This paper traces the intellectual history of conservatism in America across two distinct periods: the post-World War II conservative movement (1945–1990) anchored by anti-communism and figures such as Russell Kirk and Friedrich Hayek, and the emergence of neoconservatism after 1990. Drawing on Louis Hartz's thesis that America is defined by a deep and lasting attachment to Lockean liberalism, the paper examines how thinkers such as Crick, Carey, and Boland confirm, challenge, or refine that claim. It also addresses the split between paleoconservatives and neoconservatives following the Soviet Union's collapse, ultimately arguing that despite their differences, all major strands of American conservatism remain shaped by fundamentally liberal foundations.
The paper effectively employs comparative analysis across thinkers — placing Hartz alongside Crick, then contrasting Carey's communal republicanism against both — to show that the central question of American liberalism is contested from multiple directions. This multi-perspective approach strengthens the thesis by acknowledging complexity rather than asserting a single unchallenged view.
The paper opens with the historical origins of conservatism and the emergence of neoconservatism, then pivots to Hartz's liberal tradition thesis as its theoretical core. Subsequent sections test that thesis against Crick's and Carey's alternative readings, examine the Federalist Papers, and trace the anti-communist glue of the Cold War movement. It concludes by addressing the paleo–neoconservative split and affirming Hartz's enduring relevance — a clear arc from historical context to theoretical synthesis.
Intellectually, it is correct that post-World War II conservatism in America can be divided into two periods: the period which emerged directly after the war (1945–1990) and the period from 1990 onwards. Traditionally, as Ball explained, conservatism in America was opposed to rapid development and industrialization in the early twentieth century: "From their point of view, this new mass society posed the same threat that democracy had always posed — the threat that the masses would throw society first into chaos and then into despotism. In arguments similar to those of Plato, Aristotle, and more recently Alexis de Tocqueville, traditional conservatives maintained that the common people were too weak and too ignorant to take charge of government" (Ball, 108). Essentially, this meant that conservatism in the twentieth century revolved around the notion of self-restraint and a core belief that only a small minority are suitable to govern, while the rest of the masses are not (Ball, 109).
Conservatism as a movement only began to gain real forward momentum in the 1950s in America. At that time, conservatives were a diverse group of intellectuals ranging from libertarians and anti-communists to traditionalists (Regnery, 60). They began to use debates and discussion — and their mutual opposition to libertarianism and FDR's legacy — to form an actual organized movement (Regnery, 60). During these earlier days of the movement, conservative literature helped to organize and coalesce conservatives around fundamental issues close to their hearts, with communism representing the greatest threat of all (Regnery, 76).
The second movement of conservatism in America could be deemed the emergence of neoconservatism — something distinct from the more classical form of conservatism that Americans were more familiar with. Neoconservatism was different enough to draw criticism from both liberals and traditional conservatives alike. "The underlying problem was that neoconservatives were claiming a mantle that had long been claimed by conservatives in general. Neoconservatives had accepted the premise of the welfare state. They fought over its extension, certainly, and argued about whether specific policies were worthy of continuing, but they did not doubt its efficacy in the manner conservatives had. 'Government is not the solution of our problems,' Reagan said in his first inaugural address, 'government is the problem.' Very few, if any, neoconservatives believed this" (Schneider, 168–169). These tendencies highlight some of the key differences between the two conservative movements, as they are far from identical.
Hartz's thesis revolves around the notion that America is marked by a dogmatic and lasting attachment to Lockean liberalism, which he argues is part of the nation's cultural phenomenon (19). Hartz asserts that this liberalism is manifested in things like the remarkable power of the Supreme Court and the "cult of constitution worship" as forms of evidence for his thesis (19). The fundamental ethical issue that Hartz identifies with a liberalist society is "…not the danger of the majority which has been its conscious fear, but the danger of unanimity, which has slumbered unconsciously behind it: 'the tyranny of opinion' that Tocqueville saw unfolding as even the pathetic social distinctions of the Federalist era collapsed before his eyes… Do we not find here, hidden away at the base of the American mind, one of the reasons why legalism has been so imperfect a barrier against the violent moods of its mass Lockianism? If the latter is nourished by the former, how can we expect it to be strong?" (20).
The crux of Hartz's thesis revolves around the differences between America and Europe. America never had to abolish feudalism or eradicate a rigid social order; it is easy to mistake America's political revolution for a social one as well, but in reality the American Revolution was strictly political. Hartz essentially argues that in America consensus rules, and that all parties are the same at foundational levels, with liberal mindsets guiding all parties to some extent. Thus, Hartz believes that to anticipate a social revolution in America is completely misguided. In this manner, Hartz is regarded as a consensus theorist, because many Americans can fundamentally agree on core principles, given that the country has long been so dominated by liberalism. To argue that America is still fundamentally dominated by liberalism carries a ring of universality: Hartz is asserting that liberalism and liberal thought constitute the foundational universal truth in American political life.
