FBI Drugs and WMDs

Introduction
The USS Cole Bombing in October 2000 was a prelude to the intense focus on the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) that the FBI took up in earnest one year later in the wake of and in response to 9/11. With the killing of several crewmen and the wounding of several more, the USS Cole Bombing was in reality just one more terrorist incident in an already growing line of attacks (both foreign and domestic) that revealed a pressing need for a counterproliferation strategy. When the USS Cole was hit in Aden harbor, the FBI began focusing on suspects who would later be tied to 9/11 and the spread of terror cells throughout the Middle East.[footnoteRef:2] It was not, of course, the only incident to spark that focus—but it was an important factor in the development of a new counterproliferation strategy that would inevitably become the plan to stop the spread and usage of WMDs by terrorists against America. As the primary research question of this study is “In what ways can the nonproliferation regime connect and collaborate with homeland security as a way to improve counterterrorism strategy?” this literature review will focus on identifying sources that can help to answer that question, including covert operations that the FBI has engaged in to help prevent the proliferation of WMDs throughout the world. [2: Joseph Chinyong Liow, \"The Mahathir administration's war against Islamic militancy: operational and ideological challenges.\" Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 2 (2004), 242.]
Literature Review
The Development of a Strategy
As Mauroni points out, the plan to stop the spread and usage of WMDs by terrorists against America and American interests was “based on a counterproliferation strategy developed in response to the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons to military forces in the 1990s.”[footnoteRef:3] Yet, it was 9/11 that truly introduced the intensely broadened scope, especially with regards to homeland security.[footnoteRef:4] The origins of the strategy can ultimately be found in the Gulf War crisis of 1991, under the George H. Bush Administration—and its culmination was witnessed under his son, G. W. Bush’s Administration. Yet, as Mauroni notes, there is still room for the strategy of counterproliferation to be improved even more.[footnoteRef:5] [3: Albert J. Mauroni, \"A counter-WMD strategy for the future.\" Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010), 58-59.] [4: Albert J. Mauroni, \"A counter-WMD strategy for the future.\" Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010), 59.] [5: Albert J. Mauroni, \"A counter-WMD strategy for the future.\" Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010), 59.]
The reason there is still more work to be done in developing a strategy to address counterproliferation needs is that because of globalization it is increasingly a dangerous world in which rogue nations can obtain WMDs and threaten or hold hostage the rest of the civilized world.[footnoteRef:6] The covert mission of rogue nations to possess WMDs is a threat to the international community, which means that there must be a high level of interaction, cooperation, collaboration, and communication among the allied nations of the international community. A counterproliferation strategy that does not have this level of collaboration will not be an effective one. The problem that the current strategy faces is a political one: with the rising tide of populism and nationalism all over the world, more and more nations that should be allied in the international community are becoming less open to working or collaborating with one another. Tensions are fueled by economic warfare (sanctions) and the walking away from treaties, such as recently took place between the U.S. and Russia with respect to the suspension of the Nuclear Arms Control Treaty.[footnoteRef:7] The destabilization of the relationship between the East and the West is evidence of the growing nature of this challenge. Furthermore, the fact that mistrust plays such a factor in international relations makes it difficult for true collaboration and cooperation to exist. Thus, there has been identified by the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction a plan for using covert operations in the overall strategy. [6: Rowena Rege Fischer, “Guide to the Study of Intelligence: Counterproliferation,” Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies 21, no. 1 (Winter 2014-15), 78-79.] [7: David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “US Suspends Nuclear Arms Control Treaty with Russia,” The New York Times, Feb 1., 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/us/politics/trump-inf-nuclear-treaty.html]
Covert Operations
Organizing to combat the proliferation of WMDs “requires a clear delineation of responsibilities,” according to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.[footnoteRef:8] The Commission was established in 1998 and its report was presented the following year to Congress. The Commission observed that to stop proliferation, action must be taken both domestically and abroad, but that overall the strategy “requires specific mechanisms to plan and execute operational responses to the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction, whether diplomatic initiative, foreign assistance, security assurances, covert action, or military retaliation.”[footnoteRef:9] The emphasis on covert action is particularly of importance insofar as the FBI is concerned. The infiltration of organizations and enemy groups has always been a mainstay of U.S. intelligence. From COINTELPRO to today, covert action is an important process in preventing cells or groups from taking steps to undermine or attack the interests of America. [8: The Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. “Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Washington, D.C. (1999), 8. ] [9: The Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. “Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Washington, D.C. (1999), 9.]
