This paper examines Renford Bambrough's philosophical argument that moral knowledge exists and is provable by parity of reasoning with knowledge of the external world. Drawing on G.E. Moore's defense of common sense and his proof of the external world, Bambrough contends that accepting evidence for an external world while simultaneously denying moral knowledge is a position of self-contradiction. The paper surveys Bambrough's responses to major objections — including arguments from cultural disagreement, the nature of moral attitudes, Hume's skepticism, unresolvable moral disputes, and Nowell-Smith's claim that objectivism leads to authoritarianism — concluding that moral knowledge rests on the same logical premises as knowledge of the physical world.
The central idea of A Proof of the Objectivity of Morals by Renford Bambrough is the thesis that we possess moral knowledge. This is a controversial assertion, and one that is not accepted by many philosophers. Bambrough's argument connects the existence of moral knowledge to widely accepted philosophical arguments for the existence of the external world, and he contends that the two stand or fall together.
Bambrough opens with a consideration of two of G.E. Moore's arguments: the defence of common sense and the proof of the external world. There is evidence to support the propositions Moore makes, since any attempt to disprove knowledge that another person believes they have — such as an individual's belief that they possess two hands — means it is the contradiction itself that must be seen as erroneous. The person making such a denial must be doing so as a result of false argument or mistaken reasoning. Therefore, if we have knowledge of the external world, there is a self-evident proof that serves as a model for the existence of moral knowledge (Bambrough, 1969).
An important factor in this discussion is that Bambrough focuses on the knowledge itself rather than on the language used to express it. He argues that if a linguistic philosopher entered the discussion, that philosopher would contend that Moore used the term "know" in an unusual way (Bambrough, 1969).
Looking at the argument regarding moral knowledge, Bambrough contends that to accept the evidence for the external world while simultaneously denying moral knowledge is a position of self-contradiction — yet this is a position adopted by many modern philosophers. His argument is that, by parity of reasoning, if there is an external world whose existence we accept as proven, then moral knowledge must equally be provable on the same logical basis (Bambrough, 1969).
The illustrative example offered in the paper is that we know, when a child is to undergo surgery, that an anaesthetic should be administered first, otherwise the surgery will be painful. This is a proposition that is true, and one that, Bambrough argues, could not be argued against with any reasoning that would appear credible (Bambrough, 1969).
By using the belief that one's hands exist as proof of the external world, Moore also maintains a commitment to common sense. Those who argue against moral knowledge do not accept the argument from common sense when it applies to morality, applying it only to the physical world. Furthermore, no logical explanation is given for departing from the use of common sense in the moral domain (Bambrough, 1969).
The reverse position has also been held by some philosophers: to reject the proof of the external world while accepting the moral argument. If the same standards of argument are applied consistently — given that the two support each other — this reverse position is equally self-contradictory (Bambrough, 1969).
"Cultural disagreement, attitudes, and subjectivist objections"
"Hume's skepticism and unresolvable moral disputes addressed"
When examined as a whole, the basic premise of Bambrough's argument is that accepting the evidence of the external world — and the premises on which that acceptance is based — commits one equally to accepting the arguments for moral knowledge. The two are grounded in the same logical premises, and to deny one would lead, by logical consistency, to the denial of the other.
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