State v. Burrell
1. In the State of New Hampshire, Marc Burrell was convicted in a jury trial on the count of manslaughter. State v. Burrell refers to Burrell’s appeal of the original conviction. The grounds of Burrell’s appeal were that the jury was improperly instructed on the parameters of criminal liability. In the original case, Burrell accidentally shot someone.
2. Crucial to the Burrell case is the definition of a “voluntary act.” Under New Hampshire criminal codes, "[a] person is not guilty of an offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." RSA 626:1, I. Because Burrell’s act can be considered involuntary, Burrell appealed on the grounds that criminal liability was not properly proven. Burrell is claiming that the jury did not sufficiently distinguish between a voluntary and an involuntary act.
3. The courts ruled against Burrell, claiming that the trial judge wasn’t required to give the jury as much specific instruction as Burrell had hoped. “As long as the trial court adequately instructs the jury on the applicable law, the court is under no obligation to include the specific language requested by a party,” (State v. Burrell).
4. In my opinion, contextual evidence does matter when determining whether an act was voluntary or not. Burrell claimed that only his last act—the act that ultimately led to the death of the victim—had to be shown to be voluntary in order for him to be criminally liable for the death. However, there were a series of events precipitating the fatal shooting including playing Russian roulette, drinking alcohol, and other risk factors that were voluntary.
References
State v. Burrell....
Leagle. Retrieved online: https://www.leagle.com/decision/1992850135nh7151731
State v. Newman
1. The appellant, Newman, claimed that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder that rendered his behavior involuntary. Newman had been convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), which in the state of Oregon entails criminal liability. In his appeal, which was ultimately heard by the Oregon Supreme Court, Newman referred to ORS 161.095(1), which “requires proof that a person engaged in the voluntary act of driving for criminal liability,” (Payment, 2013).
2. The State argued that ORS 161.095(1) does not apply to vehicular codes, and that vehicular codes are the crucial grounds for Newman’s conviction. The fact that he was sleep driving was therefore argued to be irrelevant to the case. In other words, the State argued that it does not matter if the DUII occurred voluntarily or not. However, the State did reverse and remand because the critical voluntary act was not intoxication but driving.
3. Newman argued that “sleep driving” was an involuntary act. One of the key facts in the case was that Newman had been drinking with friends earlier in the evening and actually asked a designated driver to take him home. The DUII occurred later, while he was sleep driving. Evidence and testimony from a physician helped to bolster Newman’s case, as people with Newman’s disorder are not acting voluntarily in their sleep.
4. The Oregon Supreme Court focused on the theme of “voluntary acts.” A person who is sleeping is by definition not conscious, and therefore any acts that take place in the sleep state cannot be voluntary acts. Whereas the Courts do refer to the prior case of State v. Miller (1990), in which the voluntary act in question…