It is also notable that, according to Boland, Hartz transforms the traditional beliefs of the American ethos in light of the ideological requirements of the Cold War. "Hartz himself, in a later chapter of The Liberal Tradition, cites with approval the claim that 'America is… conservative… But the principles conserved are liberal and some, indeed, are radical' (50)" (Boland). Thus, in Hartz's viewpoint, liberalism is renovated as an overarching ideology in a way that is necessary for the Cold War context (Boland). One could argue, following Boland, that this positions Hartz as conservative only in the narrow sense of his particular perspective on the Cold War.
Crick does indeed echo the fundamental thesis of Hartz, as is apparent in his remark that "That exclusive unity of a liberal-democratic political experience and expression of the United States — which forms the central thread of De Tocqueville's great work — is an historical experience that refutes any easy British, French, or German identification of traditional behavior with a conservative political philosophy. 'America is… conservative… but the principles conserved are liberal, and some indeed are radical' — this was the brilliant aperçu of Gunnar Myrdal" (361). Crick's writing pinpoints the confusion that persists between traditionalism and conservatism: in England these terms might be nearly identical, as Crick illuminates, but in America they are simply not. Essentially, Crick argues that Americans hover at the edge of real conservatism but never actually achieve it (361). This cannot help but seem evocative of Hartz's notion that liberalism underscores all political movements and modes of thought in America. Crick believes that all conservatives are actually "doctrinaire liberals" (365) and that conservatism in America cannot transcend the American tradition — which is why America remains, in his view, a liberal nation at heart.
It is notable that Carey contrasts Hartz with the "republican" school and, as Carey demonstrates, one can view America as more strongly shaped by communal forces. Carey highlights an important aspect of the founding of America that many political theorists leave out. Americans of the founding period were in fact shaped by certain indelible social institutions: family, neighborhood, religious congregation, schools, and government (20). These organizations are all guided by fundamental moral ideas about what constitutes a good human life. This creates a strong communal context — one that acknowledges the rights of individuals and minorities while also committing to a strong and specific moral vision that closely resembles adjusted Protestant norms (Carey, 21). Carey concludes that the Republican school, in ignoring this type of commitment to a communal moral vision, offers a more incomplete and mistaken understanding of the origins and dynamics of the public good that shaped early Americans (Carey, 21). In this sense there is a strong basis for a more communal understanding of America at large. Carey had a deeper appreciation of the permanent institutions which have long shaped American society — the church, family, and government — which he likened to sinews fastening the various parts of the human body together.
As Ball and Dagger have demonstrated, World War Two may have brought an end to the Great Depression, but a lasting welfare state remained, with welfare liberalism becoming the dominant ideology of the postwar world at large (76). The literature of this period thus attempts to make a bold and lasting statement about America in the 1950s: namely, that it had always been liberal, and that in the immediate postwar decades it was remarkably so.
As Abott has argued, "we still come back to Louis Hartz after all these years." So much of American political and social policy is very much a delicate dance of push and pull between seemingly liberal and seemingly conservative ideas. For Hartz to assert that America is a confluence of liberal and conservative ideas is correct. Furthermore, the fact that America was founded without a rigid class structure is something that continues to shape its social and political values — something that Americans continually appear to rediscover, representing yet another continual return to Hartz's thesis.
This paper has thus attempted to examine the various ways in which conservative values have shaped and influenced the manifestation of American society, in both social and political terms. While different conservative movements have evolved into different camps, one could argue that at the end of the day, the different conservative groups still share a tremendous amount of common ground. They are shaped by an overwhelming desire to conserve some of the more classical ideals of rule, governance, and the individual within society — many of which are, strikingly, fundamentally liberal.
Ball, Terry, and Richard Dagger. Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal. London: Pearson, 2014. Print.
Boland, Joseph. U.S. Political Thought: Lecture 2. 28 September 1995. Web. 2013.
Carey, George W. "The American Founding and Limited Government." The Imaginative Conservative. Web.
Crick, Bernard. "The Strange Quest for an American Conservatism." The Review of Politics (1955): 359–376. Print.
Hartz, Louis. The Liberal Tradition in America. Orlando: Harvest Books, 1991. Print.
Regnery, Alfred S. Upstream: The Ascendance of American Conservatism. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008. Print.
Schneider, Gregory L. The Conservative Century: From Reaction to Revolution. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009. Print.
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