Machiavelli's Justification for "Not Good" in The Prince

Introduction: Morality and the Problem of Leadership

Morality appears to us as a concrete term underscored by certain rational assumptions about the universe. And yet our own experience tells us that what one person considers a vice may, to another, appear as virtue — and the reverse may also apply. It is thus rather difficult to pin down precisely what defines the cause of moral behavior, though all major figures in the history of philosophy have ventured a framework. The Renaissance in particular witnessed a flurry of intellectual activity, with successive generations of thinkers engaged in a spirited exchange across decades of literature on what inspires moral behavior, what entitles behavior that is "not good," and what makes for meaningful governance.

In our investigation of the various possible lenses through which to understand morality, consideration of Machiavelli's seminal work The Prince reveals an ideology that has long since entitled leaders and despots to take action according to rank and circumstance rather than according to any existing code differentiating right from wrong.

Pragmatism Over Principle: Machiavelli's Framework

In The Prince, Machiavelli indulges in an evaluation of the qualities that constitute a suitable leader, offering a thoughtful analysis not of what it means to be "good" or "not good" but of what justifies appealing to either as a matter of pragmatism in rulership. His perspective is unique in that it does not rely on the conventional code of Judeo-Christian ethics in order to shape a regimen of conduct — a tradition that has informed no small number of philosophers in their attempts to understand ethical orientation. By contrast, the Machiavellian view on conduct is very much instructed by what the author considers the necessary and pragmatic realities of rulership.

As such, the "evils" of poor leadership differ from those "evils" committed between private individuals insofar as the goals of a leader, he argues, sharply contrast those of an ordinary person. It is thus that Machiavelli begins to build an exception to codified moral rationales, arguing instead that the course of leadership will often require a ruler to make decisions, engage in activities, and initiate processes which, to some, might be perceived or experienced as "not good."

Evil Properly Used: Violence, Dishonesty, and Statecraft

To the point, Machiavelli explains that evil deeds, when properly executed, may actually be legitimate as a means of achieving or maintaining power. He observes that the negative implications of deeds which deviate from conventional standards of rightness are perceived as such only because they are not employed to the correct ends.

Where a leader is concerned — required to make war, allot resources, and arrive at decisions that could be expected to affect large numbers of people — the simple distinctions that help most individuals differentiate between right and wrong will not be sufficient. Instead, a leader must undergo a conscientious process within which moral imperatives are only one factor among many. Bad leadership, Machiavelli argues, is not necessarily or inherently derived from one who behaves in a manner that is "not good." Rather, it stems from one who fails to use all available information to make decisions unrestrained by practical necessity. Thus Machiavelli notes that "this follows from severities being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it is lawful to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to one's security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can be turned to the advantage of the subjects." (Machiavelli, ch. VIII) Machiavelli thereby advocates the implementation of "evil" where such actions can be demonstrated as being for the eventual good of those subjected to it — meaning that an act of war, of oppression, or of discriminatory internal practice might be justified as serving the greater good.

The Prince proceeds from the understanding that politics and power are inextricably related. The balance an individual achieves in applying each of these to leadership will likely determine his success as a principal figure in the perpetuation of statehood. This is the preoccupation that the author uses to justify what we might characterize as an immoral disposition, building a carefully structured argument in favor of a fairly wide-ranging degree of power for an individual in a position of leadership.

Machiavelli's treatise on effective government offered an explanation of both the most intuitive and the most blunt ways to control the public, with either approach justified by the particulars of any given leadership scenario. His endorsement of conditional dishonesty is particularly striking. Where historical, philosophical, and spiritual discourse on honesty almost universally regards false witness as behavior that is "not good," Machiavelli justifies such by explaining that "a prince never lacks legitimate reasons to break his promises [where] such an observance of faith would be to his disadvantage; and when the reasons which made him promise are removed." (Machiavelli, ch. XVIII) In no uncertain terms, Machiavelli endorses a conditional dishonesty grounded in necessity.

Machiavelli Against Kant and Hobbes

Contrary to many thinkers who have observed some existing commitment to moral organization — such as Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative or Thomas Hobbes' social contract — Machiavelli believes that a leader is somewhat exempt from the stringent rules those frameworks impose. Both Kant and Hobbes, though differentiated with respect to moral absolutes, believed that a large part of the retention of social order hinges on some overarching commitment to the rule of right versus wrong.

By direct and striking contrast, Machiavelli explains that the traits considered to demonstrate "evil" in leadership are actually those that make principalship weak rather than merely objectionable. Where aggression, dishonesty, and intransigence may be seen as "not good" by conventional sensibilities — and by thinkers such as Kant and Hobbes — Machiavelli provides an entirely distinct list of traits he regards as more dangerous to a state and its people. Of a leader, the author explains: "what makes him despised is being considered changeable, frivolous, effeminate, cowardly, irresolute; from these qualities a prince must guard himself as if from a reef, and he must strive to make everyone recognize in his actions greatness, spirit, dignity, and strength; and concerning the private affairs of his subjects, he must insist that his decision be irrevocable; and he should maintain himself in such a way that no man could imagine that he can deceive or cheat him." (Machiavelli, ch. XIX)

Here, Machiavelli reveals that the moral canon applicable to principalship is evaluated by its success in execution rather than its alignment with conventional moral standards — giving enduring expression to the principle that, in his view, the end justifies the means.

Conclusion: Historical Viability and Contemporary Caution

Today, we must be very careful in the way that we apply Machiavellian principles to the political process. For though his work and its justification for certain types of behavior could be seen as a mode of resistance in its time and place, it is today a doctrine that has since been dissected, refuted, and acted out a great many times. In the last of these capacities, it has rendered much of the suffering and ill-will which it promises. Therefore, the discussion here contributes to a more thorough understanding of the ways in which Machiavelli's justifications were viable in their historical context and, simultaneously, of the ways in which such ideology can be reduced to institutional rhetoric quite akin to that against which it sought to rebel.

Works Cited

Cameron, E. (1991). The European Reformation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Jonathan Bennett.

Garnett, G. & Brutus, S.J. (1994). Vindiciae, Contra Tyrannos. Oxford University Press.

Machiavelli, N. and Bondanella, P. (eds). (1992). The Portable Machiavelli. Penguin Books.