Vietnamization's role in the collapse of South Vietnam

Vietnamization of the Vietnam War

More than 25 years after the last helicopter lifted from the United States embassy in Saigon, the Vietnam War continues to cast a shadow on American history. Whether the preservation of South Vietnam was worth the human and financial costs to both the Americans and Vietnamese continues to be the subject of contentious debate.

The chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces in 1975 was a blow to the collective American psyche that had, until then, yet to experience such a failure. By then, the United States had spent an estimated $150 billion on the Vietnam War, wreaking havoc on its economy in the process. It had dropped seven million tons of bombs in both North and South Vietnam. The war had served as a divisive force, causing tense civil unrest throughout the country.

More importantly, of the 2.7 million American men and women who served in Vietnam, there were 300,000 wounded. An estimated 58,000 more were killed (Dudley 17).

This paper examines how the U.S. military policy of Vietnamization contributed significantly to the chaos and collapse of democratic and military structures and the eventual loss in the Vietnam War.

The first part of this paper examines the roots of American involvement in South Vietnam, as well as the American objectives in maintaining two separate Vietnamese nations. In the next part, the paper examines the origins of the policy of Vietnamization, tracing how this policy evolved through the terms of President Johnson to President Nixon. In this section, the paper also looks at how Vietnamization was enacted. The next section details how these Vietnamization policies ultimately proved insufficient in light of the North Vietnamese offensives from 1972 to the final offensive in 1975.

In the last part, the paper concludes that Vietnamization failed not as a policy per se, but because Vietnamization failed to meet its own goals. The South Vietnamese armed forces was not yet equipped or trained to stave off their North Vietnamese opponents. This weakness was exacerbated by the fact that Vietnamization was enacted at the very time when the North Vietnamese armed forces were gaining strength in the countryside.

I. American Involvement in South Vietnam

The entire country of Vietnam fell under French colonial rule in 1883, a little more than three decades after France began a military campaign, ostensibly to protect the lives of its Roman Catholic missionaries. Despite sporadic attempts at national independence, the French easily remained in control of Vietnam until World War II (Dudley 24).

With the Second World War, however, France itself fell under German control, while its Indochinese territories were occupied by Japan. This presented the Vietnamese forces with an unprecedented chance to win their independence. The strongest of these factions were the Communist Viet Minh, based in the North, headed by Ho Chi Minh (Bowman 15).

By the 1950s, the Communist Viet Minh had established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North. In the south, on the other hand, the non-Communist factions of Ngo Dihn Diem established the Republic of Vietnam. The two states established themselves as separate, distinct states.

Faced with this dichotomy, the United States government under then-President Eisenhower threw his support behind Ngo Dihn Diem's factions. This decision, forged in the prevailing conditions of the Cold War, was more a decision against Ho Chi Minh, who was, in Eisenhower's words, "indoctrinated in Moscow...an associate of the Russian Borodin" (38).

United States involvement was premised on the "domino theory," the idea that if Vietnam falls to Communism, other satellite countries would follow. The United States, Eisenhower insisted, could not afford the possibility of a "dictatorship that is inimical to the free world" (Eisenhower 39).

The United States extended military aid through the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), headed by Lt. General John W. O'Daniel. Their mandate was to shore up the weakening South Vietnamese government and to preserve a separate, non-Communist South Vietnam.

The MAAG was charged with creating a national South Vietnamese armed forces capable of repelling Communist aggressors and maintaining the integrity of the demilitarized zone that marked as separate North and South Vietnam. Towards this, the United States sent an initial force of 150,000 troops, incorporating the lessons learned from the Korean War.

By 1968, South Vietnam had an armed forces composed of 250,000 troops. Patterned after the United States forces, the South Vietnamese troops were divided into an armed forces, navy, air force and marine corps. Through U.S. military aid, these forces were also furnished with equipment like artillery, tanks, ships and airplanes (Herring 57).

In addition to these forces, the South Vietnamese military was also aided by the Territorial forces, which were smaller, militia-like organizations. These Territorial forces were dispatched throughout the countryside and were provided with training, as well as equipment like jeeps, radios and small arms (Herring 59).

