This paper addresses four core questions arising from emergency planning and operations methodology in the context of U.S. homeland security. It examines the main issues raised by states at the 2002 State Emergency Response Commission Conference, particularly the tension between transparency and information restriction. It then evaluates whether SERCs and LECs face a threat to local disaster control from the Department of Homeland Security, and considers whether the federal government should do more to limit liability for state and local governments in disaster situations. Finally, the paper argues for the inclusion of private industry in strategic emergency and disaster planning, highlighting the specialized knowledge that industry partners bring to local and state hazard response.
Most of the states attending the 2002 State Emergency Response Commission Conference expressed an overall sentiment that, in relation to security, outcomes will vary from state to state based on the capabilities of emergency response agencies in each state, as well as the types of hazards that states are likely to face in addition to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). For example, states must take into consideration whether they have chemical facilities, nuclear facilities, or similar hazardous materials to address. States must also consider whether their highways are used to transport hazardous or nuclear waste materials.
Colorado made the point that secrecy regarding Homeland Security measures will not help. This opinion was likely expressed because many provisions related to the Homeland Security Act are kept confidential. Colorado argued that the federal government needs to open up and share its safety and security procedures so that local emergency response commissions understand what is happening — or what should be happening — during an emergency event. Important information should be available to the public, and it needs to reach the public in a timely manner so that appropriate action can be taken to prevent exaggerated disaster.
Idaho felt that the public already has the information it needs, and that the federal government should instead focus on restricting the flow of information, releasing only what is deemed necessary at appropriate times and places. Montana appeared to agree with this standpoint, arguing that it is the responsibility of the Attorney General to assess whether information must be disseminated based on the potential that withholding it could compromise public safety.
The purpose of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) is not to spread widespread panic among the general public. It is important that the public is aware of dangers within their neighborhoods. If people live in an area where nuclear waste is transported along their highways, for example, this information should be readily available. The public should also be aware of emergency response protocols should a situation arise that requires following them. At the same time, it is important to maintain public calm; as Montana indicated, it may sometimes be necessary to restrict sensitive information to ensure it does not fall into inappropriate hands.
No single solution is correct in this situation. The EPCRA must take into consideration each state's unique position and the inherent risks that exist within it. No two states are alike with respect to emergency response protocols.
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