Maritime piracy and terrorism: causes and impacts

Maritime Piracy and Terrorism in the Atlantic and Caribbean Oceans - a Methodology to Counteract

More than six years after the attacks of September 11th, 2001 showed the United States to be a nation deeply vulnerable to the type of attacks which are favored by terrorist organizations, the security policies and approaches to protecting the American people and America's friends and interests remain deeply impeachable. Security responses relating to the combat of foreign wars, the bureaucratic consolidation of American security agencies, the enhancement of surveillance freedoms to be used against the American people and the selling of America's port security to a state-run firm in the United Arab Emirates are all suggestive of a government which has not taken the proper steps to address the specific threat of terrorism in ways that are valid or effective.

This draws the attention of the discussion here to the issues of America's maritime safety. Using the events of the bombings of the U.S.S. Cole, the attacks of September 11th and the emergency management breakdowns of Hurricane Katrina, this research examination will show the United States to be unprepared for the threat of a significant maritime attack and that emergency management resources are woefully insufficient to prepare for the economic, infrastructural and human tolls of such an attack.

With the focus directed on the crucial Caribbean trade route through which so much of America's imported petroleum flows, we can see that the threat and vulnerability of an attack in which a terrorist organization used an inbound oil-tanker as a weapon of mass destruction are substantial. Recommendations to be drawn on the discussion of America's core security shortcomings will suggest that greater coordination between the U.S. And other states must be implemented in order to reduce piracy, that America's port security must be returned to American-based security groups and that America's approach to the War on Terror must be generally reoriented.

Introduction:

On the morning of September 11th, there appeared only a singular meaning to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. While indefinable in any concrete terms, it was embodied in the shared experience of shock, horror and helplessness that shadowed Americans. The at first incomprehensible notion suggested on live television by the black plumes that cut through the New York skyline, that the World Trade Center and its inhabitants were no more, has since become the subtext to our times. The hijacking of four commercial airliners, and the subsequent attempted targeting of various strategic locations on continental U.S. soil, marked the first of such incidences to succeed on such a broad and grim scale. Though a group of al Qaeda operatives had been connected to the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, it still seemed in the clearing smoke and debris omnipresent in the first days after 9/11 that such a plot as that which was executed to a degree of terrifying success would have been previously unthinkable.

In the years which have passed since, it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the likelihood that this is a deliberately projected mischaracterization of what really took place in the months and days leading up to September 11th. While the Bush Administration has been most forthcoming, many might even suggest unconstitutionally draconian, in its allotment of retribution for the deaths of nearly 3,000 on 9/11, it has been most reluctant to accept any internal responsibility for the security failings which facilitated the attack. However, a serious consideration of accounts from within the administration, which tend to contradict one another with alarming frequency and unrepentance, tell a story which deviates from what the mainstream media portrays. What has been perhaps most telling about the Bush Administration's unwillingness to confront the factual details surrounding September 11th is the nonsensical contrast between the implications of the event and the opportunistic, internationally despised responses which the administration has been unwavering in applying. What is implied by this is a misdirection of efforts and a misappropriation of resources as the administration has foregone the proper steps at orienting America's security. Its focus on the abstractions of foreign war and privacy invasive policy initiative as will be further explored in this account denote an administration that has failed to recognize the core qualities of attack innovation, opportunity exploitation and vulnerability penetration which could be seen on 9/11.

Such is to say that this discussion is based on the current failures and shortcomings in Americas security as they relate reciprocally to the incapacity of the U.S. federal government to meaningfully construct obstacles to terrorist initiative. The focus here will be on the maritime theatre, and through the Caribbean trade route which plays an absolutely vital role in America's trade economy. Across this route, where tankers carrying Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) or petroleum or both bound for the United States and markedly vulnerable to seafaring piracy, is presented a threat to the United States which would mirror in these qualities of innovation, exploitation and penetration the events of 9/11. In the opportunity and potential scale of a maritime attack by such a method as rendering an LNG tanker as a Weapon of Mass Destruction, as well as in the inherent vulnerabilities of the United States in this context, there is cause for the focus on categorical improvements by the U.S. As will be argued for here.

As this discussion proceeds upon this premise, it must be acknowledged that much as with the scale and effectiveness of the 9/11 attacks, no prior precedent currently exists for assuming that our capabilities are up to par with the degree of the threat of the extensiveness of its catastrophic outcome. Indeed, "although this mode of attack has not yet been used by terrorists, it is not without precedent. The British used the obsolete destroyer, HMS Campbeltown, loaded with explosives to attack the heavily defended dry dock of the St. Nazaire in occupied France during World War II. They rammed the dock and then detonated the charges onboard. This demonstrates the feasibility and effects of such an 'improvised weapon of mass destruction (WMD)." (Mitchell, 2) the very prospect of this makes many of the conditions today contextualizing America's defensive and securities strategies concerning the nation and its ports essentially and deeply flawed.

