Divided Government and Constitutional Reform in France and Germany

Introduction

When it comes to government, there are many forces within the framework that influence political change for a nation and its people. The governments of Germany and France are each structured and managed differently; however, the same force of divided government has resulted in profound constitutional reforms in both countries. This paper discusses the forces that expand opportunities for change and influence the legislative process. The issue of divided government is present in both governments, and its effect on legislation carries both short-term and long-term ramifications.

How each country chooses to accept or reject divided government is where each forms its own identity and path for future decision-making. It is the country's ability to embrace or resist divided government that frames its present political machine and defines its overall global success. This paper explores how Germany has embraced divided government within its political framework as a means of maximizing representation and providing checks and balances for future reform. It also examines how France has taken a more conservative approach, treating divided government not as an opportunity but as a problem to be eliminated. Does this mean one country is more open to change while the other is more resistant? The sections below explore similar and different governmental characteristics between the two countries and how these characteristics have shaped constitutional reform.

Defining Divided Government

Many factors contribute to a government's management. Before defining divided government, one must understand that people are the driving force of change, and there is a direct relationship between human agency and sociopolitical outcomes. As Kirk Buckman explains, "human agency impacts the social world only through concrete political, social, and economic structures" (28). Divided government can be defined as "gridlock, deadlock, or stalemate" (Buckman 26), but what it really describes is "opposition partisan control of separate branches of government that can produce institutional paralysis" (Buckman 26). In practical terms, this means one political party outweighs another in terms of power and reform. Ironically, it is divided government that makes American democracy possible.

France: Cohabitation and Constitutional Realignment

Divided government can affect change in France and Germany, but it is not solely responsible for each country's reaction to it, nor can it fully account for the divergent reforms that resulted. For both France and Germany, divided government carries different meanings, and the concept works within each political structure in ways that ultimately produce distinct forms of constitutional reform.

For France, divided government is defined as cohabitation. This occurs when "the President and Prime Minister are from opposing political parties" (Buckman 26). Cohabitation arose in the French system partly because of different electoral cycles: prior to the 2002 presidential election, the President was elected for a seven-year term, while the National Assembly — to which the Prime Minister is responsible — was, and continues to be, elected for a five-year term subject to presidential dissolution (Buckman 37). This misalignment caused considerable institutional unrest, as the constitutional separation of executive power between the President and the Prime Minister became unclear.

France experienced two periods of cohabitation, and initially the arrangement appeared accepted by the public. However, calls for reform emerged as the French concluded that "cohabitation is inconsistent with constitutional conventions or normative expectations and therefore would be best to reform" (Buckman 38) to prevent recurrence. The result was a constitutional change reducing the President's term from seven to five years, matching that of the Prime Minister. For the French, this adjustment signaled a return to more unified government, strengthening the relationship between the President and the parliamentary majority (Buckman 41). Rather than accepting divided government as an inherent product of constitutional rules, French politicians chose to change those rules, creating a political environment in which power is more uniform and institutional comfort is prioritized. This approach limits the range of change that divided government might otherwise generate, promoting stronger connections between governmental bodies instead of exploiting the tensions between them.

Conclusion

As Kirk Buckman elaborates, "the constitutional reaction to divided government in France and Germany were based on expectations for institutional practice, which themselves were based on repeated historical experience" (52). What this observation really conveys is that even politicians can learn from the past — from both its successes and its mistakes. Government, as a construct invented by humans for human use, is not immune to the influence of human nature, and its present is inevitably shaped by its past. This is nowhere more evident than in the evolution of divided government within modern European politics.