Landmark 4th and 5th Amendment

Landmark 4th and 5th Amendment Issues in Law Enforcement

In the United States, criminal procedure underwent a tremendous evolution during the second half of the 20th century. Prior to several important cases that led to the ultimate resolution of issues by the U.S. Supreme Court, accused persons and criminal defendants lacked any appreciable protections to guarantee their constitutional rights in any practical or meaningful sense, particularly in certain areas of the country and especially with respect to persons of the then-persecuted minority classes (Dershowitz, 2002). Among other things, persons arrested by police were routinely deprived of the most basic comforts such as food and water; they were subjected to prolonged hostile interrogation without the benefit of counsel, and they were frequently coerced and even beaten to produce signed confessions of the crimes of which they were supposed to be considered innocent pending proof to the contrary adduced at their criminal trials (Schmalleger, 2009).

Three Landmark Cases in American Law Enforcement and Criminal Procedure

While there were many criminal justice cases, social factors, and pivotal events that contributed to and shaped the evolution of the modern American criminal justice system, three Supreme Court decisions in particular were responsible for introducing specific changes to the criminal procedures of arrest and custodial interrogation. Both individually and especially in combination, the series of three cases of Spano v. New York (1959), Miranda v. Arizona (1966), and Terry v. Ohio (1968) produced radical changes that resulted in significantly greater constitutional protections for those accused of crimes in the U.S. (Zalman, 2008). They played an important role in changing the rules of policing and law enforcement operations; and they generated and represented cultural and social changes to the very fabric of American society from the perspective of the rights of citizens in relation to governmental authorities.

In Spano, a young man was arrested for the shooting death of another man during the course of a physical alteration arising from the fact that the eventual victim had stolen money from the defendant when they were both at a bar (Zalman, 2008). Spano followed the other man out of the bar and confronted about the theft him nearby. The accused man was an accomplished boxer and during the physical altercation that ensued, he knocked Spano to the ground and beat him fairly seriously. Spano then returned home to retrieve a handgun and returned to find the boxer, whereupon he shot and killed him. Spano was convicted of murder and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the conviction was reversed on several grounds by virtue of constitutional violations of Spano's rights (Zalman, 2008).

During the police investigation of the matter, Spano was not permitted to consult an attorney even though he had requested to do so several times (Zalman, 2008). There was also evidence that the police attempted to use psychological ploys involving guilt over fabricated trouble Spano had caused a good friend and that friend's family. Finally, when Spano still refused to confess, he was interrogated aggressively by a group of experienced law enforcement personnel and he was taken back to the scene of the shooting and prompted to re-enact it and respond to questions about it. There was also evidence that Spano was operating at a lower-than-average level of intellectual capacity. The Supreme Court determined that Spano's confession should not have been introduced against him at trial because it was not given freely and in conjunction with the right of consultation with and representation by legal counsel (Zalman, 2008).

In Terry, a police officer on patrol noticed two men behaving suspiciously, apparently "casing out" a local store for felonious purposes (Schmalleger, 2009). The officer approached the men for questioning in the context of a constitutionally permissible investigative detention short of arrest. During the process of that exchange, the police officer conducted a search of the external clothing of Terry that revealed the presence of an illegal concealed weapon for which Terry was arrested and subsequently tried and sentenced. On appeal, Terry argued that the conviction should be thrown out because the search that produced the evidence of the weapon in his possession was improper because it was an impermissible search of his person without a warrant or probable cause as required by the 4th Amendment (Schmalleger, 2009).

The Supreme Court decided that the type of search the police officer conducted was not prohibited by the 4th Amendment. Instead, it was a reasonable and appropriate means of ensuring the safety of the officer from concealed weapons in a tactical situation in which that concern was appropriate in light of the totality of the circumstances in which it occurred. While the 4th Amendment does prohibit more invasive searches with the intention of finding evidence of crimes, (such as for concealed contraband or of small containers), it does not prelude an external frisk now known as a Terry frisk or Terry stop, in which the police simply ensure their safety by identifying armed individuals in suspicious circumstances (Schmalleger, 2009).

In Miranda, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of rape and he was subjected to the custodial interrogation techniques that were typical of the era. He was deprived of comforts such as sleep, water, food, and a sanitary bathroom facility. He was interrogated aggressively until he produced a confession to the crime, on the basis of which he was convicted of rape. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was reversed on the basis of the improper questioning and the deprivation of the defendant's opportunity to consult counsel before answering any interrogation questions. Miranda generated a series of specific obligations on the part of law enforcement personnel in connection with interrogating persons under arrest or in custodial custody (Zalman, 2008). While those changes are often referred to as "Miranda rights," they are actually not rights; they are rules with which police must comply to prevent confessions and other testimony elicited improperly from being excluded from the evidence available to the prosecution to introduce at trial (Hendrie, 1997).