This paper presents and tests three propositions about the public policy-making process in the United States. The first proposition argues that policy should be grounded in measurable outcomes rather than appeals to compassion or political point-scoring. The second examines whether extensions of government benefit programs — including unemployment insurance and the Affordable Care Act — risk enabling dependency rather than providing genuine safety nets. The third questions whether legislative mechanisms like the Senate filibuster serve as necessary checks or harmful obstacles to governance. Drawing on sources including Sabatier, Hacker, Kingdon, and Zedlewski, the paper tests each proposition through concrete policy examples and concludes that evidence-based, scientifically grounded policymaking is preferable to ideologically driven approaches.
This paper presents three general propositions pertaining to the policy-making process and then tests each one in turn. The first proposition is that policy-making should be based less on simple appeals to compassion and fairness and more on the results that policies actually produce. Many people argue, for example, that welfare is an absolutely necessary lifeline for vulnerable populations, while others contend that allowing welfare usage in perpetuity is harmful. Second, it should be questioned whether extensions of government health programs — such as the Affordable Care Act (ACA) — actually promote appropriate usage or instead encourage over-usage and abuse, and whether the aggregate results are positive overall. Third, the question must be asked whether legislative mechanisms like the filibuster hurt or help the overall governing process.
Regarding concerns about compassion and fairness, these discussions can noticeably detract from the overall quality of policy debate and its resulting outcomes, because some participants hold limited perspectives or advance arguments that are devoid of logic. The habit of pandering while advocating for legislation is common among politicians, and when it is obvious that a politician is doing exactly that, it becomes a problem — arguably a greater problem than the rhetorical vitriol that emerges from uninformed commentators, as noted by Hacker (2010). Public policy should be oriented toward producing the greatest good for the greatest number of people, not toward scoring political points or settling ideological scores. Proceeding in a reasonable, scientific manner is far preferable to the kind of process that produced the ACA. Studies and policy analyses such as the one conducted by the NYS Health Foundation (2009), while not immune to bias or political agendas, represent a more sound approach to policy development.
Regarding the second proposition, there is a meaningful distinction between extending temporary help to those facing genuine hardship and enabling counterproductive behavior. One compelling example is the repeated extension of unemployment benefits. Even during a severe recession, a person being unable to find work for 99 weeks — nearly two years — raises legitimate questions. Rather than examining whether conditions truly justify such extended benefits, policymakers often retreat to characterizing any skepticism as either "heartless" or an "economic drain." The central question is at what point unemployment insurance (and by extension, welfare) transitions from a social safety net into a subsidization of avoidable dependency.
Zedlewski's (2012) statement that TANF is the only means-tested safety net program is striking. Aside from return-on-investment programs like Medicare and Social Security, targeted means testing should be the rule rather than the exception. The same rigorous standard should apply to programs such as unemployment insurance and disability benefits. There should be a demonstrable need before benefits are granted, along with clearly defined limitations on their duration.
Third, the question must be raised whether the filibuster is helpful or harmful to the legislative process. On a related note, forcing legislation through Congress using procedural maneuvers — as occurred with the ACA — demonstrates that the process can be abused. However, removing all such protective provisions and leaving every policy decision to a simple majority vote is also probably unwise, as the following analysis will demonstrate.
Regarding the first proposition, the history of welfare reform and its measurable outcomes supports the argument that examining what is truly happening and crafting policy accordingly is the superior approach. This view is echoed by Sabatier (2007), who argues that each policy framework should be supported and validated by proven scientific theory. The ACA represents something of the opposite approach. The centerpiece of that legislation was the individual mandate requiring Americans to purchase health insurance. The problem with that provision — even though it has survived Supreme Court review — is that the financial penalty for not purchasing coverage is demonstrably lower than the cost of purchasing a policy independently. This may or may not hold true for individuals who have access to employer-sponsored insurance and simply decline it, but the problem highlighted by ACA proponents is that many employers either do not offer coverage or make it prohibitively expensive. If the genuine goal of the ACA was universal insurance coverage, the penalty would need to be considerably higher — even accounting for concerns about Commerce Clause violations. Free riders are a genuine problem in healthcare, but the ACA falls short in addressing them, which may suggest that the legislation had additional, less-advertised objectives.
Regarding the second proposition, the line between extending mercy to those facing temporary hardship and enabling dependency is a fine one. Many have pointed to the so-called "99ers" as evidence that people truly cannot find work. Based on personal observation and experience — including in areas with weak job markets and during recessionary periods — this claim is difficult to accept without scrutiny. A telling pattern involves individuals who exhaust 99 weeks of unemployment benefits and subsequently apply for Social Security Disability benefits. If a qualifying disability truly existed, the question must be asked why the individual was not already receiving or applying for Social Security Disability Insurance. The fact that this pattern has been widely reported in the news cycle represents a significant red flag, suggesting that some individuals are knowingly gaming the system.
"Whether filibuster helps or hurts governance"
"Each proposition tested against real policy cases"
Zedlewski, Sheila. "Welfare Reform: What Have We Learned in Fifteen Years." Urban Institute 24 (2012): 1–10. Print.
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