Legal Cases Criminal Codes and Liability

State v. Burrell
1. In the State of New Hampshire, Marc Burrell was convicted in a jury trial on the count of manslaughter. State v. Burrell refers to Burrell’s appeal of the original conviction. The grounds of Burrell’s appeal were that the jury was improperly instructed on the parameters of criminal liability. In the original case, Burrell accidentally shot someone.
2. Crucial to the Burrell case is the definition of a “voluntary act.” Under New Hampshire criminal codes, "[a] person is not guilty of an offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." RSA 626:1, I. Because Burrell’s act can be considered involuntary, Burrell appealed on the grounds that criminal liability was not properly proven. Burrell is claiming that the jury did not sufficiently distinguish between a voluntary and an involuntary act.
3. The courts ruled against Burrell, claiming that the trial judge wasn’t required to give the jury as much specific instruction as Burrell had hoped. “As long as the trial court adequately instructs the jury on the applicable law, the court is under no obligation to include the specific language requested by a party,” (State v. Burrell).
4. In my opinion, contextual evidence does matter when determining whether an act was voluntary or not. Burrell claimed that only his last act—the act that ultimately led to the death of the victim—had to be shown to be voluntary in order for him to be criminally liable for the death. However, there were a series of events precipitating the fatal shooting including playing Russian roulette, drinking alcohol, and other risk factors that were voluntary.
References
State v. Burrell. Leagle. Retrieved online: https://www.leagle.com/decision/1992850135nh7151731
State v. Newman
1. The appellant, Newman, claimed that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder that rendered his behavior involuntary. Newman had been convicted for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), which in the state of Oregon entails criminal liability. In his appeal, which was ultimately heard by the Oregon Supreme Court, Newman referred to ORS 161.095(1), which “requires proof that a person engaged in the voluntary act of driving for criminal liability,” (Payment, 2013).
2. The State argued that ORS 161.095(1) does not apply to vehicular codes, and that vehicular codes are the crucial grounds for Newman’s conviction. The fact that he was sleep driving was therefore argued to be irrelevant to the case. In other words, the State argued that it does not matter if the DUII occurred voluntarily or not. However, the State did reverse and remand because the critical voluntary act was not intoxication but driving.
3. Newman argued that “sleep driving” was an involuntary act. One of the key facts in the case was that Newman had been drinking with friends earlier in the evening and actually asked a designated driver to take him home. The DUII occurred later, while he was sleep driving. Evidence and testimony from a physician helped to bolster Newman’s case, as people with Newman’s disorder are not acting voluntarily in their sleep.
4. The Oregon Supreme Court focused on the theme of “voluntary acts.” A person who is sleeping is by definition not conscious, and therefore any acts that take place in the sleep state cannot be voluntary acts. Whereas the Courts do refer to the prior case of State v. Miller (1990), in which the voluntary act in question was intoxication, in Newman’s case they show that the voluntary act critical to the case was the driving, not the intoxication.
5. Sleep driving is difficult to prove, but the courts in this case did seem satisfied with the level of proof that Newman was indeed unconscious. In that case, the sleep driving precludes actus reus generally.
6. Based on the scientific evidence, it does seem that sleep driving is possible, as difficult as it is for most people to believe.
References
Payment, C. (2013). State v. Newman. Willamette University. Retrieved online: http://willamette.edu/law/resources/journals/wlo/orsupreme/2013/05/state-v.-newman.html
Commonwealth v. Pestinikas
1. Walter and Helen Pestinikas agreed to be Joseph Kly’s caregivers, and cleared their role with nurses and caregivers. Contracts between Kly and Pestinkas seem spurious and only oral. Kly originally hired the Pestinikas for funeral arrangement consultation, but Kly later agreed to allow them to be his primary caregivers after he had been hospitalized. Evidence presented in the trial showed that the Pestinikas couple had been withdrawing money from Kly’s account but not providing him with the care they had agreed to provide. Evidence showed that Kly had not actually been living with the Pestinkases, who housed Kly off site, “subjected to the elements and did not have access to a refrigerator or running water,” (Isaac, 2010). The jury determined that even though no formal written contract had governed the relationship between Kly and the Pestinkases, that the Pestinkases were nevertheless criminally liable. After Kly was found dead, the Pestinkases were charged and convicted of 3rd degree murder. They appealed.
2. The presence of an actual contract is a troubling issue in this case, but ultimately, the Pestinkases were grossly negligent and their behaviors led to the death of Kly. The jury made their decision based on 18 Pa.C.S. § 301(b), which shows that omission can be a basis of liability. However, 18 Pa.C.S. § 301(b) also stresses the importance of voluntary acts. Fact: the Pestinkases voluntarily entered into a verbal agreement with Kly to be his primary caregiver. Fact: the Pestinkases did not fulfill their obligation to care for Kly, leading to Kly’s death. Fact: the Pestinkases voluntarily neglected/omitted to perform their caregivingn duties.
3. The courts show how the case involves a confluence of criminal and civil law, as the civil law covers the nature of the contract. The courts also distinguish between legal duty and moral duty, and uphold the legality of the contract even though it was not a formal one. Ultimately, the courts determined that the failure to fulfill the terms of the civil contract was sufficient for the jury to make its original conviction. The majority opinion also argued that it was not just omission but deliberate intent that led to the death. In the dissenting opinion, McEwen argues that the omission clause is insufficient, and that the appellants were correct that the jury in the original trial had been misinformed about how to interpret omission or a voluntary act.
4. The Pestinkases did have a moral duty to care for Kly, based on testimony by healthcare workers. Therefore, their legal duty can be inferred by their informal contract. Agreeing to take care of Kly, and taking his money to do so, implies the Pestinkases were fully cognizant of their duties in fulfilling a contract. Their negligence in not providing the care agreed upon is the crucial element in the case.

References
Isaac (2010). COMMONWEALTH V. PESTINIKAS 617 A.2D 1339 (1992). DVI. Retrieved online: http://www.justiceguy.com/?p=66