This paper offers a critical review of Jonathan Marks's essay "Black, White, Other: Racial Categories Are Cultural Constructs Masquerading as Biology." The review summarizes Marks's central argument that race is a cultural inheritance rather than a biological reality, tracing his logic from the history of human classification through the genetics of human variation. Key points include the role of Linnaeus in early racial taxonomy, the distinction between cultural and biological groupings, and genetic evidence showing greater diversity within so-called racial groups than between them. The review concludes with a brief critique noting the essay's failure to address superficial biological differences between populations.
"Black, White, Other: Racial Categories Are Cultural Constructs Masquerading as Biology" by Jonathan Marks argues that race can be considered a category, but not a biological one. The author begins with an anecdote: a New York Times article that erroneously describes a person in a photograph as "half-black." He poses the question: how can a person be "half-black"? He argues that race is not strictly biological but is rather a cultural trait — one that is inherited and passed down over generations.
Marks starts his argument with a history of the study of human variation. Linnaeus, the first to classify humans into groups, established Homo sapiens as one species within a group he called Primates. Many scientists followed, attempting to establish specific groups within Homo sapiens, but they could never agree on where precisely to draw the divisions between those groups. Marks then identifies two ways in which humans think about race: biologically, as Linnaeus did, and culturally — as illustrated by designations such as "Hutu" or "Jew." Of particular significance to Marks's argument is his claim that these cultural groupings are "neither strictly nature nor strictly community. The groupings are constructions of human social history."
Adding to his argument, Marks states — quite logically — that visually obvious natural variation is almost never as socially important as cultural difference. For example, one rarely encounters institutional discrimination against people with black hair by those with blond hair. This observation supports Marks's argument by illustrating how culture is a stronger driver of social division than physical features or genes. That logic, he contends, applies directly to what race truly means: a difference in culture, not a difference in biology.
"Genetic gradients and diversity within racial groups"
By the end of the article, Marks concludes, as he states at the outset, that race is not a biological factor but a cultural one. While the flow of the piece is at times a bit rough, Marks develops a clear line of logic that can be traced from point to point, with all supporting arguments falling into place along the way. His central message is relatively simple, and — aided by modern genetics — relatively straightforward to support. Of particular interest is his observation that racial violence between biologically indistinguishable groups (such as Hutus and Tutsis) that invokes "race" as justification is, in effect, using an invented excuse.
You’re 54% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 1 section.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.