Statement of Problem:

The imperative surrounding this examination is the legitimate threat of maritime terrorism, based on precedent, demonstrated intent and current vulnerability. Such is to say that for the United States in particular, and its friends and allies, the threat of a maritime terrorist attack on a seafaring vessel or a port is extremely high. Conditions are in many ways favorable to this method for terrorist, whom this examination will demonstrate have comparably fewer levels of scrutiny to penetrate in order to achieve their aims.

At the heart of this danger is the prospect of a major attack on an American port, or along an American trade sea route that directly mirrors the attacks of September 11th. Namely, just as airplanes were used as missiles to make key strikes at civilian and military structures on United States soil, so too can it be considered a real prospect that American bound sea vessels could be used in the same way. The attraction to U.S. ports as a potential target is manifold and parallels in many ways the attractions which drew terrorists to the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Namely, the certainty of extensive civilian casualties, infrastructural damage, economic loss and strategic emergency management breakdown as had occurred in midtown Manhattan on September 11th could in some way be anticipated as the result of an attack on any major American port.

This is especially true in direct consideration of the Caribbean trade route which remains essential to the United States economy. The Eastern Seaboard, through which much of America's economic lifeblood is pumped also serves as the point of entry for a significant portion of America's imported petroleum, and much of that comes from this nearby region. In spite of this, security attention has been fixed in regions more notorious for terror activity, demonstrating a failure to acknowledge the patterns of innovation and unpredictability amongst evolving terror cells. Indeed, "while all eyes are placed on the area surrounding the Malacca Straits, the world oil bottleneck, and on the Indonesian coast off Aceh, very little attention is placed on the U.S. underbelly of the Caribbean and the softer targets in the region closest to America's back yard: Trinidad, Venezuela and the Bahamas. These Caribbean countries are among the short list of natural gas producing countries and liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) exporters." (Kelshall, 1) Within the boundaries of this trade route, there still persists a great vulnerability, even more than five years after the September 11th attacks which are said to have shifted the attention of America's defenses to the prevention of terrorism. America's ports are still notoriously porous and susceptible to the creative forces of terrorism.

And the particular concept of using a tanker as a potential weapon is real and pressing, especially given the sheer volume of transport which flows through the area. This is to note that "Trinidad and Tobago alone account for 80% (1st quarter 2004) of all U.S. LNG imports, up from 68% in 2002. Therefore, any incident involving an LNG tanker along the Caribbean routes could harm not only U.S. energy security but also the economies of the Caribbean islands, affecting tourism and other industries." (Kelshell, 1) Such a trajectory has all the markings of an Al-Qaeda styled plot, which by its premise will take an interest in that which is likely to have such widely rippling destructive purpose.

The Caribbean trade routes are of particular interest to this discussion given their proximity to the United States continental mainland and their historical appeal to the activities and organization of pirates. According to Mitchell, "the Caribbean island chain stretches for 2500 miles in a convex arch from the Bahamas past the south east point of Florida and downward to the island of Trinidad, only seven miles off Venezuela's east coast. The islands encircle the Caribbean Sea, the body of water between them and the American continent. This vast maritime area has always attracted piracy and other illegal activities." (Mitchell, 4) Inherently, piracy is an issue which must be addressed in this discussion as centrally relating to terrorism. This is a correlation which will be raised frequently throughout the discussion, denoting the inherent value of such relationships for terrorist operations.

A brief history of piracy will also contribute to the assertion of this relationship. Once, piracy in the Caribbean had been associated with the notion of independent privateering in defiance of colonialist corporations such as the Dutch East India Company. In this context, such seafaring mercantilists could be seen as more democratic than their monopolizing counterparts occupying the American colonies and their invaluable ports. These connotations, while apparent if one is to draw an analogy between these acts and those committed for political reasons by terrorists, are otherwise absent from today's understanding of piracy.

