This paper examines the argument that incapacitation has become the predominant goal of criminal sanctions in the United States. Beginning with an overview of the four traditional rationales for criminal punishment — incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and just deserts — the paper traces the historical shift away from indeterminate sentencing in the 1970s toward determinate sentencing reforms. It analyzes the concerns that drove these changes, including judicial disparity, leniency toward violent offenders, and the perceived failure of rehabilitative models. The paper also evaluates the consequences of this shift, including rising incarceration rates, and identifies two fundamental shortcomings of incapacitation as a dominant penal philosophy.
In every society there are acceptable social norms which everyone is expected to adhere to, and whenever an individual violates any of those norms a penalty is usually imposed — this is referred to as a sanction. These violations can be criminal or civil in nature, and so are the corresponding sanctions. When the violation is criminal in nature, a criminal sanction is imposed, which may take the form of a fine, imprisonment, or both. The rationale for criminal sanctions falls into four categories: incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and just deserts. Each of these has influenced criminal punishment differently throughout the history of the American justice system (Ronald, 2000).
Incapacitation uses detention in prison or execution as a way of reducing an offender's capacity to commit further crimes. Typically, imprisonment is the primary method of incapacitation, while capital punishment represents its most extreme form. Incapacitation therefore seeks to reduce future crime by removing the offender from society, since those on the outside cannot be harmed by criminals who are behind bars.
There has been growing attention to incapacitation in the application of criminal sanctions in America, extending even to selective incapacitation, in which repeat offenders receive longer prison terms. This shift is evident in the history of the American criminal justice system. In the early 1970s, support for indeterminate sentencing declined due to several factors (Anderson et al., 1999). First, it was widely perceived that indeterminate sentencing gave judges too much latitude to be lenient toward criminals, at the expense of public safety. This concern was frequently validated when violent offenders received lenient sentences and subsequently committed more serious crimes.
The second concern was the uneven application of criminal punishments, even in cases involving comparable offenses (Frankel, 1973). In many instances, judges would agree on verdicts for identical cases but impose widely varying sentences. This broad discretion was considered to undermine equal treatment under the law. The third concern centered on the medical model of rehabilitation, which formed the philosophical foundation of indeterminate sentencing. This approach was seen as having failed, since it gave judges the authority to determine both the nature and duration of sentences. The general public perceived unfairness in tailoring treatment to individual offenders' character, as it produced inconsistent outcomes. In response to these concerns, the U.S. Sentencing Commission was created, and the Sentencing Guidelines were established to guide a shift toward determinate sentencing, alongside the increased use of mandatory minimum sentences set by statute.
"Legislative reforms replacing parole and indeterminate terms"
"Rising incarceration and flaws in predictive punishment"
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