This paper examines the inevitability of defense budget reductions facing the U.S. Department of Defense in the post-Afghanistan, post-Iraq era. Drawing on the 2012 DoD Budget Priorities document and supporting commentary, the paper argues that cuts mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act — approximately $487 billion over a decade — should be viewed as an opportunity to eliminate waste rather than a net loss of capability. Key areas analyzed include contracting reform, Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) processes, force structure modernization, and a strategic shift away from large-scale stability operations toward flexible, regionally focused deterrence. The paper situates these changes within the broader context of public opinion, fiscal pressures, and evolving national security threats.
The paper demonstrates effective use of policy argumentation supported by institutional sources. Rather than relying solely on secondary commentary, the author repeatedly cites the DoD's own budget document to show that the department itself acknowledges the need for reform — a technique that uses the subject's own voice to validate the thesis. This approach, sometimes called "conceding from authority," is particularly effective in policy writing.
The paper opens by establishing the fiscal and political inevitability of cuts, then traces the historical causes of the spending surge. It moves through concrete reform mechanisms — contracting, base closures, force structure — before concluding with the broader strategic philosophy shift required. This funnel structure moves from macro-context to micro-policy and back to macro-strategy, creating a coherent analytical arc.
Cuts in the defense budget are inevitable for the Department of Defense, and the department must accept this fact. Given the burgeoning deficit, reductions in tax revenue, and the increased need for social services — such as unemployment assistance and entitlement programs — the DoD must find ways to do "more with less." Granted, this will be challenging given the current demands of modern warfare, but the department must meet this challenge rather than attempt to lobby against such legislative initiatives. The 2011 Budget Control Act would "reduce Defense Department future expenditures by approximately $487 billion over the next decade… Achieving these savings is hard, but manageable. It is hard because we have to accept many changes and reductions in areas that previously were sacrosanct" (Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, 2012, Department of Defense, p. 2). Ultimately, rather than viewing these measures as a net loss, the DoD must regard enforced cuts as an incentive to reduce waste and inefficiencies.
According to Harris polls, since 2008 the percentage of Americans favoring defense cuts rose from 35% to 42%. Of five areas of expenditure — Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, Medicaid, and defense — the military was the only area where a majority (60%) suggested spending should be cut to reduce the deficit (Kenny, 2012). The American public clearly believes that other pressing demands require addressing, and given the scarcity of funds, it is essential that the DoD prepare for inevitable decreases in its budget, since members of Congress are likely to be highly receptive to their constituents' demands. The public's views are unlikely to change in the near term, given the shakiness of the economic recovery and the aging of the population.
When contemplating necessary budget cuts, it is important to understand how the current budgetary crisis developed. In the wake of the war in Afghanistan and the ongoing war on terrorism that followed September 11, 2001, defense expenditures increased radically. These increases in defense spending — which led to upwards of $150 billion a year over and above the base military budget — were accompanied by simultaneous tax cuts (Frank, 2012). To contextualize the scale of the increase: "between 2001 and 2009, overall spending on defense rose from $412 billion to $699 billion, a 70% increase, which is larger than in any comparable period since the Korean War" (Zakaria, 2011).
As the conflicts the United States maintained on two fronts have begun to wind down, there has been an upsurge of public support for slashing the defense budget. The combination of war fatigue, fiscal stress, and growing domestic needs has shifted the political calculus in a way that makes sustained resistance to defense reductions increasingly untenable for policymakers.
The first major change must be in the way the DoD conducts its business. Although the DoD is a government organization, a majority of its transactions to build weapons involve private organizations through contractors. It is essential that the DoD embark upon "more skillful contracting practices to increase competition, reduce costs, and increase buying power" (Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, 2012, Department of Defense, p. 3). Streamlining staff and making more effective use of information technology must be a priority.
The bipartisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan estimated that during both conflicts "at least one in every six dollars of U.S. spending for contracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade, or more than $30 billion, has been wasted" (Shays & Thibault, 2011). This represents a serious disservice to taxpayers and highlights the urgent need to fundamentally reform the contracting process. Waste of this magnitude is morally indefensible and operationally counterproductive — it diverts resources from genuine defense needs and undermines public confidence in military spending.
After every previous conflict's end, defense spending was also cut, and the requirements of the new strategic guidance have entailed increasing funding for a few key capabilities while protecting others at existing levels or making comparatively modest reductions (Zakaria, 2011; Defense Budget Priorities and Choices, 2012, Department of Defense, p. 9). The threats the United States faces are constantly evolving, and the appropriate response is not to demand more funding but to determine how the current budget can be used to meet such changing needs — including the growing priority of counter-terrorism.
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