Today, piracy has garnered an immutably negative association to acts of criminality, torture and murder on the high-seas. It is more prominently remembered now that many of the most famous pirates of the Golden Age, such as Blackbeard, Captain Edward Low and Calico Jack were feared terribly by voyagers to and from the New World than that the institution of privateering was a crucial entity in colonial war and trade. This was, however, a trend of collective perception that became gradually inevitable, especially when the in the 18th century the British had begun in earnest to forcibly eradicate its purveyors. (Krystek, 1) Thus, the royal crown's efforts at creating a theretofore nonexistent establishment sentiment against piracy rendered it illegal and its likely practitioners more prone to wanton criminality.

In 1958, the United Nations passed an anti-piracy law. However, "what the law fails to address are acts of piracy committed: by governments, within territorial waters, for political purposes." (Vallar, 1) Much like in the past, governments who are incapable of levying the kind of direct political authority in trade as they would desire are inclined by this dearth of regulation to appeal to seafaring piracy. To those with little hegemonic influence to lose in regional affairs, such as is commonplace in the unprotected waters of war-torn Southeast Asia, piracy seems a practical means to some of taking by force what is inaccessible by diplomacy. Much as in the past, piracy continues to be a means of resistance to naval imbalance, especially for those who lack the military or political structure to achieve such within the confines of international law.

It is here that the political intercession between piracy and terrorism becomes more wholly apparent, especially given the historical propensity for such activities in the Caribbean sea's colonial history. Such is to say that acts of resistance against a dominant military and economic force such as the United States have been shown to bear more sensible success when taken upon through such guerilla tactics. Historically, independent maritime infringement is shown to have success, comparable to the attempt at using overwhelming military support, in undermining overwhelming and dominant force.

Here again, there is a problematic appeal to the proximity of the Caribbean Sea to crucial ports and cities along the Eastern Seaboard. Where its geographical positioning has historically allowed it to feel some sense of relative imperviousness to the full-scale threat of military assault, the United States is inherently vulnerable by the same token to the type of guerilla warfare favored by terrorists and pirates alike. This helps to capture the situation that drives the research here. Namely, there is a clear motive of opportunity in the Caribbean shipping lane that, in the age of terrorism, removes prior illusions of American imperviousness.

Such illusions have also created an infrastructural weakness in this particular capacity that makes even more appealing this venue for attack by America's enemies. "Inhabiting the most peaceful corner of the world has meant that captains of industry and urban planners have been able to treat security as a marginal issue. Those carefree days are now gone and unfortunately we have inherited critical infrastructures so open that they offer terrorists a vast menu of soft targets." (Flynn, x) for the United States, there has been a certain disadvantage rendered it due to its insulation for global conflict, which has very rarely touched its soil. The outcome has been an overwhelmingly unprepared infrastructure in the face of today's security challenges. Though the United States has long oriented its defenses to project its conflicts into the far reaches of the globe -- and generally a great distance from the U.S. itself -- it remains in many ways incapable of deflecting a major attack at its borders.

Such is to say that in the face of the terrorist ideology, premises protecting American security have become obsolete and largely only theoretical. America's geographical disposition has historically protected it from invasion due to its strong continental relationship with Canada and Mexico and its situation between two sprawling oceanic bodies. However, this is a logic which has only served effectively to understand the challenges facing a power which might seek to mount a traditional 'boots-on-the-ground' invasion of the United States. The logistical implausibility of sustaining and empowering a force which could physically occupy any political or military authority in the United States has protected it in nation-to-nation conflagration. However, with the threat of terrorism comes a new framework for operational orientation. Enemies are no longer bound to the rational assumptions regarding the mounting of a full-scale military operation. Inherently, terrorism will strategically seek to mount a series of isolated or coordination attacks which effectively amount to crippling blows to economy, infrastructure and psyche. In the case of its assaults on the United States, the terrorist underworld has never relied upon the concept of a detectable military force with the capacity to occupy. Nor has it oriented itself historically toward any long-term stationary position toward the invasion of the United States. Instead, as seen by the 9/11 plot which, with the help of various supporting players, was nonetheless carried out according to official reports by no more than 19 actual hijackers. In spite of this, the destruction and death toll were both catastrophic, owing to the success with which the plot exploited notable weaknesses in America's civil defense methods.

This points to the problem of America's defense strategy, which is structured to prevent a traditional infantry or ballistics assault which identifiable long-term trajectories against the United States. The diffuseness and global guerilla tactics of terrorist organizations as reflected by the attacks of 9/11 and the various prominent examples of maritime assault such as on the U.S.S. Cole and the French oil-tanker, Limburg, defies the logical deterrents upon which the United States has always relied for security. In particular, the notion that the United States will surely respond with swift and decisive force at the prompting of an attacker is undermined by the elusiveness of the terrorist target. This allows it to operate at a more strategically innovative approach than that taken by American defenses.

