This paper examines the competing arguments of the Federalist and Anti-Federalist movements, focusing primarily on Federalist Paper 10 and Anti-Federalist Paper Brutus 3. It analyzes James Madison's defense of large republics as a check on factional conflict and evaluates how his reasoning applies to the modern United States government. The paper also explores Brutus's opposition to the proposed constitution, particularly his critique of property-based representation and the concentration of political power among the wealthy. By applying the arguments of both sides to contemporary American governance, the paper concludes that while Federalist reasoning has largely proven effective, certain Anti-Federalist concerns about wealth and political representation remain relevant today.
The Federalist Papers were written in support of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, while the Anti-Federalist Papers were written in opposition to it. The most important papers in the Federalist series were Papers 10 and 15, both authored on the subject of power distribution within the federation. Anti-Federalist Paper Brutus 3 was written under the pseudonym "Brutus" and was intended to oppose the arguments raised by Madison on power distribution. Keeping these papers and their arguments in mind, we might ask ourselves how these authors would evaluate the modern U.S. government and its distribution of power.
If we examine Federalist Paper 10 and the arguments made within it, we can closely connect it to cases of internal insurgence that may arise in a large republic because of factions or interest groups. Factions are present in any republic, large or small, but Madison believed that a large republic is better suited to managing these groups and their anti-social activities than a small republic:
"A pure democracy can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority, and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is, that democracies have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."
A republic in which rulers are elected by the people is more capable of controlling faction-related insurgencies than what Madison calls "pure democracy." Applying this reasoning to the United States today, it is fair to say that it has become easier for a large republic to manage factional disputes than it would have been in a smaller one. This can be illustrated by pointing to smaller nations around the world that face serious faction-related troubles, often in turmoil precisely because of their size. The United States, while not immune to such troubles, has largely been able to handle them effectively. For example, the country has confronted serious terrorism-related problems, which are factional in nature because they represent the interests of one group over another. Madison would have taken some satisfaction in seeing his prediction about the advantages of a large republic against factional problems borne out.
Similarly, the author of Anti-Federalist Brutus 3 might have found his own logic somewhat misguided in retrospect, given that he argued against large republics and the method of power distribution within them:
"As to any nation attacking a number of confederated independent republics… it is not to be expected, more especially as the wealth of the empire is there universally diffused, and will not be collected into any one overgrown, luxurious and effeminate capital to become a lure to the enterprising ambitious. That extensive empire is a misfortune to be deprecated will not now be disputed. The balance of power has long engaged the attention of the entire European world, in order to avoid the horrid evils of a general government. The same government pervading a vast extent of territory terrifies the minds of individuals into meanness and submission."
On the issue of factions, then, Federalist Madison would likely approve of the U.S. government today, as it has demonstrated that large republics can effectively manage factional conflict.
On the issue of the division of power among the three branches of government, Madison would probably be less satisfied. While Madison advocated for a complete separation of powers so that each branch would function independently, that ideal has not been fully realized in the modern American government. Today, the legislative and executive branches are mutually dependent and exercise checks on one another, while the judiciary remains reasonably independent without being entirely separate. Madison understood that complete separation was not achievable in practice, but he did want the individuals appointed to each branch to be selected through public vote rather than through the influence or vote of another branch.
"Constitutional checks and balances evaluated by Madison's standard"
"Brutus's critique of wealth-based political representation"
The approval or disapproval of both men is largely dependent on their acceptance or rejection of the U.S. Constitution in its original form. We must understand that these men had significant influence over the ratification of the Constitution and had valuable opinions to offer. Since the Constitution has largely maintained its original form, it remains true that even today it would be the Federalists who would approve of the way government is structured, not the Anti-Federalists. It is even possible that some Anti-Federalists might revise their original views upon seeing how well the Constitution has served the cause of liberty.
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