Airport Security Improvements Since 9/11

Introduction

There are certain historical moments which change everything: 9/11 is one of them. In addition to the seismic policy and personal effects of the tragedy, airport security and attitudes towards airport security have undergone substantial reforms. New screening methods of passengers in airports cost about $4 billion per year, and security is now handled by the government in the form of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), within the Department of Homeland Security, versus the private entities which used to handle security previously for the major carriers (McClure 2005). Security has clearly grown more visible and tighter, but the question arises: is it truly safer to fly in the post-9/11 world? Before 9/11, airport security consisted of a ticket agent asking if you packed your bag yourself, if it had been in your continuous custody since you packed it, and whether you had been given anything to carry aboard by a stranger, along with passing through a metal detector (McClure 2005). Now, there are many additional layers of security, but their efficacy is still being debated.

Administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Secure Flight Program is designed to make domestic and international travel safer through the use of watch-list matching. All passengers are required to submit their name, date of birth, gender, redress number, or Known Traveler number. This list is used to prevent passengers on the No Fly List from boarding or to single out specific passengers from government watch lists for screening. It is also designed to expedite the process of boarding and reduce misidentification and needless delays.

The Secure Flight Program

However, concerns remain that relevant government intelligence departments are not sharing data with the TSA, thus resulting in omissions with the no-fly list. In September 2006, Congress reported that passenger names were still not being checked against the full terrorist watch list and cut funding for Secure Flight by more than 50% (Johnson 2007). Certain "red" behavioral flags also exist: one-way passengers, for example, are subjected to additional scrutiny, given that the 9/11 bombers only bought one-way tickets, presuming no need to return (McClure 2005). But training is still characterized as "spotty," and both weapons and persons exhibiting questionable credentials still manage to evade detection (McClure 2005). On the other hand, the opposite problem may occur: because people have the same name, they may be flagged for being on the no-fly list incorrectly. The late Senator Edward Kennedy was flagged as a potential suspect simply because of his name (McClure 2005).

To quell public discontent with long security lines, the Known Traveler program was created as a response to the Secure Flight Program, to reduce potential airport delays for vetted frequent flyers. Flyers provide biometric data and pass a security assessment for expedited screening (McClure 2005). There have been numerous complaints about the extent to which needless delays have occurred because of security measures and the improper flagging of specific passengers. Although profiling versus targeting of already-known suspicious persons still is supported by a larger percentage of the public than before 9/11, concerns about false positives persist (McClure 2005).

Baggage screening has improved post-9/11. By the latter part of 2003, all checked bags were being screened for explosives, compared to just 5% before 9/11; but because of shortages of equipment and screener personnel, some of the screening is being done with canine bomb-sniffing teams and manual bag searches rather than explosive-detection equipment (Johnson 2007). Screening has also been criticized as heavily reactive. For example, after the foiling of a plot involving liquid explosives, transportation of liquids on-flight was first banned then substantially reduced. This creates the impression that the TSA is always fighting the last battle, versus anticipating novel terrorist techniques.

Screening Technologies and Protocols

There have been insufficient new technological developments in detection, according to critics. This is perhaps understandable, given the daunting technological challenge of developing detectors that are not only sensitive enough to identify explosives from among the wide array of liquids routinely carried on aircraft, but also compact and affordable enough to be widely deployed and quick enough to not unduly impede passenger flow (Johnson 2007).

A number of items which used to go unremarked-upon are now targets of screening. After 9/11, sharp or pointed knives, screwdrivers, box cutters, and other cutting tools were banned on domestic and international flights. By the end of 2002, all checked bags at the nation's 450 airports were checked for explosives. In September 2004, new regulations required that passengers' jackets without metal in them still had to be removed and x-rayed, and passengers selected for secondary screening could be patted down (McClure 2005). This is to prevent the use of metal objects—even cutlery used in-flight—as a weapon in a potential hijacking.

Conclusion

After these precautions were instituted, it has been noteworthy that there have been no successful 9/11-style attacks. But it is uncertain if this is due to improved precautions regarding national security, the terrorist's efficacy, or other unrelated factors. Measuring the success of the program based upon what has not happened is problematic. However, the consensus is that the precautions that have been instituted have made things safer than before, even though improved screening and greater cooperation between law enforcement officers is necessary to continue to enhance security in the future.