This paper surveys the evolution of fire science and wildland fire policy in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century. Drawing on the work of Gregory H. Aplet and James K. Agee, it examines key milestones including the founding of the National Fire Protection Association, the Wilderness Act of 1964, the catastrophic 1910 fires that shaped a century of suppression policy, and subsequent policy shifts toward prescribed natural fire. The paper also addresses the 1983 Missoula Wilderness Fire Workshop, the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy Review, and the 2001 policy update, concluding with a call for sustained research funding and public education on the ecological role of fire.
Gregory H. Aplet's (2006) work entitled "Evolution of Wilderness Fire Policy," published in the International Journal of Wilderness, states that ecosystems have been "shaped by fire" and that wilderness policy "has been affected by fire policy" (Aplet, 2006, p. 9). Aplet explains that the Wilderness Act and "subsequent wilderness bills have addressed fire, and policy has evolved to recognize the free play of fire as a natural process. Similarly, fire policy has evolved to accommodate the peculiar demands of wilderness" (Aplet, 2006, p. 9). This process was one of co-evolution, and Aplet traces its origin to the "confluence of ecological thought and wilderness philosophy that occurred in the late 20th century. For most of the century, fire was considered a universal threat to people, resources, and wildlands" (2006, p. 9).
In 1896, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) was established for the purpose of providing, on a voluntary basis, technical information and standards as well as recommendations for procedures and practices concerning fire safety (Leong, n.d., p. 1).
Aplet relates that the realization of fire as playing a critical role in "sustaining species and maintaining the character of ecosystems" grew from the "observations of foresters like Aldo Leopold (1924) and Elers Koch (Arno and Fiedler 2005) added to the research of scientists such as Harold Weaver (1943) and Herb Stoddard (1935)" (Aplet, 2006, p. 9). According to Aplet, a panel of ecologists in 1963 "responded to the National Park Service's request for a management review with the suggestion that 'The goal [of park management] is to maintain or create the mood of wild America'" (Leopold et al., 1963, as cited in Aplet, 2006, p. 9). They recommended that fire be restored to the national parks.
Passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 represented the culmination of the "fight for the freedom of the wilderness" begun by John Muir and continued by Robert Marshall (1930) and the other founders of the Wilderness Society in 1935 (Aplet, 2006, p. 9). The Wilderness Act states that wilderness retains "its primeval character and influence [and] generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature" (Aplet, 2006, p. 10). The forces of nature quite clearly include fire.
Wilderness fire policy first became an urgent concern in 1910, when millions of acres burned in Idaho and Montana, killing 86 people and decimating entire communities. Because of the horror, loss of life, and destruction of homes caused by the 1910 fires, the resulting policy was one of "intolerance and all-out suppression of fire throughout most of the 20th century" (Aplet, 2006, p. 10).
Finally, in 1968, a shift in policy occurred within the National Park Service, and in 1978 the USDA Forest Service followed with a policy that would allow some natural fires to burn "in specified locations under previously identified conditions" (Aplet, 2006, p. 10). Aplet states that for twenty years this "prescribed natural fire (PNF) policy spread from its original application in California to national parks and wilderness areas across the country" (2006, p. 11).
However, in 1988, fires that had successively been allowed to burn in Yellowstone National Park due to "extreme fire weather blew up into the largest fire event in the United States since that catalyzing year of 1910" (Aplet, 2006, p. 11). Federal officials promptly rescinded the PNF policy. However, a federal review board following the Yellowstone fires "concluded that the objectives of prescribed natural fire programs were sound" (Aplet, 2006, p. 12).
According to James K. Agee (2000), wilderness fire has presented both managers and scientists with considerable challenges over the 30 years that wilderness fire programs have been operational. Wilderness fire, in its purest form, should be "wild" fire: unfettered by the constraints of humans. As Agee observes, we have never prescribed a "let-it-blow" policy for tornadoes and hurricanes, a "let-it-erupt" policy for volcanoes, or a "let-it-grind" policy for glaciers. Why, then, was a "let-it-burn" policy for fires — or surrogate strategies like prescribed fire — deemed necessary? The answer lies in the fact that "humans and fire have an inseparable history" (Agee, 2000, p. 5).
Agee further notes that the classical view of plant succession "persisted much of the 20th century: the Clementsian view of regional convergence towards a vegetation life-form created by autogenic succession in the presence of stable climate" (Agee, 2000, p. 6). He identifies the primary obstacle to conducting an appropriate economic analysis of fire in wilderness as understanding "the natural state," a concept defined by Mills in 1985, who held that the objective of wilderness policy should be to "allow resource change to be viewed as cost or benefit" (Agee, 2000, p. 14).
"Key fire science issues debated at Missoula conference"
"Federal reviews endorse wildland fire use policy"
"Call for ongoing research and public education"
You’re 61% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 3 sections.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.