Ash Carter noted that one covert operation that the FBI can use is the tactic of “tagging,” which involves covertly placing some kind of marker or identifying feature or tag on any and all objects that would be destined for a WMD lab.[footnoteRef:10] The tag can be a transmitter, a chemical marker or anything that allows the Bureau to trace the movement of the material. This is one example of a covert operation that the FBI can implement in order to halt proliferation, especially as the movement of goods and materials in the globalized world is so rampant. The better able the Bureau is to monitor this traffic, the more likely it is to secure America’s borders and interests both domestically and abroad, so that another bombing like that of the USS Cole or attack like 9/11 cannot occur in the future. [10: Ashton B. Carter, \"Overhauling counterproliferation.\" Technology in Society 26, no. 2-3 (2004), 267.]
Penetrating the information infrastructure is another covert operation strategy that the FBI can use in its counterproliferation plan. This strategy uses signals intelligence—i.e., allows for cell phones, laptop computers, local area network and other information infrastructure devices to be penetrated and exploited so that the Bureau can monitor what information is being passed through networks and devices in target groups that are suspected of engaging in terror activity.[footnoteRef:11] [11: Ashton B. Carter, \"Overhauling counterproliferation.\" Technology in Society 26, no. 2-3 (2004), 267.]
Technology obviously plays a major role in the FBI’s ability to engage in covert operations. Miniaturization is one advancement in technology that supports this process: it involves the shrinking down of monitoring technology to such a size that it is undetected. One of the uses of miniaturization is in verifying that allies and treaty signees in the international community are actually staying true to their words and not engaging in proliferation.[footnoteRef:12] [12: Ashton B. Carter, \"Overhauling counterproliferation.\" Technology in Society 26, no. 2-3 (2004), 268.]
In order to successfully penetrate, mitigate and/or disrupt proliferation networks around the world, the FBI has to engage in covert operations or risk its objectives being made known to the very parties and networks it aims to thwart.[footnoteRef:13] One other way the FBI can engage in covert operations is through legal means: for example, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) allows the Bureau to use possible violations of the ECRA “as a predicate offense to obtain search warrants, conduct undercover operations, conduct both domestic and foreign investigations, and make arrests.”[footnoteRef:14]  To this end, the FBI can use undercover agents as it did when it ensnared Brussels-based Kaiga and disrupted his illicit activities regarding exporting aluminum tubes from the U.S. that were believed to be destined for WMD labs in Iran.[footnoteRef:15] [13: FBI Counterproliferation Center. “About.” https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security-branch/fbi-counterproliferation-center] [14: Aaron Arnold and Daniel Salisbury, “The Long Arm,” Belfer Center, 2019. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/long-arm] [15: Aaron Arnold and Daniel Salisbury, “The Long Arm,” Belfer Center, 2019. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/long-arm]
Undercover, lure and sting operations are all part of the FBI’s counterproliferation strategy today.[footnoteRef:16] They are all useful in building up criminal cases against suspects and targets. Another example of undercover operations can be found in the Department of Homeland Security’s sting operation in which Jiang Guanghou Yan was caught trafficking counterfeit goods.[footnoteRef:17] The natural link between the FBI and Homeland Security should allow for a more comprehensive sweep of international groups and networks so as to reduce the risk of proliferation. Using undercover, sting and other covert means and methods, an alliance between the FBI and Homeland Security could pay off handsomely in terms of preventing WMDs from falling into the wrong hands.[footnoteRef:18] Indeed, Mike McConnell has already shown that the DHS and the FBI are developing an integrated approach to intelligence gathering in hopes of addressing the issue of counterproliferation and the spread of WMDs.[footnoteRef:19] [16: Aaron Arnold and Daniel Salisbury, “The Long Arm,” Belfer Center, 2019. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/long-arm] [17: Aaron Arnold and Daniel Salisbury, “The Long Arm,” Belfer Center, 2019. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/long-arm] [18: Ashton B. Carter, \"Overhauling counterproliferation.\" Technology in Society 26, no. 2-3 (2004), 267.] [19: Mike McConnell, \"Overhauling intelligence.\" foreign affairs(2007): 49-58.]
