W.D. Ross on Prima Facie Duties and What Makes Acts Right
This paper examines W.D. Ross's ethical theory as presented in his essay "What Makes Right Acts Right?" Ross rejects both Mill's utilitarianism and Kant's deontology, arguing that moral action cannot be reduced to a single good. Instead, he proposes a pluralistic framework built around prima facie (conditional) duties — obligations arising from promises, relationships, consequences, and past actions. The paper traces how Ross navigates the tension between rule-based and outcome-sensitive ethics, exploring the concept of "cases of conscience" where competing duties clash, and assessing why Ross's framework is considered more explanatorily powerful than utilitarian alternatives.
- Introduction to Ross's Ethical Framework: Ross rejects single-principle ethics for pluralistic moral theory
- Critique of Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology: Ross argues utilitarianism lacks sufficient explanatory power
- Prima Facie Duties and Conditional Obligation: Conditional duties arise from promises, relationships, and consequences
- Consequence-Sensitivity and the Limits of Promise-Keeping: Ross concedes consequences can override promise-keeping duties
- Cases of Conscience and Terminology: Clashing duties create conscience cases; prima facie terminology debated
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper clearly situates Ross's theory in relation to competing ethical frameworks (utilitarianism and Kantianism), giving the reader immediate comparative context.
- It accurately tracks the internal tension within Ross's own position — acknowledging where he reluctantly concedes to consequence-sensitivity — rather than presenting his view as monolithic.
- Specific examples, such as the promise-keeping and friend-versus-stranger scenarios, are used to ground abstract philosophical claims in concrete moral situations.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper demonstrates comparative philosophical analysis: rather than summarizing Ross in isolation, it evaluates his theory against utilitarian and Kantian alternatives, showing where each framework succeeds or fails on explanatory grounds. This technique is especially effective in ethics essays, as it forces the writer to articulate not just what a theorist believes, but why that position is preferable to rival views.
Structure breakdown
The essay opens by introducing Ross's core rejection of monistic ethical theories. It then examines the content of his conditional duties and compares them favorably to utilitarianism. The second half shifts to a more critical reading, identifying where Ross's own theory becomes consequence-sensitive and exploring the terminological difficulties he admits around the phrase "prima facie duty." The conclusion returns to the broader significance of the concept for modern ethics.
Introduction to Ross's Ethical Framework
In his essay "What Makes Right Acts Right?" W.D. Ross rejects both Mill's utilitarianism and Kant's deontology, asserting that ethics cannot be reduced to any single good, as claimed by these theories. Instead, he argues that moral acts are those that generate the greatest good, where "good" can imply many diverse things, including pleasures and duties. He begins by assessing what individuals take into consideration while deliberating about which action to take.
When an individual reflects on a promise he or she has made, Ross observes that the individual normally does not consider it with regard to its consequences. Furthermore, keeping the promise is not thought of as good merely because it results in the best outcomes. Under ordinary circumstances, the word "promise" itself suffices to demand that the promise be kept; however, this obligation can be annulled if breaking the promise does more substantial good.
Ross contends that, instead of any one simple principle governing how one must act, there are numerous ethically relevant facts — such as one's will, relationships, and consequences — that create a conditional, or prima facie, duty. Therefore, in the absence of any significant countervailing concern, an individual has a conditional duty to abide by promises, be truthful, be kind to friends, and so on. To ascertain whether one has an actual (or proper) duty, one must consider all the morally relevant particulars of one's situation.
Critique of Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology
Ross developed a number of conditional duties — duties arising from promises, from prior relationships, from outcomes, from one's past wrongdoings, and others — in order to compare his approach with utilitarianism. While utilitarianism is an essentially simple theory, he believes it does not possess adequate explanatory power when placed alongside his list of duties.
One could, for instance, generate the same amount of overall happiness by aiding a stranger rather than a friend. Utilitarian theories offer no compelling reason to choose to aid the friend over the stranger. Ross, however, argues that one obviously must help the friend, with his conditional-duties framework accounting for this choice. He regards this as a more explanatorily powerful principle than utilitarianism. Since no theoretical reason exists to presume that moral values must be reduced to any single good — such as pleasure — he believes that right action is best understood by considering a range of goods together.
Prima Facie Duties and Conditional Obligation
Ross's essay arrives at the concept of prima facie (conditional) duty, an idea that some modern authors have deemed worthy of integration with a revised version of certain aspects of Kantian deontology. Ross disagrees with utilitarian ethics' commitment to treating the maximization of goods as the sole grounds for making an act right — a position recent treatments describe as placing the "good" before the "right."
Ross opposes this position by referencing an individual who keeps a promise because he believes he simply must, without giving any thought to the consequences of his pledge. The author has come up with his list of conditional duties to capture this intuition: that many moral reasons for acting are not reducible to the production of good outcomes, but arise from the specific relationships and commitments that constitute a person's moral situation.
References
Banham, G. (2010, February 8). W.D. Ross and prima facie duties. Retrieved from http://kantinternational.blogspot.com/2010/02/wd-ross-and-prima-facie-duties.html
What makes right acts right. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.cengage.com/philosophy/book_content/0495094927_feinberg/introductions/part_5/Proposed_Standards_of_Right_Conduct/ross.html
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