This is important, as we enter into a discussion as to the relative rarity of a successful maritime attack in the United States or as a product of terrorist organizational efforts in general. Particularly, the research will note that there is a necessity to attend with great intensity even to those terrorist prospects which have yet to be successfully ventured. As this discussion ventures on to consider the ways in which a lack of preparedness contributed directly to the capacity of terrorists to attack the United States on September 11th, it will become increasingly clear that the precedent which currently exists to suggest that a maritime attack in this context is sufficient enough to justify the allotment of considerable attention and resource by the American and Caribbean governments, as well as private organizations engaged in LNG transport. The distinct nature of the opportunity here presented -- and particularly intimated by the inherent value of relationship between piracy and terrorism -- suggests it to be a valid and imminent threat. This is because "terrorist organizations have displayed a willingness and intent to seek innovative ways to create mayhem and instill fear in the world of their perceived enemies.

Ships present a much larger target than aircraft and are potentially easier targets even when on the move. Once an aircraft has taken to the air, it cannot be boarded unless it lands; however, a ship at sea can be made to stop and can be boarded at any point along its journey, as pirates have done for as long as man has sailed the waters of the globe." (Mitchell, 8)

The current shortcomings in America's general strategy of combating terrorism its failure at defining a proper security strategy for its ports and its overall unwillingness to properly understand its enemies will figure into the findings and recommendations here prompted. This is a statement of purpose in response to the clear failures of the United States to properly adapt to the changes which it has so vociferously pointed to in justifying its global War on Terror. In many substantial ways, the United States appears to have postured itself in such a way as to actually actively diminish the logistical and resource capacities of law enforcement and security groups even as the federal government has proposed to be primarily directed by the inclination to prevent infiltration of security vulnerability. Accordingly, "outside of Washington, pink slips for police officers and firefighters are more common than new public investments in security. With state and local budgets hemorrhaging red ink, mayors, county commissioners, and governors are simply in no position to fill the security void the federal government has been keen to thrust upon them." (Flynn, 2) Thus, as the United States' federal government increasingly diverts funding from domestic law enforcement agencies to lumbering groups like the Department of Homeland Security and, even more dubiously, those privateering organizations contract to help rebuild such nations as Afghanistan and Iraq, which appear in their rebuilding phases to be mutually still in a state of constant demolition. The result is an increased rather than decreased lack of preparedness. Another result which the Flynn text discusses of this misappropriation is the selective attention which it promotes amongst lawmakers and defensive strategists. Amongst these exists a perception of reactionary necessity, in which the clear vulnerabilities exposed by 9/11 have directed the focus of security policy on airport screening and, in many instances, the obtuse law enforcement tool of racial profiling. These responses are attendant to a culture of relative strategic laziness, contrasting dangerously the energy for ingenuity shown by terrorist cells. As Flynn argues, "from water and food supplies; refineries, energy grids, and pipelines; bridges, tunnels, trains, trucks, and cargo containers; to the cyber backbone that underpins the information age in which we live, the measures we have been cobbling together are hardly fit to deter amateur thieves, vandals, and hackers, never mind determined terrorists." (Flynn, 2) the basic case is made here that we are ill-prepared in terms of security, emergency response and recuperation from an effectively catastrophic maritime attack at one of America's ports.

This is a discussion which will touch upon various associated issues relating to America's maritime defense capabilities; the documented, foiled, anticipated and imagined maritime activities of terrorist organizations; and the implications, scale and shape of such an attack carried out effectively. Though this research examination is stimulated by the threats inherent in the Caribbean region and pertaining to the extreme danger of the hijacking and weaponization of tankers carrying LNG from the islands to th mainline, it will also be concerned with general patterns of piracy, with failures in America's general security response to the attacks of September 11th and the need to reconsider core philosophical terror combat strategies as concern policy, ports and military dispatching. All of these factors will factor into the desired set of recommendations projected by this research study as will concern the improvement of terror combat, of port security, of maritime defense strategy and of preparedness for disaster response in the event of a successful LNG tanker attack.

Evidence of Need:

In the past, terrorism had rarely been associated with the events occurring on the high seas or at the ports. The proclivity of terror groups toward bombing foreign embassies, hijacking airplanes and invoking hostage situations by holding foreign dignitaries, soldiers or overseas civilians has often promoted this oversight. However, with the threat of terrorism taking on increasingly omnipresent and flexible proportions, it is clear that this oversight is distinctly problematic. As we consider the major trade route connected the Eastern Seaboard of the United States with various close diplomatic partners throughout the Caribbean Seas and the Atlantic Ocean, it is clear not only that consideration is due for stronger protection of the ports and vessels implicated in this trade but also that the maritime context must necessarily be seen as one of the greatest weaknesses in America's defense against global terrorism.

