Hackensack Fire Department: History, Tragedy & Safety

History of the Hackensack Fire Department

The Hackensack Fire Department was established in 1871, though its origins date back to 1864, when a public meeting was held in the city with all citizens present in order to find an effective way to deal with the constant fires ravaging the village and surrounding areas. When it was discovered that the village commission had no money for the cause and could not promise to raise any, it was decided that the fire committee would raise the funds necessary to purchase ladders and buckets needed to fight fires. It was in 1871 that the State legislature commissioned a real fire department, and thus the City of Hackensack Fire Department was born. Soon, voluntary fire companies were formed, including Bergen Hook and Ladder Company, Relief Hook and Ladder Company, Protection Engine Company, Vigilant Engine Company, and Liberty Hose and Steamer Company.

In 1909, motorization was introduced into the fire departments, and by 1911 the need for a full-time department was formally recognized. The Hackensack Development Commission passed an order to that effect, and the professional Fire Department was created. At that time, there were two ways in which a fire could be reported: by telephone, or through alarm boxes placed throughout the city, which when activated would ring a bell at the fire station. It must be remembered, however, that a fire department is a high-risk and hazardous organization where firefighters must place their own lives in danger to protect citizens' property and lives.

The 1988 Hackensack Ford Fire Tragedy

In 1988, Captain Williams, Lieutenant Reinhagen, and Firemen Kresja, Radumski, and Ennis were killed while fighting a fire at Hackensack Ford, 320 River Street. This was an unforgettable incident in the history of the Hackensack Fire Department. The five men were inside the structure — a bowstring truss building — attempting to extinguish a raging fire when the roof suddenly collapsed on them. Four men died on the spot, while Ennis died later from carbon monoxide poisoning.

An important question must be raised here: what exactly constitutes an "on-duty fatality"? It means that the person on duty was at the scene of the incident while the fire was raging, or was en route, or returning from an alarm, or was performing other work-related duties such as maintenance. The largest number of such fatalities, however, occur during fire ground operations — as was the case with the truss roof that collapsed on the Hackensack firefighters, killing them on the spot.

Truss System Dangers and Firefighter Safety

Numerous firefighter fatalities occur due to floor truss or roof truss systems collapsing — often without any warning whatsoever. This means that all firefighters must take certain recommended steps to mitigate the risk and minimize death and injury. They must be able to accurately identify truss roof or truss floor construction, and they must report the presence of such construction and any fire involvement to their supervisor. They must exercise extreme caution when operating within a truss roof or floor structure, move deliberately, and immediately open all ceilings and concealed spaces if fire is suspected within a truss roof construction. Firefighters must also ensure they have a charged hose line available when operating under such conditions.

According to the Wood Truss Council of America, as cited in the NIOSH publication on truss system failures, more than 60% of all buildings in the United States use a truss roof or floor system. While the truss system may perform well under engineered and normal conditions, fire can cause it to become completely weakened and ultimately fail, leading to the collapse of the roof, the floor, and potentially the entire structure.

What makes the hazard even more dangerous is that when fire enters a truss system, the flames go unnoticed for extended periods of time because the truss system is concealed within the building's structure. This results in a progressive loss of structural integrity. Fire degrades the structural members silently, and firefighters generally rely on typical warning signs of imminent collapse — such as a sagging or spongy floor — to alert them to danger. When a truss system is about to fail, however, these warning signs are often absent. The firefighter remains inside the building, completely unaware that the roof or floor is about to collapse. This is precisely what happened in the 1988 Hackensack tragedy, where five brave men lost their lives because there was no indication that the truss roof was on the verge of collapsing.

Conclusion

Although there was plenty of controversy surrounding the incident — some attributing it to plain human error and bad judgment, while others pointed to interference or mechanical malfunction — the actual truth, as later discovered, was that the firefighters had been inadvertently transmitting on a general channel. Because no one was monitoring that channel, no rescue could be organized, and five men perished. This tragedy underscores the importance of rigorous communication protocols, structural hazard awareness, and thorough post-incident investigation in the fire service. The lessons learned from the 1988 Hackensack fire remain relevant to fire departments across the United States today.