In comparison to the joint United States and South Vietnamese forces, the Viet Cong armed forces seemed small and weak. The armed forces of 80,000 guerillas, in addition to 80,000 North Vietnamese troops, were further hampered by their fragile supply lines. Despite these disadvantages, however, the Viet Cong score important victories over their more numerous opponents. These include an early 1963 victory in the battle of Ap Bac and a later, more massive and coordinated attacks during the Tet Offensive in January 1969 (Dudley, 263-265).

By 1969, then President Nixon recognized the changing public perceptions regarding the war in Vietnam. By this time, the Senate was already holding hearings to investigate the background and make recommendations for the future of the Vietnam War. All over the country, people agitated for peace or, at the very least, for an end to the United States involvement in Vietnam.

In light of the growing public and Congressional discontent, Nixon authorized the secret bombing of known Viet Cong strongholds in Vietnam. The number of American troops stationed in Vietnam reached its peak of 543,000 in 1969, under the Nixon administration (Dudley 266).

However, even Nixon recognized that increasing or just maintaining American presence in Vietnam was no longer a politically defensible cause. On June 8, 1969, Nixon set the policy of Vietnamization in play by announcing the initial withdrawal of 25,000 American troops. The American troops were to be replaced by South Vietnamese soldiers (Bowman 229).

II. Vietnamization

Before discussing the effects of Vietnamization, it is useful to define the policy of Vietnamization itself.

The policy of Vietnamization was composed of two elements. The first, immediate factor was the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. The second component was the transfer of military responsibilities to the South Vietnamese troops (Herring 198-199).

Thus, aside from removing American troops from battle, the larger goal of Vietnamization was, as historian Guy Paulker writes, "the consolidation of the emerging politico-military system in South Vietnam" (cited in Schultz 55). In other words, the task of winning the war and running the country would be assumed the South Vietnamese government and military.

B. Nixon's Vietnamization

Nixon first used the term "Vietnamization" in a televised speech on November 3, 1969. In this speech, Nixon called on the "silent majority" to support his plan for "Vietnamization" and the gradual withdrawal of American troops from the war (Bowman 242).

For many analysts, the Tet Offensive shifted the focus of the war, highlighting the failures of Johnson's Americanization policies. Under Johnson's administration, the goal was to neutralize the influence of the Viet Cong in the countryside and to bring them under the control of the South Vietnamese government.

This shift from Americanization to Vietnamization was facilitated by two changes in the civilian and military leadership of U.S. forces in South Vietnam. The new commander of the U.S. Military Command, Creighton Abrams, pulled away from the offensive strategies like bombings. Instead, Abrams prioritized pacification and civic action (Schultz 54).

Abrams initiated a "Strategic Objective Plan" which incorporated the new concept of area security. This strategy was premised on the need to address the need for providing the rural population with security through a combination of combat operations and, more importantly, through pacification strategies (Herring 85-86).

The second change was the appointment of Robert Komer to the Civil Operators and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) in 1967. The CORDS office was charged with expanding the scope and pace of pacification strategies in 1966. However, this mandate did not receive priority attention until after the Tet Offensive. Komer and his CORDS successor William Colby were strong advocates of these pacification programs (Mann 243-244).

The new military command under Abrams and the growing mandate of CORDS highlighted the contrast between Johnson's Americanization and the new Vietnamization policies being set in place. In theory, Americans were preparing to surrender the reins of the war to a prepared South Vietnamese government and military.

C. The Components of Vietnamization

Towards the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the American military policy was characterized by two interrelated components - Vietnamization of the controlling troops and pacification in the countryside.

1. Vietnamization

The first component of Vietnamization was improving and modernizing the equipment and training of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Once this was done, the plan called for the transfer of day-to-day combat operations from American control to the South Vietnamese. Following this, American forces were to unilaterally withdraw from South Vietnam (Nixon, "Vietnamization," 146-147).

For South Vietnam, Vietnamization thus signaled two major changes. First, it marked the beginning of military de-escalation on the part of the United States. Concurrently, Vietnamization also heralded the start of the South Vietnamese government's attempt to create a military force capable of repelling both the North Vietnamese Armed forces and the Viet Cong forces that proliferated in the South Vietnamese countryside.

Nixon's withdrawal of troops early in his administration provided the foundation for this de-escalation. However, the key instigator for Vietnamization was not Nixon, nut his Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

Laird had long been a proponent of Vietnamizing the war. Laird believed that instead of continuing to send troops to Vietnam, the United States could instead focus on training South Vietnamese forces, arming them with the proper equipment and leaving them to fulfill the defense and regulatory functions previously filled by the American forces (Nixon Memoirs, 392).