This is a fact which becomes apparent with a consideration of America's relative dependency on the effectiveness of these trade routes. Such is to say that "the United States of America (USA) is a major trade partner for Trinidad and Tobago and many ships transport dangerous cargoes like liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the port of Point Fortin to mainly USA Eastern seaboard ports. Despite the potential danger these cargoes posed, they were not viewed as a particular threat to the U.S.A." (Mitchell, 1) Even after 9/11, there has been a problematic unwillingness to fully invest the attention which should be considered a necessity for the construction of a larger defensive strategy. To date, there is a relative absence of a larger defensive credibility with regard to our actual identification of the threat discussed here. While theory and speculation abound regarding the danger of such an attack as we have characterized, there seems not be a serious willingness on the part of government intelligence and defense strategists to create a contingency in the event of an LNG tanker hijacking and ramming.

Indeed, the absence of such a clear policy suggests an absence of the necessary understanding of existing terrorist threats, based on a long-term approach of reactionary and Cold Warfare methods to perceived external dangers. Current discourse contend that "understanding the nature of maritime terrorism risk requires an investigation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with potential attacks, as grounded both by relevant historical data and by intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of known terrorist groups." (Greenberg et al., 1) in many ways, this is an understanding that the Findings section will reveal to be elusive. American defensive policies and the relative absence of urgency concerning the treatment of our port securities suggests that current security policy is not equipped to realistically deal with the impending threat of such an attack. This shows an unwillingness also on the part of American strategist to anticipate with some insight the nature of the enemy.

Today, there are clear indications that the will and desire exists on the part of prominent terror organizations to conduct terrorist attacks that target the ports, naval occupancies and seafaring vessels of the United States and its allies. Most particularly, terrorist groups have been able to identify the precedent of success in previous maritime terror attacks and have been able to identify this as perhaps the most apparent vulnerability in America's defense structure. These are indications which, instead of lessening the threat by pointing to a structural gap in need of direct attention, have served to motivate terrorist organizations thusly. With several maritime attack successes already under its belt, Al-Qaeda and the various cells and organizations with which it associates have been stimulated "to invest extensively in developing technologies, tactics and techniques for conducting maritime terrorist operations. This was confirmed by the recovery in Afghanistan of video tapes for Asian, Middle Eastern, African and Caucasian terrorist groups to study in depth both offensive and defensive maritime operations by governments as well as by other terrorist groups." (Richardson, 2003, p. vi). These should be seen in much the same way that might have intelligence which could have prevented 9/11. While in their own defense many current intelligence and defense strategists will appeal to the refrain that agents lacked the smoking gun evidence needed to anticipate the terrorist attacks, retrospect will show that instead a policy might have been adopted in which actionable evidence as to the need for heightened security measures might have been activated. Today, intelligence concerning our ports is beaming the same prescient signals.

Nonetheless, evidence also persists that this is not a high priority of interest for current federal lawmakers. Such is consistent with the same history which allowed previous maritime attacks by terror cells. Even prior to September 11th, 2001, when the United States largely operated its security ignorant of the real and impending threat of terrorism, it was true that the dangers on its ports and on the ports where it operated were real and pressing. And even following the events which precipitated and immediately followed 9/11, there is evidence that the United States and its friends and allies were either not prepared or not fully in recognition to contend with this maritime threat. Indeed, "both before and after 9/11, Al-Qaeda successfully attacked or attempt to attack naval and commercial shipping of the U.S., its allies or its friends." (Richardson, 2003, vi) it would, in fact, be in the year just prior to that of 9/11 in which the United States would sustain one of its most significant assaults since the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Such is to say that "after an aborted attempt to target USS the Sullivans in January 2000, Al-Qaeda nearly sank the state-of-the-art destroyer USS Cole." (Richardson, 2003, vi.)

As the subject here will most specifically contend with the dangers implicit in the maritime transport of natural gas, it is sensible also to consider some historical events underscoring the pretense of terrorist organizations to target these specifically volatile transport units. And in many of such instances where success has been achieved, it is clear that we can identify a specific lacking on the part of the United States to provide suitable defenses. For instance, in 2002, "when a U.S. warship failed to appear in a pre-designated kill zone of Al-Qaeda off Yemen, an explosives-laden boat piloted by Al-Qaeda member struck a target of opportunity -- the French oil supertanker Limburg." (Richardson, vi) Here, we can see that the terrorist organizations which operate as a maritime threat to the United States and its friends and allies are opportunistic, and that the absence or insufficiency of an effective American defense has stimulated this opportunity for them.

