Treaty of Lisbon: Democratic Deficit and EU Reform
This paper analyzes the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) as a reform instrument amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It explores how the treaty addresses the concept of democratic deficit — the perceived remoteness of supranational lawmaking from ordinary citizens — through three foundational principles: conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality. The paper further examines the provisions and protocols governing the role of national parliaments, including the one-third requisition mechanism, and assesses how the treaty strengthens the European Parliament's legislative competence while preserving national sovereignty within a flexible, multi-tiered constitutional framework.
- Introduction: The Treaty of Lisbon and Its Background: Historical context and purpose of the Lisbon Treaty
- Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Definition and origins of democratic deficit concept
- Conferral, Subsidiarity, and Proportionality: Three core principles governing EU legislative competence
- Articles and Protocols Applicable to National Parliaments: Key treaty articles protecting national parliament roles
- The Strengthened Role of the European Parliament: How the treaty expands European Parliament authority
- Conclusion: EU as flexible multi-tiered constitutional order
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What makes this paper effective
- Clearly defines key constitutional principles — conferral, subsidiarity, and proportionality — before applying them to the treaty's structural mechanisms, giving readers a firm conceptual foundation.
- Uses a structured, enumerated format for treaty articles and protocols, making complex legal sources easy to navigate and cross-reference.
- Draws a comparative analogy to U.S. constitutional law (residuary powers and interposition) to make abstract EU governance concepts accessible to a broader audience.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper models treaty-based legal analysis: it identifies specific articles and protocols (e.g., TEU Article 12, Protocol No. 2) and explains their functional significance within the broader constitutional scheme rather than simply describing them. This technique shows how to move from textual citation to interpretive argument.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with the historical context of the Lisbon Treaty, then defines the problem of democratic deficit. It proceeds to explain the three core principles of EU competence allocation, enumerates the treaty provisions relevant to national parliaments, and closes by assessing how the European Parliament's role is strengthened. The argument builds cumulatively, with each section supporting the final evaluative claim that the treaty creates a uniquely flexible, multi-tiered constitutional order.
Introduction: The Treaty of Lisbon and Its Background
The Reform Treaty, or the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), is an amending instrument for two existing treaties: the Treaty on European Union (TEU, also known as the Maastricht Treaty) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, also known as the Treaty of Rome). Together these form the bedrock of the European Community's administrative and legislative functions.
The historical background for this "reform" treaty was the failure of the earlier treaty establishing a European Constitution, which had been voted down by referenda in France and the Netherlands. Nonetheless, it was felt among member states that they needed a compact that would more suitably express their desire to form a closer and more perfect union. In doing so, the member states had to strike a balance between national aspirations and the aspirations of European unity (Bonde, 2009). Added to this triangle was the need to sustain existing devolution. The complexity of the puzzle created by the various stakeholders required a sustained effort, and that effort materialized in 2007 with the aforementioned treaty, which was put into force in 2009 (Council of the European Union, "Lisbon Treaty: The Making Of").
Democratic Deficit in the European Union
Democratic deficit as a concept emerged as one of the main criticisms leveled against the centralization of legislation at the European level, which was seen as an abdication of responsibility by elected national parliaments in terms of their democratic mandates. Put plainly, the concept of democratic deficit refers to the creation of a supra-legislative council in the age of devolution, which affects an ordinary citizen in two ways:
First, it creates a sense of remoteness for the citizen. Second, it affects their access to their legislator.
The creation of the European Parliament came about as a direct result of this criticism. For a period, legislation had been limited to a council of European ministers. By creating an elected legislature at the European center — one that was elected and therefore accountable — one major prong of the criticism leveled against European centralization was addressed.
References
1. Bonde, J.P. From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty. Foundation for EU Democracy and the EU Democrats. ISBN 87-87692-71-6.
2. Council of the European Union. "Lisbon Treaty: The Making Of" (PDF).
3. House of Lords, Select Committee on EU — 10th Report 2007. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeucom/62/6205.htm
4. House of Commons, 33rd Report of 2007–2008 Session, European Scrutiny Committee.
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