The FBI’s use of covert operations has not been without its history of controversy. COINTELPRO, for example, was a covert operation that focused on putting undercover agents in domestic organizations deemed radical and a threat to the nation’s security. Agents infiltrated the various radical organizations popping up during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s and many of them attained positions of power in the very organizations they penetrated.[footnoteRef:20] It was largely used to contain Communist groups and Supremacist groups. Today, however covert operations can be used to infiltrate hate groups, radical Islamic terror cells and other extremist groups that could take part in the proliferation networks that the FBI also monitors using covert operations. [20: FBI. “COINTELPRO.” https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro]
Part of the danger involved, however, can be seen in just how difficult it was for the FBI to investigate the USS Cole bombing in 2000 in Yemen. When FBI agents arrived on the scene to investigate the attack, they were greeted by hostile Yemeni soldiers and constantly harassed in their residence by other soldiers out in the streets. At no point in time did the agents feel safe or secure, and their removal by helicopter from the environment ended with a diverting maneuver out of fear that hostiles would use surface to air missiles to attack the helicopter.[footnoteRef:21] Thus, for the safety of agents in the field, covert operations presents a better way to conduct investigations and to prevent attacks in the first place, particular when the strategies discussed by Ash Carter can be utilized in the field and operated from a safe distance. [21: Lawrence Wright, Looming Tower, Knopf, (2006), 322–331,]
International Collaboration
Nonetheless, there is still a need for better international collaboration between the FBI and other intelligence agencies and nations around the world.[footnoteRef:22] Diplomacy is one of the traditional tools of counterterrorism, as it involves the effective use of communication between countries with the object being to share intelligence and engage in oversight that can reduce the risk of terror cells gaining an advantage. Diplomacy and collaboration is something that the FBI could certainly pursue in its counterproliferation strategy, as Moroney et al. observe. [22: Jennifer D. Moroney, Aidan K. Winn, Jeffrey Engstrom, Joe Hogler, Thomas Durrell-Young, and Michelle Spencer. Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program. Rand National Defense Research Inst Santa Monica CA, 2011.]
The big challenge with international collaboration is that it requires the dissemination of information and many intelligence agencies around the world spy on other nations, collect intelligence that they have no intention of sharing, and even engage in counterintelligence so as to throw other nations off the scent. The Steele Dossier used in the Trump-Collusion investigation is one example of a foreign intelligence service using counterintelligence to throw a separate country into fits and starts.
For international collaboration to be most effective it has to be grounded in mutual trust and appreciation. The same ideas and strategies, ambitions and intentions have to be shared by the countries and they must for all intents and purposes act as allies. The problem with the current administration is that it is all too willing to turn allies into enemies if the allies do not adhere to what the administration commands. The reason the Nuclear treaty with Russia has been canceled is simply that the current administration does not want to have to work with Russia in a meaningful way.
To stop the spread of WMDs, there has to be trust and communication at a high level and in an effective manner—otherwise there will be no chance of success for the FBI to implement an effective counterproliferation process. The current security theater is somewhat hyper in terms of the extent to which everything is regarded as a security issue today.[footnoteRef:23] The abysmal failure of American intelligence in detecting WMDs in Iraq and invading the country on the bogus intelligence collected on Saddam Hussein’s supposed WMDs and mobile weapons labs helped to leave a blemish on the reputation of the American intelligence community. Thus, there is also a need for that community to atone for past mistakes by getting the tool of diplomacy correct at last. [23: Albert J. Mauroni, \"A counter-WMD strategy for the future.\" Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010), 69.]