Findings:

core complexity facing the United States in its attempts to resolve its currently faulty approach to protecting the ports and high seas is that concerning the inherent flexibility afforded to terrorist organizations. As opposed to the policy bureaucracy and military proceduralism which must dually factor into the decisions and approaches taken by the government, Al-Qaeda and other such multi-celled terror organizations are capable of adapting quickly to existing defenses and finding ways to bypass military defense expectations. This is to say that "as a learning organization, Al-Qaeda maximized its successes and minimized its failures. As the 'pioneering vanguard of the Islamic movements', Al-Qaeda also instilled in its associated groups the important belief that they must repeat successes." (Richardson, vi) as conforms with the intent and desire of Al-Qaeda, this has prompted a situation of serious challenge to the United States and its friends and allies. In an attempt to identity positive actions to be taken in the defense of ports of interest, the United States must seek a balance between the responsive design of protections against precedent such as those events which occurred on the Cole and the Limburg and the foresight to identify new and innovative attack methods.

Essentially, where terrorist organizations have the capacity to change courses and actualize initiatives with relative speed, the United States must attempt to create policy and defense precedents which are naturally armed with the same type of flexibility.

The attacks already committed have led to information and captures that are providing some important insights into how attacks are planned and executed. Specifically, the research here highlights the apprehension of maritime terrorist mastermind Abd al Rahman al Nashiri in 2002, directly following the bombing of the Limburg.

Also identified as having taken a leading role in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, "Nashiri had developed a four-pronged strategy to attack Western targets. These were ramming, blowing up medium-sized ships near other vessels or at ports, attacking large vessels such as supertankers from the air by using explosive-laden small aircraft, and attacking vessels with underwater demolition teams using limpet mines or with suicide bombers." (Koknar, 1) These are, of course, useful directives to be used in the defense of identifiable targets such as oil tankers and military vessels. However, the detection of such threats in the diffuse enormity of the sea is a logistically monumental task which is even more daunting in consideration of the foundational interest of many terrorist groups to gain strategic footholds by seeking out civilian targets. It is thus that the United States, documented as having an enormous maritime travel and cruise industry -- especially in the Caribbean -- must also turn its attention to the protection of civilian seafarers, whose vessels are inherently unprepared for detection or escape of impending threats of terrorist attack.

Moreover, the logistical threat of an encounter on the grim scale which might be equated to the events of September 11th is enormous such that proper attention must be paid to its implications. Such is to say that devastating extent of an effectively executing 'ramming' scheme targeting or utilizing oil tankers on American's Eastern Seaboard in and of itself justifies the employment of considerable resource to the prevention and defense against this threat. According to Burnett, "full speed for these ships is about sixteen knots, nearly twenty miles per hour. Even when steaming at three knots the inertia is enormous; the prospect of slamming these 300,000 tones into a reef or into another large ship even at that speed is beyond the ken of imagination." (Burnett, 151)

The Burnett text is largely concerned with the issue of piracy, which must also enter the purview of this discussion given the conclusions already drawn relating the complexity and multilayered structural proclivities of terrorist organizations. Activities of piracy on the high seas constitute an enormous range of opportunities for organized criminal syndicates, with smuggling, drug transport, arms trade, sabotage and outright hijacking all more readily available in the surrounds of active shipping lanes than on any one nation's soil. With the threat of piracy comes also a marked increase in the threat posed by the natural gas trade which is executed so significantly over said shipping lanes.

According to the findings which are currently accepted, "LNG terminals and tankers present potential targets for terrorists. In the pre-9/11 world LNG tankers were considered among the safest ships at sea. These tankers are still as safe as is possible for a vessel of this nature today. But this statement is only valid if one pre-supposes that terrorists do not want an easily attainable weapon of mass destruction." (Kelshall, 1) Such is to say that core among the needs for change is the effort to more effectively arm against hijacking or attack such vessels. This will, of course, require a closer coordination between the governments of the United States and such trade partners are Trinidad and Tobago, or Venezuela. Though many of such trade partners, and Venezuela in particular, share a somewhat rocky relationship with the United States, there is an urgency suggested by this issue which demands a cooperation betwixt such trade partners. In lieu of such diplomacy, these trade partners can become increasingly less reliable -- and perhaps willfully so -- in helping to protect the United States against its own imports. Whatever political divides persist here, the United States would do well to overcome them, for the "the potential for mass casualty maritime suicide terrorism has changed our perceptions of safety at sea especially when it comes to lean crewed LNG tankers and other PCG (Petro/chemical/gas) and ships." (Kelshall, 1) in these vessels is represented a need for cooperation which places security forces on either sides of the trade route and along the way in close coordination with one another.

