Will Congress End the War on Terror

Contemporary Political Issue: The War on Terror Introduction On September 20th, 2001, President George W. Bush proposed the new Office of Homeland Security to help confront a new threat to national security in the first step of what became the War on Terrorism (Select Committee on Homeland Security, 2004). One week earlier, Congress had signed off on the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), allowing the president broad scope for using military force against countries or organizations who “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” terrorism (Ackerman & Hathaway, 2011).

17 years and more than $2 trillion later, the War on Terrorism continues with no sign of easing up (Amadeo, 2018). Though President Trump ran a campaign on getting American soldiers out of the Middle East and letting other countries handle the ISIS threat, the war on terror rhetoric out of the White House has continued unabated, with sights now set on regime change in Iran, a nation that Trump has singled out as being the biggest supporter of terrorism in the world.

During his campaign, Trump identified Saudi Arabia as the “world’s biggest funder of terrorism” (Williams, 2018)—and the shift indicates a new alliance between the Saudis and the White House and the potential likelihood of an escalation of conflict in the region, just as the ISIS threat in Syria appears to be mitigated (Colling, 2016). So while some voters and politicians want the War on Terror to end, others support its continuation.

This paper will discuss the sides and whether change on this issue is likely to come about anytime soon. Sides to the Issue The sides to the issue of ending the War on Terror cross political affiliation and encompass Republicans, Democrats, Libertarians and Tea Party groups. The anti-war advocates are numerous as a result—but the pro-war, pro-regime change, anti-terror advocates are also numerous and powerful.

The complexity of the issue also arises from the fact that those who are said to support terror (states like Iran) are defended by anti-war proponents who argue that Iran may be a supporter of Hezbollah but that this is not the same thing as Saudi Arabia supporting ISIS, since, as they say Hezbollah is there to defend Lebanon from Israel (Sputnik, 2018) and not there to attack the U.S. or oppose its national security interests.

Mullen (2016) provides the argument of the anti-War on Terror side by stating that the War on Terror has been “as complete a failure as the War on Drugs” with its “continually increasing budgets, exploding proliferation of what is made war upon, increasingly harsh measures following each successive failure and enormous collateral damage.” The proliferation of spying on American citizens by the NSA has fueled the anti-War on Terror side as well, with whistleblowers like Edward Snowden and Julian Assange both hailed as heroes in exile (Price, 2015).

The interests of those who oppose the AUMF are rooted in a desire to preserve the right to privacy, a desire to curb spending on foreign wars, a desire to stop regime change abroad, and a desire bring American forces home. On the other side are those who support the War on Terror. At the time of Bush’s invasion of Afghanistan, Americans supported the War 2-1 (Langer, 2001). Their interests were security and a desire for atonement for 9/11.

By 2012, however, only 1 in 4 Americans supported a continuation of the War (Madison, 2012). The reason for this could be that the majority of Americans feel that the U.S. is winning or has won the War already (Rasmussen, 2018).

Today, though support may be vacillating among the public—in Congress, Senators Bob Corker (Republican) and Tim Kaine (Democrat) have shown that the War still has bi-partisan support at least in parts of the government as they seek to update the president’s authority to wage war against terrorism and its sponsors in the Middle East by allowing the president to continue to “wage an unlimited war” by granting “the administration the ability to continue conflicts against stateless terrorism organizations and start new ones” while at the same time giving Congress oversight power with a clause in the proposal to ensure that “a congressional review is built in every four years at which point Congress could amend, expand or repeal the president's authority” (Caldwell & Salama, 2018).

Kaine has argued that this proposal is the best chance at achieving bi-partisan support for a bill that both extends and simultaneously (potentially) limits the president’s broad powers in the War on Terror (Caldwell & Salama, 2018). Proponents of the War on Terror do not like the limitations aspect of the bill, while those who oppose the War do not like the extension. If Congress does nothing, the president’s mandate to wage the War on Terror will continue.

What Might Prevent Change Repealing the AUMF does not appear to be an option for today’s Congress. The War is being won as far as the majority of Americans believe, according to the latest Rasmussen poll, and curbing the president’s power to wage war against Terror could mean allowing terror cells to proliferate once more. That means that ending the War on Terror is unlikely to be a reality in the near future.

Senator Rand Paul attempted to pass a bill to repeal the AUMF last year and “the Senate voted 61-36 in a procedural motion to kill Paul’s amendment” (Herb, 2017). With Iran now in the cross-hairs of the White House, which has identified it as the biggest sponsor of terrorism in the world, it looks as though meaningful change to the AUMF in terms of repeal is unlikely.

Additionally, Israel is one of the biggest proponents of taking aim at Iran and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is a huge lobby that empowers many members of Congress—so much so that at times it seems like what Israel wants, Israel typically gets—even if it is out of step with an “America First” policy like that touted by Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign (Rossinow, 2018). Trump has agreed to move the U.S.

Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv in spite of protests, because it is what Israel wants (Hunter, Atta & Hutchinson, 2018).

This is just one example of Trump’s apparent desire to please Israel and promote its interests in the Middle East, and since Israel’s Netanyahu is on record advocating for regime change in Iran and for identifying Iran as the number one terror threat in the world, it is not surprising that Trump has pulled out of the Iran Nuclear Deal that the rest of the world wants to continue to maintain—the rest of the world, except Israel and Saudi Arabia, that is (Irish, El Gamal & Holland, 2018).

With Trump shifting from his position adopted during the campaign that viewed Saudi Arabia as the main sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East and showing support for Israeli aims, the White House, its Saudi alliance (which really goes back decades all the way to the Bushes) and its close ties with Israel (which maintains a strong and powerful influence in today’s Congress) all represent the largest obstacle to any change in the AUMF that might limit or curtail the president’s powers to continue the War on Terror at will, given him since 9/11 and unlikely to be denied him at any point in the future given Paul’s failure to get Congressional support for his proposal to change the AUMF.

How Change Would Occur In order for change to occur with regard to the War on Terror and the president’s authority to wage it at will, Congress would have to take away the powers of the president granted him in the wake of 9/11. Bush obtained a wide-ranging, broadly defined, and sweeping authority to use the military against any group or state that “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” terrorist activities.

The lack of oversight of this power means that the president essentially has a free hand to engage in the War on Terror on multiple fronts, regardless of evidence or feasibility of achieving a successful mission. The War on Terror amounts to an unlimited war thanks to the wording of the AUMF. The proposal by Corker and Kaine is the best option so far for Congress beginning to place some oversight on those powers.

As Epps (2018) notes, “Corker-Kaine seeks to remedy the fuzzy legal situation of our battle against nonstate organizations like ISIL. At the same time, it seeks to ensure that operations against terrorist groups cannot be leveraged into attacks on foreign states or governments.” In other words, the Corker-Kaine bill is the best chance of the anti-War side of the issue obtaining at the very least some limitations on the presidential power to wage the War however he sees fit.

Still, the Corker-Kaine bill may not even do what its drafters intend for it to do. As Fein (2018) points out, Congress has the power to terminate any war at any time, just as it did with Vietnam. However, the Corker-Kaine resolution’s “quadrennial congressional review of presidential wars against international terrorist organizations touted by Mr. Kaine would give the president a blank check in the interim” (Fein, 2018).

It would really do nothing to actually bring an end to the War, and so long as Congress is not opposed to ending the War on Terror for the above mentioned reasons, the Corker-Kaine bill is really more show than anything else.  Moreover, as Everett and Schor (2018) state, the resolution “is currently not supported by Republican leaders who don’t want to do anything to restrict the president — or divide the GOP six months before the midterm elections.” In short, Republicans in Congress are unlikely to do anything to limit the president’s use of power at a time when Republican voters are heading to the polls to cast their support for party politicians opposed to their leader.

The Possibilities for Change in the Future Should Republicans lose seats in midterm elections this year, there may be more willingness on the part of Congress to address the issue of the AUMF—but this is no guarantee. AIPAC has tight control over Congressional members and Netanyahu is a beloved foreign leader among most Congressional members who have demonstrated their approval of him and his ideas with numerous standing ovations during his speaking tours to Congress (Cohen, 2015).

This type of flattery was given to Stalin during his rule over the Soviet Union as well, and few objected to Stalin’s policies and lived to tell about it. Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be any changes to the AUMF in the near future, barring some change of leadership either in Congress, in Israel, or in the White House.

The triumvirate of power that these three represent (with Saudi Arabia representing a +1) indicates that change is unlikely so long as their power and authority remain in place.

The American public may view the War on Terror as won or near completion; the American public may want an end to NSA spying, wartime spending, and regime change in countries in the Middle East—but the triumvirate of power is unlikely to take their views into consideration, since the triumvirate has its own aims, beginning with men like National Security Advisor John Bolton and his mission to achieve regime change in Iran in the name of fighting terrorism (Johnstone, 2018).

Conclusion While the AUMF was passed at a time when Americans wanted to secure the nation and hold terrorists and their sponsors accountable in the wake of 9/11, many Americans today want the president’s power to wage the War on Terror to be curtailed or limited by Congressional oversight.

However, as government policy on this matter is dictated largely by members of Congress who are especially enamored of Israel and want to align themselves with its interests—and since Israel’s Netanyahu is adamant about attacking Iran, a curtail of the president’s war powers under the AUMF is not likely to occur barring some change among today’s current leadership. References Ackerman, B. & Hathaway,.