Working with the Military
There is also the option of working with the military to prevent proliferation. As Mauroni points out, “far too often, these issues are discussed separately from conventional military operations or irregular warfare.”[footnoteRef:24] The FBI’s WMD coordinators could work hand in hand with the U.S. military to engage in a more robust approach to the problem of proliferation. The Defense Department also has a vested interest in reducing proliferation and by bringing these two resources and strategies together to form one unified approach, the process could be streamlined and made into a more overall effective and united performance. [24: Albert J. Mauroni, \"A counter-WMD strategy for the future.\" Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010), 70.]
The military could help the FBI to answer the question of whether WMDs should be eliminated altogether or whether they can simply be better contained. Mauroni laments that “it may be impossible to moderate the overly excited security theater portraying terrorists as bringing ten-kiloton nuclear bombs to multiple US cities.”[footnoteRef:25] The issue is that by overestimating the means of terror cells, one is tempted to create a false impression of a very real and serious problem. [25: Albert J. Mauroni, \"A counter-WMD strategy for the future.\" Parameters 40, no. 2 (2010), 72.]
WMDs Rethought
The FBI also needs to consider how minding the borders and combating the drug trade takes precedence in the war on terror. WMDs are not merely weapons and bombs that can be used to attack ships like the USS Cole. They are also weapons that destabilize American society, and as such drugs like fentanyl can be considered a WMD. Fentanyl is such a highly potent and deadly chemical that it does not take much to poison people. Yet how easily it is smuggled into the U.S.[footnoteRef:26] The FBI, DEA and Homeland Security should all be working together to prevent drugs like fentanyl and other synthetic poisons produced in countries abroad from coming into the U.S. These drugs are dangerous not just because they are unleashed on the streets and cripple the youth and of the country and thus rob the nation of a brighter future but also because they could easily be used in a terror attack or placed into a water supply and thus used to poison the country’s citizens. For that reason it is very important to have a plan and strategy in place to prevent this type of free movement of dangerous chemicals across the border.[footnoteRef:27] Thousands are killed each year by these chemicals, and if the FBI is also not focused on this issue and is not working with DHS to address it, it is another weakness in the counterproliferation strategy overall. [26: Manchikanti, Laxmaiah, Jaya Sanapati, Ramsin M. Benyamin, Sairam Atluri, Alan D. Kaye, and Joshua A. Hirsch. \"Reframing the prevention strategies of the opioid crisis: focusing on prescription opioids, fentanyl, and heroin epidemic.\" Pain physician 21, no. 4 (2018): 309-326.] [27: Nevano, Gregory C. \"Homeland Security Investigations, Border Search Authority, and Investigative Approaches to Fentanyl Smuggling.\" US Att'ys Bull. 66 (2018): 57.]
Counterproliferation has to be considered not just from the standpoint of bombs and missiles. It also has to be considered from the standpoint of consequences and outcomes. For example, the invasion into the Middle East by the U.S. following both the attacks on the USS Cole and the attacks on the World Trade Centers had a serious consequence in terms of the global drug trade. The poppy fields of Afghanistan were liberated and the heroin trade devastated countries around the world, with many hundreds of thousands of Americans negatively impacted by it as well. So while no WMDs were found in Iraq, a massive WMD in the form of the heroin trade escaped Afghanistan and ran riot through the streets of the U.S. The FBI has to be better about working with DHS to secure the borders of the nation and prevent drugs from getting in.[footnoteRef:28] [28: Nevano, Gregory C. \"Homeland Security Investigations, Border Search Authority, and Investigative Approaches to Fentanyl Smuggling.\" US Att'ys Bull. 66 (2018): 57.]
Conclusion
The FBI’s counterproliferation strategy can be successful if it follows the recommendations of the scholars and researchers cited herein: their recommendations are to engage in greater collaboration with other nations in the international community; engage in covert operations to track goods and materials that might be used in the manufacturing of WMDs; engage in undercover operations to build cases against criminals both domestic and foreign; and to rethink what the term WMD actually means in the first place and what the real threat of a WMD is. If loss of life is the main threat, the drug trade should also be considered a WMD type.
Bibliography
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