It should be noted in a conversation less determined by what happened to allow September 11th than by what has happened since, that the security misappropriation occurring today is reflective of the misdirection which preceded the attacks as well as which emerged as de facto explanation immediately thereafter. It has been a popular refrain that the breaches which revealed such cataclysmic shortcomings in our national security system were accommodated by massive intelligence failings. In particular, this is an idea which the Bush Administration has bandied about with its typical swagger, propagated the notion that the CIA and the FBI shared blame for declining to act on intelligence regarding a possible terrorist activity surge. Even further, it was determined by the White House that it was the very structure of the intelligence community which prevented these agencies from sharing information regarding such threats. These were the notions that provided foundation for the new and as yet inconsequential Department of Homeland Security which still has several years of formation ahead of it before it can aspire to be the lumbering bureaucracy that its designers had initially envisioned.

In spite of such claims of a need for systemic recalibration and the legislative manifestation of those claims in the form of the reactionary Patriot Act, the 9/11 Commission report, released in August of 2004, countered such assertions of systemic intelligence community barriers, assessing that: "before 9/11 the C.I.A. And the F.B.I. exaggerated the degree to which they were forbidden to share information. This was a managerial failure, not an institutional one."(Posner 2004) This was an analysis which came three years too late, as the Patriot Act had received a fast-track to actualization in the confusing miasma of despair that directly followed 9/11.

In spite of its claims to the contrary, September 11th occurred because the Bush Administration had adopted as its primary security policy, a strategy of non-engagement to the terrorist threat. And while there is a very apparent effort, which has been underway for the last six years with an increasingly distended intensity, to convey the notion that this policy has been reversed in totality, the White House's security policy is only superficially constructed to confront threats. It has established its disposition toward foreign relations according to the instinct to apply dominance in all confrontations where it has deemed an entitlement to do so, with American ideological superiority servicing as an intellectual justification for an emergent unilateralism. This is reflected in the president's own explication of the security strategy after the 9/11 attacks, where he warned that "the U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better." (Bush 2002)

This poorly defined approach suggests a certain absence of rational understanding for the terrorist problem which is shown by an academic consideration of the policy theories prevalent in the discourse over terrorism and national security. This is to say that "the application of rational expectations theory to policies of retaliation against terrorism suggests that only unexpected retaliations will be effective in causing terrorist attacks to deviate from their natural rate and that there is a time inconsistency problem in responding to terrorism. (Brophy-Baermann et al. 1994) Indeed, these words would prove prophetic, offering us great insight into the demand for an approach to terrorism which does not conform to the expectations of a traditional, and protracted conflict. The current quagmire in Iraq certainly endorses the idea that a more rational orientation, with a long-term plan aimed at providing contingency responses to the flexibility of terrorist cell-groups, might more sufficiently serve policy interests than the current incrementalism in place. There appears practically no end in sight to a policy approach which pursues a finite goal such as domestic security through a continually formulating method to confronting the enemy on its terms. On the balance, this has suggested a need for a more rational policy approach in this category. Indeed, beneath the self-gratifying spin, which has been given a loyal soapbox in the form of mainstream media venues such as talk radio and cable news, the Bush Administration's management of security policy after September 11th is as hamfisted and misdirected as in the summer of 2001 which allowed 9/11.

One of the clearest indicators of a philosophical shortcoming on the part of American defensive strategists naval port protections is the fact that so many vessels and containers essentially enter into the country without inspection. This is a fairly unconscionable oversight given the immediately of the threat. However, ships are afforded substantial freedoms in docking at the United States after undergoing little to no scrutiny. Smuggling of weapons, explosives drugs and even human beings is an attractive option to terrorists who view the seas as comparably untouched by the structures of defense and authority. Such is to say that "containers are rarely inspected on their journey, and provide easy cover for smugglers to transport drugs, weapons and people, especially to the European ports, which attract tens of thousands of illegal migrants from the Middle East, Africa and Asia each year." (Koknar, 2) There are clear indications in the case of this circumstance that more intensive container inspection will actually serve as a significant deterrent for those intent upon moving contraband into westernized nations. An example of this defensive success may be found in the intersection between Europe and the Middle East which is uniquely situated in Turkey. This nation and European Union aspirant "was a prime transit route for human traffickers for many years. Law enforcement efforts, however, seem to have started to pay off recently, as southern European authorities report that the traffickers now prefer Tunisian and Libyan routes to transit their human cargo instead of Turkey." (Koknar, 3) These are generally anti-smuggling and piracy measures which should figure into an effective and concerted strategy, but this discussion should reveal that 9/11 is the most appropriate way of measuring the threat facing America in the maritime venue.

