Juvenile Death Penalty: History, Abolition, and Reform

Introduction

One of the most contested and debated issues in the United States today is the death penalty. Until its abolition in 2005, the death penalty for juvenile offenders attracted even greater debate. While the juvenile justice system was recognized as a mechanism to hold juvenile offenders accountable for their actions, many believed that including the death penalty in juvenile justice was cruel, unusual, and largely unnecessary. The primary reason was the youth of juvenile offenders: opponents reasoned that young offenders could rarely be said to have no possibility of rehabilitation. A life sentence, or a significant term of imprisonment, was therefore considered to produce better outcomes — for both the offenders and society — than the death penalty. Indeed, many professionals and members of the public have increasingly argued for the abolition of the death penalty as a whole.

Writing in the year 2000, before the abolition of the juvenile death penalty, Lynn Cothern (2000) emphasized the purpose of the juvenile justice system as an accountability mechanism that also provides treatment for delinquent behavior. The system regarded youthful offenders as not only accountable for their actions but also as having an inherent capacity for rehabilitation and personal growth. Systems such as rehabilitation services and programs were made available to help young people return to potentially productive lives. This approach was largely a reaction to the harsh treatment of youth within the general criminal justice system. Juvenile justice explicitly recognizes the developmental differences between adults and young people.

The Nature and History of Juvenile Justice

However, the end of the twentieth century brought a revision of death penalty policy. Concurrent with an increase in violent crime, the juvenile justice system was revised to include stronger policies and harsher punishments. This resulted in a growing number of youth who committed capital crimes being sentenced either to death or to life in prison without parole. In the year 2000, 23 of the 38 American states that authorized the death penalty also permitted execution for those who committed capital crimes before the age of 18. Cothern nevertheless emphasized that the laws governing the death penalty for juveniles in those 23 states varied significantly from one another.

Like the general death penalty, the juvenile death penalty at the time generated substantial debate about its effectiveness. According to Cothern (2000), proponents supported it as an appropriate response to certain serious crimes and as a deterrent to others tempted to commit similar offenses. Opponents, however, contested that it was cruel, risked wrongful conviction, and failed to serve as an effective deterrent.

Historically, Thomas Graunger was the first known juvenile to be executed in the United States. He was executed for bestiality in 1652 in Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts. Between that time and the year 2000, 361 persons were executed for crimes they committed before their eighteenth birthday. The juvenile justice system evolved over this period in an attempt to ensure fairness in matching the nature of a crime with its punishment. Mitigating circumstances were also taken into account in sentencing decisions.

The law also recognized that minors are generally less mature and less responsible than adults. The Supreme Court reflected this understanding in its decisions to reject five requests to consider the death penalty for juveniles between 1983 and 1986. In Thompson v. Oklahoma in 1987, however, the Supreme Court found that the issue merited closer attention. Although the specific ruling was against the death sentence for the particular 15-year-old defendant involved, the Court also acknowledged for the first time the right of juvenile courts to decide similar issues or refer them to the Supreme Court.

Because of the gravity of the issue, legislation began to focus on standardizing decision-making in this area. It was recognized that juveniles were entitled to certain rights when waiver decisions were at issue — including the right to a hearing, access to counsel, and access to information regarding the waiver decision and the reasons for it. Furthermore, juvenile courts were legally obligated to consider specific factors before making a waiver decision. According to Cothern (2000), these factors included: (1) the seriousness and type of offense; (2) the maturity of the individual in terms of home life, environment, emotional attitude, and living patterns; (3) the person's record and prior history; and (4) the possibility of rehabilitating the individual, along with public protection considerations.

According to Cothern, the ultimate outcome of the Supreme Court's decisions on the issue — upheld until 2005 — was that capital punishment could, under certain circumstances, be permitted under the societal standards of decency established by the Eighth Amendment for persons aged 16 or 17, but not for those younger than 15. The issue remained much debated, but relatively settled, until 2004.

According to Victor L. Strieb (2004), the issue received renewed attention during that year. In addition to the minimum age set by the Supreme Court, it was found that Washington and Florida had independently set their minimum ages for the death penalty at 18 and 17, respectively, departing from the general Supreme Court standard. The United States Constitution also prohibited the death penalty for mentally disabled offenders, both juvenile and adult.

Supreme Court Decisions and the Eighth Amendment

In the 2003 case of Simmons v. Roper, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the Eighth Amendment applied and that capital punishment was cruel and unusual in this instance. Although the decision initially applied only to Missouri, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case in October 2004, with a decision expected early in 2005.

In 2004, several questions surrounded the "cruel and unusual" standard established by the Eighth Amendment. First, how strictly should lower courts be bound by the Supreme Court's standard — or could states settle the matter individually, as some had already done? Second, at what age should the "cruel and unusual" threshold be set, given the evolving interpretation of the Eighth Amendment? The issue was widely divergent among death penalty jurisdictions at the time: of the 38 jurisdictions using the death penalty for capital crimes, 21 chose age 18 as the minimum eligible age, five chose age 17, and the remaining 14 chose age 16.

Conclusion

Sherman (2009) also cites Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, which held that young persons are less culpable in criminal activity than their adult counterparts, and that minors are more amenable to rehabilitation. On the other hand, public safety considerations demand that severe crimes — whether committed by youth or adults — be met with sufficiently serious punishment, even where those crimes do not result in death.

Notably, opponents of both the juvenile death penalty and juvenile life imprisonment have observed that the United States is the only country that imposes such severe punishments on youthful offenders.

The death penalty is not a solution to crime, whether among individual offenders or in society at large. No study has ever conclusively demonstrated that the death penalty serves as a deterrent to crime. The punishment is indeed cruel and unusual under all circumstances. Even where rehabilitation is not possible, it is far more reasonable — and arguably a greater punishment — to detain such a person for life without the possibility of parole. Capital punishment serves only to perpetuate violence, satisfying little more than the drive for revenge.

Rehabilitation and even reconciliation produce better outcomes for society as a whole when the offender is incarcerated. Such offenders can, for example, participate in labor programs that benefit society. In this way, criminals are punished by the permanent loss of their freedom, while society benefits from their productive contributions. This arrangement also has the potential to reduce the burden on taxpayers while benefiting the wider community.

The death penalty is an extremely serious punishment from which there is no return once it is carried out. This is especially troubling in cases of wrongful conviction or last-minute pardons. Moreover, a substantial body of research suggests that death penalty convictions are disproportionately applied to members of minority groups. When life sentences are imposed instead, both the possibility of rehabilitation and the possibility of reversal remain open.

The death penalty in the case of juvenile offenders is particularly harsh, unnecessary, and unjust. The original purpose of the juvenile justice system — recognizing youthful offenders as less mature and at a different stage of development from adults — was sound. All juvenile sentences up to the age of 18 should focus expressly on rehabilitation. Furthermore, a nationwide standard should be established not only for juvenile offenders but for all capital cases. A patchwork of state standards only dilutes the justice system and undermines its effectiveness.

There is no doubt that juvenile justice and punishment present extraordinarily difficult challenges, particularly in light of rising crime rates and complex security concerns such as terrorism. The temptation is to want such offenders removed from society and placed in secure facilities where they can do no further harm. However, one must ask whether that is truly the answer. Rehabilitation and reintegration into society appear to be better options when the well-being of both young people and the country as a whole are taken into account.