Laird formulated the idea after a 1969 visit to South Vietnam, where he formed an optimistic assessment of the training and defense potential of the South Vietnamese forces. Largely based on Laird's assessment, Nixon agrees to gradually reduce the American troops in Vietnam (Nixon Memoirs, 392).

Nixon, however, had problems with how to define the actions itself. He had built his campaign around a strong platform of anti-Communism, and did not want to be viewed as admitting surrender to the far-smaller Communist forces. Terms like de-escalation, removal and withdrawal seemed tinged with the negative connotation of defeat.

Laird once again came through by coining the phrase "Vietnamization." Though premised on United States withdrawal, Vietnamization focused the concern on passing the reins of power to the legitimate South Vietnamese government. Nixon thus introduced the American people to the noble idea of Vietnamization in his "Silent Majority" speech (Mann 644). Eventually, he insisted that every member of his cabinet use the phrase Vietnamization to address the U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam (Boettcher 263).

The implementation of Vietnamization was divided into two phases. The first phase involved the continued American participation in the Vietnam War. During the second phase, the focus would shift towards preparing the South Vietnamese armed forces to defend South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese armed forces and the Viet Cong. In addition to the training, phase two also involved arming the South Vietnamese with the latest weapons and technology to enable them to stave off the Communist forces (Davidson 107).

2. Pacification

Vietnamization would occur over a three-year period and be divided into three main programs. The first program continued to address area security, the provision of security and protection for the rural population. This meant that the ARVN would be directly involved in providing security for all levels, from peasant individuals to households to small political groupings in the countryside. Such close interaction with the rural peasantry would also have the fringe effect of neutralizing sympathy with the North Vietnamese.

Corollary to this, the second program was targeted towards weakening Viet Cong political organization in the countryside.

This involved neutralizing Viet Cong through practices like disrupting enemy communication networks and placing villages and hamlets under surveillance.

In addition, programs like "Open Arms" sought to persuade Viet Cong members and supporters to surrender, through the promise of various rewards and amnesty programs that suspend punishment. A more punitive program, "Phoenix," involved a series of direct attacks against known members of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside.

The third program aimed towards creating a "sense of community" between the Vietnamese armed forces and the rural villages. This sense of community was supposed to lay the foundation for future political, social and economic reform after the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The success of these three programs, however, was premised on the capability of the United States and the Vietnamese armies to maintain area security in the rural region, which was the Viet Cong stronghold. The first step was increasing the Vietnamese armed forces from 1.13 million to 1.18 million troops (Schultz 56). The United States was then charged with providing these troops with training and equipment.

Initially, securing the rural areas necessitated the physical presence of the United States and later, the Vietnamese forces. This physical presence, however, was aimed at establishing "security" first, rather than "control." The distinction was important, because both governments wanted to define the occupation as a friendly force, geared towards the security of the area.

Only after this security is in place can the Vietnamese armed forces truly control the rural population. In this formulation, "control" is defined by the Vietnamese armed force's ability to mobilize the rural population physically, politically and psychologically to act in support of the South Vietnamese government. The logic behind this argument was that both security and control go hand in hand. Merely providing security risked a tenuous hold in the region, one that could change instantly should the North Vietnamese launch attacks similar to the Tet Offensive.

A significant component of the Vietnamization policies was the rural development program, a program intended to introduce pacification in the countryside. This development program aimed to address the concerns of rural peasants, who may already be sympathetic to the Viet Cong or who may continue to harbor distrust against the Americans and, by extension, the South Vietnamese forces.

The rural development programs included the revival of a rural administration program, farmer incentives such as land reform, and providing essential services to the previously ignored rural areas. These services included education, medical and refugee care (Schultz 57).

These Vietnamization and pacification strategies aimed to help the Vietnamese armed forces attain legitimacy and support with the rural population. The aim was to increase popular acceptance by showing peasants and rural folk that, unlike the Communists from North Vietnam, South Vietnamese government was able to offer programs like land reform and self-administration. These were programs that offered tangible and immediate benefits for the masses.

