This paper examines the philosophical and institutional evolution of the American military, from the colonists' distrust of standing armies to the constitutional frameworks that mandated organized national defense. Drawing on the Federalist Papers — particularly Jay's Federalist No. 2 and Madison's Federalist No. 41 — the paper traces six core themes in American military history identified by Millett and Maslowski, including anti-militarism, pluralism, geographic advantage, civilian oversight, professionalization, and technological innovation. The paper also considers how recent developments, including network-centric warfare and interventionist foreign policy, have complicated America's constitutional commitment to providing for the common defense.
The colonists' most revered military institution was the militia, a model inherited from their forebears in England. The philosophical underpinnings of the militia model are easy to understand: a deep "fear of a standing army" (Millett and Maslowski 1). A standing army can turn against its own people, staging what would now be called military coups. During and especially after Independence, the validity, effectiveness, efficiency, and relevance of the militia model were called into question. This is why the United States Constitution eventually included provisions for federalized systems of national security, which naturally required a standing army to "provide for the common defense."
Independence required an organized military strategy against a powerful empire. To protect the new nation, it was certain that a military would be necessary to preserve all that had been hard-won. The Constitution therefore enabled the creation and maintenance of standing armies — a development many original settlers and anti-Federalists would have decried. Yet, as Spalding points out, "Collective defense against external threats was the primary reason why the American colonies banded together in the first place" (1).
It was only natural that the new nation would need to reckon with potential threats to national security. America was just born, and already it needed to grow up. It was an idealistic nation-project, but one that required pragmatism in order to survive. All the blood shed during the Revolutionary War would have been in vain if the new union submitted to external threats, let alone internal insurgencies. Providing for the "common defense" is what many believed to be the "price of liberty" (Spalding 1).
As John Jay put it in the second of the Federalist Papers, "Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is equally undeniable … the people must cede to it some of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers" (1). In other words, Americans must accept the presence and role of the military as part of their social contract. National security is a collective endeavor, the responsibility for which all Americans share. To leave national security to the individual states would be disastrous: states would have differential military budgets, inconsistent methods of training, varying strategies, different levels of preparedness, and different risk factors. It would be technically impossible to protect the United States within a state-based militia system, much to the chagrin of anti-Federalists.
Nowhere was the role of the military more thoroughly debated in early American political history than in the Federalist Papers. John Jay pointed out that some sacrifices are necessary to maintain the integrity of the union, and that those who might oppose a strong national military would need to reconcile themselves with the realities of the modern world. In Federalist No. 41, James Madison offers an even stronger case in favor of American military might. According to Madison, "Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union" (1). One of the primary functions of government, by definition, is to provide national security.
Madison goes on to articulate a philosophy of harsh realism, in which the world order is defined by its inherent antagonism and hostility. "Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative" (Madison 1). As cynical as Madison's views may seem, no one can deny the reality of war as a constant in history. This is why "raising armies and equipping fleets" is absolutely necessary and "involved in the power of self-defense" (Madison 1). Madison further argues for the need to maintain standing armies in peacetime as well as wartime, since there is no use for an army that is untrained and ill-equipped to deal with threats lurking both abroad and within.
The American "way of war" has evolved little on a philosophical level since the Federalist Papers, though it has certainly changed with regard to foreign policy. The United States has spent much of its history attending to domestic matters, diverting military attention to disparate projects ranging from the suppression of internal revolts to skirmishes with the French at the northern border and the Spanish to the south. These incidents do not constitute the types of national security threats perceived in the twentieth century, the era in which the United States would develop its first real outward-looking military model — one bent far more on policing the world order than on attending to domestic land disputes.
According to Millett and Maslowski, six core themes have played themselves out in American military history. The first is the anti-Federalist aversion to standing armies — what Millett and Maslowski describe as a potent thread of irrationalism rooted in "preoccupation with private gain, a reluctance to pay taxes, a distaste for military service, and a fear of large standing forces" (vii). Because of the lack of general consensus on the form, function, role, and relevance of standing armies, the nation's military has evolved rather sporadically and inconsistently.
The second major theme in American military history is therefore pluralism within its military institutions — a mix of professional and citizen soldiers, alongside antimilitarist and pacifist cultural trends. Third, the United States has been blessed with a unique geographic position that has insulated it from the existential pressures besieging European nations in the early twentieth century. Close proximity to enemies forced European nations to devise military strategies far different from those of the United States. In spite of this, the American commitment to military might has grown and has "done remarkably well in preserving the nation's security" (Millett and Maslowski vii).
The fourth theme is that the American military falls under the authority of elected officials, making it directly accountable to citizens. Fifth, the American military has shifted from a fragmented and largely civilian force to one that is highly trained and professional. The sixth and final theme is the skillful means by which Americans have developed the tools of war to enhance strategic power and prowess. The American way of war has been shaped by these core guiding principles, rooted in the constitutional value of national security — a security that depends on both manpower and technology.
"Network-centric warfare and post-Gulf War strategy"
"Interventionist policy diverges from constitutional defense principles"
Americans have an ambivalent and strained relationship with war. The country was founded in war and through bloodshed. Its bloodiest conflict involved no foreign players but rather the division between North and South during the Civil War. Domestic episodes like the Civil War highlight some of the profound changes in history that have shaped the evolution of the national military's role. Preparing for war also means preparing for the inevitable changes that occur both domestically and abroad.
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