At this juncture, the attacks on the U.S.S. Cole and the Limburg remain templates for considering the danger of maritime terror. This discussion should imply above all else that this idea is woefully shortcoming in its provision of insight for defense and security strategies. It is far more accurate to draw security recommendations based on the failures that had allowed the occurrence of September 11th. The sheer shock and the failure -- in spite of what is presented in this discussion as ample evidence -- to anticipate the scale possible in a terrorist attack as would occur on 9/11 did largely conspire to its occurrence. At present, the same could be said in retrospect were a maritime attack on that intended scale to occur today.

Therefore, it is important to identify the security failures in post-9/11 security orientation that have created this lag in defensive evolution. In response to the unexpected scale of disaster on 9/11, the United States government swiftly adopted a hardline policy approach that was two-fold. The first element of United States doctrine which changed dramatically was its foreign relations tactics. The president asked Congress for broad powers in selecting the necessary military conflicts abroad to prevent any further terrorist aggression on American soil. This would help to reinvigorate the premise which should perhaps have been perceived as obsolete in light of the events of September 11th, that America could enjoy full insulation from its global activities by 'taking the fight to the enemy.' As 9/11 would show, it is no longer reasonable to rely on the idea that the displacement of conflict to faraway places such as Afghanistan and Iraq will in turn mean the inherency of protection from collateral aggression or violence on American soil. As this concerns the threat of a maritime vulnerability, there has been a remarkable effort on the part of the current presidential administration to actually undermine opportunities at improving port security. While defensive resources have been moved overseas to fight foreign wars to the prevention of terrorism, the current administration has actually argued vociferously in favor of the management and ownership of port securities by United Arab Emirates' state-controlled firm, DP. In 2006, "brushing aside objections from Republicans and Democrats alike, President Bush endorsed the takeover of shipping operations at six major U.S. seaports by a state-owned business in the United Arab Emirates. He pledged to veto any bill Congress might approve to block the agreement." (AP, 1) the strenuous support which the president vied for in support of a move that many public figures, private enterprisers and ordinary Americans speculated would stimulate further security disconnect from our major ports and instigate greater threat to American security.

This inexplicable selling out of American ports would be complemented by another element of post-9/11 security policy which seems clearly to misunderstand the source of that which threatens it. This element of the War on Terror would formalize as a sweeping piece of legislation aimed directly at the American people. Entitled the U.S.A. Patriot Act, its name is indicative of its intent to employ draconian governmental practices as a means to enforcing domestic loyalty. With no input from the public and a silence from Congress that suggested either total and unanimous concurrence with the unprecedented new legislation or a fear of the political repercussions to opposing any action designed to prevent future acts of such devastation.

Passed on October 24 of 2001, not even two months after an event which was said to have forever altered the American way of life, the Patriot Act's controversial nature would not be explored before its passage due to a reluctance on the part of lawmakers to risk roiling an already emotional public. Its adoption and subsequent implementation would suggest that the American public was done a great disservice by its elected officials for their failure to pose the needed legal objections to its numerous and glaring diversions from the U.S. At its most basic, the Act is intended to prevent terrorism by increasing government surveillance entitlements, removing obstacles to criminal investigation, breaking down the wall between criminal investigation and counterterrorism and reducing the protections to individual rights against illegal searches and seizures, undue criminal investigation and a laxity in the standards for mounting of evidence against any individual suspected of terrorism. At its most basic, the Patriot Act changes the rules of the Constitution by adding the clause of a potential link to terrorism to any case in which the government may seek broader investigative and prosecutorial rights.

Ironically, the U.S. government would habitually fail at finding ways to incorporate this strategy into the prosecution of piracy on the high seas. Instead, these regulations have been used to wiretap ordinary Americans, to engage in search and seizure without legal clearance and to monitor library book checkouts, medical records and internet browsing activities of ordinary Americans. Simultaneously, the U.S. would be strangely slower in developing methods of more closely and accurately scrutinizing incoming sea vessels, cargo containers and individuals.