3. The Twin Strategies

In summary, Vietnamization policies encompassed a number of military and pacification strategies. The main goal was to prepare the South Vietnamese armed forces to assume the duties of repelling North Vietnamese forces. However, the means to reach this goal went beyond simply beefing up the military ranks.

The strategy of pacification thus formed an important part in ensuring Vietnamization's success. Towards this, the South Vietnamese government took great pains to establish a sense of political community in the countryside, even as their armed forces prepared to assume responsibility for the Vietnamese conflict.

Evaluating the Policy of Vietnamization

Vietnamization

By early 1972, the two phases of Vietnamization were almost completed. Most of the United States troops had been withdrawn. The United States logistics and intelligence structures had been dismantled. American bases had been turned over to the Vietnamese armed forces. The U.S. advisors set in place through the CORD program had also been reduced to only a few division levels at the various corps branches of the South Vietnamese armed forces (Palmer 118).

During this time, the South Vietnamese Army deployed a new division, composed mostly of new recruits, to guard the important demilitarized zone (DMZ) that had previously been guarded by U.S. Marines. By doing so, the South Vietnamese Army placed an untested and relatively untrained army contingent to an important battle site that had been the target of previous attack.

The end of March 1969 was the end of the monsoon season, and it also ushered in the renewed Communist offensive from North Vietnam. Some 15,000 troops, armed with tanks, artillery and even anti-aircraft guns, converged on the demilitarized zone. Though the beginning of the dry season was a logical time for a Communist attack, this Easter Offensive still caught the South Vietnamese armed forces by surprise, highlighting their ill preparation for dealing with Communist attack (Bowman 224).

The Easter Offensive was not limited to the DMZ. Within the next few weeks, North Vietnamese forces attacked from bases in Laos and Cambodia. Heavy fighting occurred in An Loc, an area located just sixty miles along a highway that led directly into the capital of Saigon (Bowman 225).

Recognizing that the fall of Saigon was a very real possibility, Nixon, upon the advice of his special adviser Henry Kissinger, sent B-52 bombers to strike targets around Hanoi. Nixon also authorized the U.S. 7th Fleet to mine the Haiphong Harbor. Most importantly, he authorized Kissinger to insinuate the United States' willingness to launch a tactical nuclear strike against military targets north of the demilitarized zone (Kimball 305).

Many Allied commanders agreed that the United States effort was the only reason Saigon did not fall during the Easter Offensive. Despite this, however, Nixon insisted on keeping his withdrawal timetable and the removal of United States troops from South Vietnam continued. By removing the troops, Nixon had kept his pledge to the American people of withdrawing American troops from Vietnam.

However, as the Easter Offensive clearly showed, the South Vietnamese armed forces were nowhere nearly prepared to deal with the dual threats presented by the North Vietnamese Army and by the Viet Cong. The South Vietnamese armed forces were not trained in how to use the weapons supplied by the United States. Furthermore, the program to supposedly create a new South Vietnamese officer corps was never initiated (Herring 262-264).

B. Pacification

In addition to failing to provide a well-trained and responsive armed forces, Vietnamization also failed to neutralize the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside. Despite the Open Arms and Phoenix operations, few Viet Cong surrendered. In fact, the ranks of peasants joining the Viet Cong grew (Schultz 102).

Therefore, while the United States forces withdrew, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces remained intact or even grew in strength. The success of the Easter Offensive demonstrated that the influence of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in the countryside was far from neutralized.

The goal of pacification was to progress from security to mobilizing the peasants for political control, motivating the peasants to actively support the government. In many areas, however, the South Vietnamese government was unable to advance beyond a mere physical presence.

IV. Conclusion

As with most policies, Vietnamization was based on an ideal concept. The problem lay in its execution.

Eager to placate a public that was increasingly against the war in Vietnam, Nixon stuck to an unrealistic withdrawal timetable. As the Easter Offensive clearly showed, the South Vietnamese armed forces were clearly not yet capable of withstanding concerted attacks from the North Vietnamese.

In addition, the South Vietnamese government was unable to establish a political community in the countryside, where support for the Viet Cong was strongest.

In these areas, Viet Cong forces continued to grow, taking advantage of their government's failure to establish legitimacy or any form of political community.

Given these shortcomings, the fall of Saigon was inevitable. On April 30, 1975, the North Vietnamese forces captured Saigon, signaling to the world the failure of America's Vietnamization policy.