emasculation of the political culture and the growing stress on 'Chineseness.' But, in general, China has taken more of an overtly 'hands-off' approach than some had feared" (163).

Crime, Gambling, and Colonial Decline

This laissez-faire attitude was due in part to the same processes that had kept Macau mired in its colonial past, making the territory less attractive than neighboring Hong Kong for developmental purposes. Bridges cites the high crime rate that characterized Macau at the time of transition and adds that, "In general there appears to be little that Macau can do for China's external relations that Hong Kong is not better equipped for. . . . Macau has some potential utility as a link between China and Portuguese-speaking countries or even the broader Latin world but, in reality, for the Chinese it may be little more than a pale replica of Hong Kong" (164). Porter similarly suggests that Macau "was not nurtured, except perhaps in an exclusionary sense, by the economic and political conditions of the region. What set Macau apart from other colonial port cities of Asia, then, was that it belonged neither to the class of numerous small traditional Asian ports that preceded the establishment of Western hegemony nor to the few preeminent Westernized colonial emporia that emerged in the nineteenth century" (4).

On the day prior to the transition to Chinese control, Kurlantzick cited both the high crime rate in Macau and its inherent charm as a holdover from the colonial past. In an interview with a local Macanese citizen identified as "Jorge," the report notes that Macau "is a unique place with the most incredible history in Asia, but it is deteriorating. The economy is bad. We are too dependent on gambling to make money. The streets aren't safe. I hope that China can clean the place up without destroying it" (quoted in Kurlantzick 1).

Despite the trepidation that naturally accompanies such a profound shift in sovereignty, Kurlantzick maintains that many Macanese citizens were not only ready for the transition but were actively welcoming it as a chance to gain a new lease on their economic lives. Kurlantzick reports that, "In the waning years of Portuguese rule, many residents — weary of the colony's dependence on gambling for a living and machine guns to settle disputes — began looking to Beijing for a fresh start" (1). This sentiment was echoed by Woik Leih, a Macanese shopkeeper, who emphasized, "Portugal cannot help us any longer. They cannot stop the triads [Chinese crime gangs] or do anything about the economy. Only China can change things" (quoted in Kurlantzick 1).

The need for change, and the Macanese's welcoming attitude toward the reversion to Chinese control, were due in large part to the inordinate reliance on industries conducive to criminal activity. Prior to the transition in 1999, Macau's economy was highly reliant on tourism and gambling, with fully 43 percent of the territory's revenues generated by these activities (Kurlantzick 1). According to Kurlantzick, "Because Macao's economy is built on betting, an industry that criminal elements can infiltrate easily, many gangs, or triads, have set up operations in the colony. They rob high rollers, provide prostitutes, supply drugs and offer high-interest loans" (1). Similarly, in 1998, Adams described the territory as "the seedy Portuguese enclave of Macau, a hotbed of intrigue, prostitution, and gambling near Hong Kong" (42).

During the years leading up to the transition, Chinese gangs had become especially aggressive and prolific. In 1998 alone there were 37 gang-related deaths, and in 1997 the Macanese police chief narrowly escaped assassination by a car bomb that was detected by a police dog just seconds before detonation (Kurlantzick 1). These gang-related activities had a negative effect on the very industries on which Macau depended for much of its economic activity, and tourism dropped by almost 10 percent in 1998 (Kurlantzick 1). One Macanese resident summed up the situation: "I still won't walk around at night . . . and every sound makes me think of a gunshot" (quoted in Kurlantzick 1).

In an interview with Macao's last Portuguese governor, Rocha Vieira, Borton also emphasized the deleterious impact that gambling had on Macau. Governor Vieira noted that, "For too long, Macao has been promoted through casinos, gambling and nightlife, which are associated with negative things such as loan sharks, prostitutes and triads, so we are trying to diversify" (quoted in Borton 15). The governor also stressed that gambling was not the only source of organized crime prior to the reversion: "In the case of Macau, the deterioration of public security has a lot to do with the regional environment, where triads or organized gangs from Hong Kong and Taiwan take shelter in Macao because of its lax immigration policies. This only serves to intensify the turf war between them" (quoted in Borton 15).

Following a lengthy stay in Macau and interviews with several government officials and private citizens, Lintner reported that, "Conveniently located at the crossroads of Asia, but under European — Portuguese — jurisdiction, Macau in the 1990s had become a unique mix of Chicago in the 1920s, pre-war Shanghai and Casablanca: a sanctuary for gangsters, gunrunners, pimps, prostitutes, gambling tycoons, corrupt officials and secret agents of western as well as Asian powers" (72). In an astounding display of political ineptitude, Macau's under-secretary for security even attempted to reassure potential visitors by emphasizing the accuracy of the territory's gunmen. Lintner reports that, "While addressing the press in 1997, he said that 'our Triad gunmen are excellent marksmen,' implying that there was no need to worry because they would not miss their targets and hit innocent bystanders" (72). Not surprisingly, this bizarre attempt at reassurance did little to calm potential visitors' concerns, and the events that followed only served to reinforce the territory's dangerousness for outsiders and Macanese alike. As Lintner puts it, "This particularly insensitive remark did not allay people's fears and, ironically, a year later his own driver was gunned down. By the end of 1999, no one was joking about safety in the streets of Macau; even locals were afraid to go out after dark" (72).

Conclusion

The research showed that the transfer of control over Macau on December 20, 1999 marked the end of four centuries as the first permanent European settlement in China. The primary sources published prior to the transition were consistent in emphasizing that, although Macau was a charming place with a distinct legacy inherited from its Portuguese architectural and social influences, the very industries upon which it depended also attracted great numbers of criminals whose gang-related activities were threatening the territory's stability and keeping away the tourists and high-rolling gamblers upon whom the Macanese economy depended. The primary sources published just prior to the transition were also replete with warnings about what could be expected from the Chinese leadership, who were perceived as more likely to transform the special autonomous region into a tightly controlled communist outpost despite their assurances to the contrary.