This paper examines the August 10, 1994 crash of Korean Airlines Flight 2033, an Airbus A300B4-622R that overran the runway at Cheju, South Korea, during adverse weather conditions. Drawing on accident records and cockpit voice recorder transcripts, the paper reconstructs the sequence of events leading to the overrun and subsequent fire. It focuses on the breakdown in crew coordination between Captain Barry Woods and Co-pilot Chung Chan Kuy, whose competing decisions during the final approach resulted in a dangerous landing. The paper considers crew error as the primary causal factor and briefly addresses whether cultural differences played a role in the communication failure.
Korean Air Flight 2033, operated by an Airbus A300B4-622R and carrying 152 passengers and 8 crew members, crashed on August 10, 1994, after the plane overran the runway at Cheju, South Korea, and caught fire while landing during adverse weather conditions. The approach was flown with slats and flaps set at 15/20 degrees due to suspected wind shear. The plane approached at excessive speed and touched down 1,773 meters past the runway threshold, was unable to stop within the remaining 1,227 meters, and overran at a speed of 104 knots. After striking the airport wall and a guard post at 30 knots, the plane caught fire and burst into flames. A struggle and argument between the captain and co-pilot occurred during the final seconds of the landing. Crew error was determined to be the primary cause, and there were no fatalities.
As the plane approached, Co-pilot Chung Chan Kuy — apparently concerned about the length of Runway 6 — asked Captain Barry Woods, a Canadian, several times whether he wanted to execute a go-around. However, when Captain Woods told his co-pilot not to go around, the co-pilot grabbed for the throttles, and Woods told him to let go.
When the aircraft was only 30 feet off the ground, the co-pilot decided to initiate a go-around and pulled back on the yoke, directly contradicting the captain's instructions. This action in the final moments of the approach set the stage for the runway overrun that followed.
The cockpit voice recorder captured the following exchange during the final seconds of the approach:
Co-pilot: Go around, forty [feet], thirty [feet]…
Captain: Get your hands… Get off! Get off! Tell me what the altitude is. Twenty [feet]. Get off.
Co-pilot: Go around?
Captain: No, no, ten, five [feet].
The aircraft then touched down and the brakes and thrust reversers were deployed. However, the co-pilot still wanted to abort the landing and go around, against the wishes of Captain Woods, who continued to instruct him not to go around but to brake the aircraft.
Co-pilot: [I wanted to] go around… go around.
Captain: Yeah, but we were on… we were on the runway. Why did you pull us off? Okay, okay. We've got to get out of here. Open your window.
[Sound of opening the cockpit window]
Captain: Get your [evacuation] slide. Why did you pull us off? We had full reverse on. Pull the fire handles. Pull them.
Co-pilot: Fire pulls.
Captain: Okay, get out. Get out.
"Passenger evacuation and potential charges"
"Causal analysis of crew error and communication"
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.