This essay compares and contrasts John Locke's and David Hume's philosophical theories of personal identity within the British empiricist tradition. Locke grounds personal identity in consciousness — a continuous awareness of past, present, and future thoughts — rather than in bodily substance or the soul. Hume, by contrast, takes a more skeptical position, arguing that the self is unobservable and that personal identity is nothing more than a bundle of fleeting perceptions. The essay examines points of convergence, including their shared diachronic view of identity and their mutual de-emphasis of the soul's substance, while highlighting key divergences regarding memory, psychological continuity, and the role of perception in constructing the self.
Among the many controversial issues in British empiricist philosophy is the concept of personal identity. The purpose of this essay is to compare and contrast two influential theories on the problem of personal identity: Locke's and Hume's approaches to the matter. Debates over the issue have continued among contemporary philosophers, who seek to deny or defend the positions of these remarkable predecessors. One defender of Hume's concept of personal identity is Susan Mendus. Despite various criticisms leveled against Hume, Mendus identifies two redeeming aspects of his treatment of personal identity: Hume rejects the distinction usually made when identity is ascribed to persons versus non-persons, on the basis that in both cases we are dealing with imperfect identity (Mendus, S., 1980: 61).
Hume is rather skeptical when he claims that we have no experience of a simple, individual impression that we can call the self. He understands the notion of "self" as the totality of a person's conscious life. The main argument for this idea is that our perceptions are fleeting, and he concludes from this that all we are is a bundle of different perceptions. This "bundle" of different perceptions accounts for the idea of personal identity in his view.
In Hume's view, the soul retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, constantly changing elements. The question of personal identity is thus subject to the loose cohesion of one's personal experience. Hume also holds that the "self" is utterly unobservable: in the process of introspection, all we may observe are fleeting thoughts, feelings, and experiences — never a self. Therefore, Hume's view on personal identity is not entirely clear, and his account remains more vague, skeptical, and relative than Locke's.
After this brief account of Hume's perspective, Locke's approach appears more comprehensive and complex. A common point of agreement between the two philosophers is their treatment of the soul: neither Hume nor Locke emphasizes the substance of the soul as foundational. Locke's conception of personal identity dwells not on substance or the body, but on "the same continued consciousness," which is also distinct from the soul. For Locke, the soul may have no consciousness of itself. Body and soul differ because the body has substance and the soul does not, yet the soul may possess the quality of "consciousness." The body, like any substance, may change, while consciousness remains the same. According to Locke, personal identity resides not in the brain — which is substance, like the body — but in consciousness. Many scholars argue that John Locke was in fact the first to employ the modern meaning of consciousness in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
According to Locke, personal identity "depends on consciousness, not on substance" nor on the soul. Identity refers to the fact that we are the same person to the extent that we are conscious of our past and future thoughts and actions in the same way as we are conscious of our present thoughts and actions. Consciousness underlies all other thoughts, doubling them back upon themselves, and therefore personal identity is founded only on the repeated act of consciousness. For Locke, the soul represents the thing which thinks inside the human body. He argues, however, that consciousness can be transferred from one soul to another, and that personal identity follows consciousness. The soul changes as a result of such a transfer, but consciousness — and therefore personal identity — is preserved.
The reverse is also true: Locke holds that consciousness can be lost, as in cases of utter forgetfulness, while the "soul" or "thinking substance" remains the same. This distinction makes Locke's conception quite radical. For Hume, by contrast, perceptions do not belong to a "thinking substance" as they do for Locke; they simply occur, unattached to any underlying subject.
A common point between the two philosophers is their diachronic view of personal identity. For Locke, the same soul or thinking substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity over time; for Hume as well, time is important in relation to identity. However, a key difference remains: for Locke, consciousness stays the same during the transition between thinking substances, whereas for Hume, identity is shaped by perceptions as they accumulate over time. Only the broad temporal frame is shared — the two thinkers' approaches to identity across time diverge substantially.
"Shared and divergent views of identity over time"
"Memory's role in personal identity for both thinkers"
They emphasize different aspects of certain mental processes and diverge in many points. At the same time, some common aspects can also be identified. The intricacy of these issues is considerable, and the present essay has been an attempt to establish some of those common points while also mapping the most significant differences between the two thinkers' accounts of personal identity.
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