Individual vs. Society: Durkheim, Weber, and Bourdieu

Introduction: The Individual and Society

The relationship between the individual and society are recurrent themes and profoundly linked concepts in the fields of anthropology and sociology. While the individual is defined as a human being considered in isolation from the broader community, society is thought of as the aggregate of these individuals, or as a more holistic structure that extends beyond them. Both concepts are nonetheless problematic, since their significance varies according to whether the approach is holistic — focusing on society — or individualistic — focusing on the individual. The causal relationship between the individual and society is therefore of the utmost importance in the related academic fields.

Since this subject is evidently central to the study of human beings, many social theorists have taken a focused interest in these relationships. A classical debate sets advocates of society's primacy, led above all by Durkheim, against advocates of the individual's primacy, led by Weber. The following discussion first presents an evaluation of Durkheim's conception and attempts to illustrate its limitations. This is then contrasted with Weber's conception, whose shortcomings are also examined. Finally, the argument is made that one should move beyond this classical opposition in order to thoroughly understand the interactions between the individual and society.

Durkheim's Holism and Social Solidarity

There are numerous types of societies. Yet, when surface appearances are filtered out, two essential types can be observed: collective societies and individualistic societies. In collective societies, the focus falls on society's moral traits rather than on the actions of any singular individual; individuals carry value as a whole. These societies are found "especially in East Asia, Latin America, and Africa" (Spielberger, 2004, p. 532). By contrast, individualistic societies designate the individual's desires, needs, existence, and personality as the main focal point. These societies are found "in the West, e.g. in Western and Northern Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand" (Spielberger, 2004, p. 532).

As maintained by Durkheim, these two forms of social organization correspond to two types of social solidarity. In his doctoral dissertation, he put forward the terms "mechanical solidarity" and "organic solidarity" (Durkheim, 1893, cited by Giddens, 1972). According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity is solidarity of resemblance, in which disparities between individuals are minimal. Members of the same society exhibit similarities because they share and consent to the same feelings, values, and sacred beliefs — a circumstance Durkheim defines as the conscience collective. By contrast, organic solidarity arises from the differentiation of individuals from the group. Individualism is strengthened in societies with organic solidarity, which is found in societies specializing in the "division of labor" (Durkheim, 1893, cited by Giddens, 1972).

Changes in society resulting from the division of labor are associated with many broader transformations that influence social structure, and they illustrate the differences between mechanical and organic solidarities. Durkheim analyzes the phenomenon of social solidarity as dependent on the division of labor because he regards social order and solidarity as crucial to society's functioning. He does not define the concept of "division of labor" explicitly, but writes:

"… co-operation … does not come about without the division of labor. To co-operate, in short, is to participate in a common task. If it is divided into tasks qualitatively similar but mutually indispensable, there is a simple division of labor of the first degree. If they are of a different character, there is compound division of labor, specialization properly called." (Durkheim, 1893, cited by Barnes, 1966, p. 165)

Durkheim explains social evolution by reference to the division of labor, which he regards as the first and most essential truth of society; in his view, individualism can only be explained through that fact. Indeed, Durkheim indicates in The Division of Labor in Society that the division of labor is one of the reasons why individualism developed at all. The conscience collective is merely a limited feature of highly developed societies. The more advanced the division of labor, the weaker and more diffuse the collective consciousness becomes. Conversely, in societies with mechanical solidarity, the resemblance of individuals hinders the division of labor, and individualism is correspondingly less prominent. In other words, Durkheim believes the individual to be a product of society, and the emergence of the individual as a genuinely singular entity is, in his account, a relatively late historical event.

Functionalism and Ethnographic Evidence

To support his theory, Durkheim illustrates the inner unity of collective feelings in mechanical societies with the example of the Iroquois tribes of North America. Each tribe consists of several resembling clans, forming a "segmental society" (Morrison, 1995, p. 162). The Iroquois "live without specialized functions or privileged hierarchies or private property"; "adults of both sexes are equal to each other"; and "the individual is wholly absorbed by the clan" (Law, 2011, p. 112; Allerton, 2015).

Durkheim's research on formalized forms of social organization, drawing on examples such as the Iroquois, was later absorbed into British social anthropology's functionalism — a structural, top-down theory that regards society's organization as more important than the individual. Bronislaw Malinowski, who helped develop this theoretical orientation, demonstrates how functional analyses follow Durkheim's position:

"… the individual member of a culture must acquire the necessary skills, learn how to work and produce, appreciate the prevalent values, manage his wealth, and regulate his consumption according to the established standard of living. Among primitive peoples there will be in all this a considerable uniformity as regards all individuals. In highly civilized communities, the differentiation of labor and of functions defines the place and the productive value of the individual in society." (Malinowski, 1939, p. 950)

"… in primitive societies the individual is completely dominated by the group … he obeys the commands of his community, its traditions, its public opinion, its decrees, with a slavish, fascinated, passive obedience." (Malinowski, 1926, p. 3)

This argument is also visible in the ethnographies of functionalism's most distinguished representatives. Evans-Pritchard points to the Nuer people, who believe that "there is no master and no servant in their society, but only equals who regard themselves as God's noblest creation," due to their "hard and egalitarian upbringing" (1940, p. 181). Likewise, Radcliffe-Brown demonstrates the importance of the Andaman warriors' dance before setting out to fight in establishing collective solidarity:

"The group is to act as a group and not merely as a collection of individuals, and it is therefore necessary that the group should be conscious of its unity and solidarity … the chief function of the dance is to arouse in the mind of every individual a sense of the unity of the social group of which he is a member, and its function before setting out to a fight is therefore apparent." (Radcliffe-Brown, 1922, p. 252)

In Durkheim's conception, then, the individual is dissolved into society. It is society that influences the individual, and not the other way around. When individuals believe themselves to be singular entities, they are in reality reproducing what society wants them to do or to be. Given that there is no real freedom in this sense, the individual genuinely blends into and disintegrates within broader society. Durkheim's school of sociological thought offers a valid framework for understanding individual–society relations in both modern and primitive societies; however, critics argue that it is too broad and generic, and that not all social facts can be handled through objectivist macrostructural analyses alone — some phenomena can only be interpreted subjectively.

Conclusion

The distinction between the collective and the individual has often appeared as a sharp opposition in the fields of anthropology and sociology. However, both Durkheim's holism and Weber's individualism were too restrictive. The individual and society intertwine in so many ways that it would be impossible to express this mutual relation in terms of a simple dualism. Indeed, they are not only dependent on each other but also illustrate two paradoxical aspects of the same phenomenon. On the one hand, the individual is completely social — that is, the product of society. On the other hand, society exists as the result of the individual's actions — that is, the product of the individual. The causality dilemma between the individual and society therefore represents a never-ending cycle of action and reaction that repeats indefinitely.