This paper examines the organizational transformation of Seoul National University (SNU) Business School's Graduate School of Business (GSB) as it pursued a vision to become a top-10 global business institution within ten years. Using Lewin's three-stage change model, the analysis traces the implementation of new MBA programs—including the Global MBA (G-MBA), SNU MBA (S-MBA), and Executive MBA (E-MBA)—and the challenges encountered in adapting North American business practices within a Korean academic culture. The paper identifies key barriers including faculty resistance to performance-based evaluation systems, increased salary costs for international faculty recruitment, and curriculum standardization requirements. It concludes by proposing solutions for tuition cost management, specialized course structures, and faculty globalization initiatives to strengthen SNU's competitive position in international business education rankings.
Seoul National University (SNU) Business School consists of two sub-organizations: the College of Business Administration (CBA) and the Graduate School of Business (GSB). The Business School's primary goal, as stated in its vision statement, was to enter the global top 10 within ten years. This ambitious objective required significant organizational transformation and strategic realignment.
SNU, a national research university located in Seoul, South Korea, was founded in 1946 as the country's first national university. It served as a role model for many public universities throughout South Korea. The College of Business Administration, the main body of SNU Business School, was one of sixteen colleges at the university and primarily focused on undergraduate, master's, and doctorate programs across seven majors: Finance, Marketing, Management Information Systems, Operations Management, Organizational Behavior, Accounting, and International Business.
In 2006, the Graduate School of Business (GSB) was formed and separated from the College of Business Administration. The GSB's purpose was twofold: to pioneer a new program called the Global MBA (G-MBA) and to launch two other professional training programs. The school also aimed at achieving global recognition in worldwide business school rankings, which required fundamental changes in how the institution operated.
As a government-administered institution, SNU faculty and staff were accustomed to traditional norms, including automatic tenure granted after a few years of service. The introduction of North American management practices—such as student-based faculty evaluation—was considered unusual and even offensive within Korean academic culture. In the Confucian tradition, where scholars are highly revered, professors were believed to deserve respect based on their position alone, not on performance metrics. However, most staff members attempted to remain positive and understand the rationale behind the new strategy. Once they grasped the objectives, many became supportive of the program.
By 2009, the dean outlined three remaining critical goals. First, the Faculty and Research initiative aimed to improve research output and support by hiring and retaining more qualified professors. Second, the Korean Case Study focus emphasized developing more Korean company cases as teaching resources and financing sources. Third, the proposed merger of G-MBA and S-MBA programs would address confusion caused by different application deadlines (G-MBA in August, S-MBA in January) and reduce administrative overlap.
Planned change is change that results from deliberate, well-thought-out effort to achieve specific goals. Unlike accidental change or change by drift, planned change involves intentional, goal-oriented activities that are carefully designed and implemented. Kurt Lewin's change model provides a widely used framework for understanding organizational transformation through three distinct stages: unfreezing, transition, and refreezing.
Lewin identified several fundamental principles for implementing change successfully. First, change should only be implemented for valid reasons. Second, change should always be gradual rather than abrupt. Third, all change should be planned and deliberate, not sporadic or sudden. Fourth, all individuals affected by the change should be involved in planning for it. These principles guided much of SNU's transformation process.
The first stage, unfreezing, involves preparing the organization to accept that change is necessary. This requires breaking down the current status quo and creating dissatisfaction with existing conditions. At SNU, this stage manifested through continuous questions from faculty members about the practicality and benefits of introducing MBA programs. Changes included new teaching methodologies, a new evaluation system, modifications to the academic calendar, and adjustments to student admission quotas.
The second stage, transition (or changing), involves altering the behavior of individuals, faculty, and the broader organization. This stage includes shifting paradigms and applying innovative concepts like the "blue ocean" strategy to gain competitive advantage. At SNU, the transition stage saw the establishment of the GSB as a separate entity, the appointment of a curriculum committee and new faculty board, recruitment of highly selected professors from prestigious international business schools, and the introduction of the one-year G-MBA program. The school also adjusted class sizes and carefully selected professors to teach elective and core courses.
The third stage, refreezing, makes improvements sustainable and establishes them as new standards. While change is constant, refreezing creates stability around the new practices. At SNU, refreezing included establishing new teaching methodologies, creating improved student-lecturer relationships, emphasizing real business applications in coursework, and making student learning satisfaction a priority reflected in public faculty evaluations. The school also developed a highly competitive, performance-driven culture, upgraded facilities, and implemented new English language requirements.
SNU's strategy for achieving its top-10 vision involved diversifying its market segment by launching three distinct MBA programs targeted at the international market. In August 2006, following authorization from South Korea's Ministry of Education, SNU launched the Global MBA (G-MBA) to encourage global standard business education in the country.
The G-MBA was an aggressive program welcoming candidates from outside South Korea. The twelve-month intensive full-time program was equivalent to a two-year coursework in North American MBA programs, allowing students to gain competent-level education in less time at lower cost. All lectures and in-class discussions were conducted in English, making the program accessible to international students.
The SNU MBA (S-MBA) was a second program offered as a one-year program with the same workload as the G-MBA but specifically designed for Korea's business environment. While the curriculum was largely similar, most lectures were delivered in Korean, creating a distinction based on language and cultural focus.
The Executive MBA (E-MBA), which commenced in 2008, targeted working professionals with more than ten years of industry experience. Classes were held on Friday and Saturday, allowing professionals to continue working while pursuing their degree. This program expanded SNU's reach into the executive education market.
The recruitment of prominent international faculty significantly enhanced SNU's brand recognition both globally and domestically. These professors conducted media interviews during their stays in Seoul, indirectly promoting SNU's MBA programs to international audiences. This visibility proved crucial for attracting international students and establishing credibility in global business education networks.
Strategic Challenges and Program Positioning
The school faced pressure to reduce undergraduate enrollments to improve student satisfaction as MBA programs gained prominence. As the dean explained, this created a trade-off: declining some prospective undergraduate students promised future benefits through improved graduate program quality. By 2009, foreign faculty had been hired to teach elective courses, though budget constraints made this investment questionable.
Program naming also became a strategic issue. The initial "SNU MBA" designation was changed to "Junior Executive MBA" and then reverted to "SNU MBA," creating confusion about market positioning. The school recognized from the beginning that positioning these multiple programs would present challenges.
Criteria for Global Business School Recognition
To understand SNU's strategic positioning, it is essential to identify what distinguishes world-recognized MBA programs. Top business schools employ highly selected, well-compensated professors evaluated based on academic achievement and research productivity. They prioritize publications in top-tier journals and maintain strong research capabilities. While research is not the primary driver of MBA quality, high research potential typically correlates with higher-ranked programs.
Top-tier schools emphasize understanding diverse business practices across cultures. European schools, for example, leverage cultural diversity and global business experience for competitive advantage. Many leading programs also focus on developing soft skills applicable across industries. International student enrollment ratios are key indicators of globalization; top MBA programs typically maintain high percentages of international students and gender diversity, with female student representation exceeding 20%.
Ultimately, a primary student motivation for attending highly ranked business schools is salary advancement after graduation. Top schools are measured partly by their graduates' employment rates at international firms and their post-graduation salaries. SNU faced a significant constraint: limited international recognition limited the salary prospects of its graduates, reducing competitiveness in attracting top candidates.
Organizational Restructuring
The GSB underwent substantial structural changes. The faculty grew to 53 full-time professors and 18 visiting professors responsible for teaching across the three MBA programs. All recruitment, evaluation, promotion, and career development decisions were centralized under the dean's office, representing a significant change from traditional departmental autonomy.
Eight new administrative staff members were hired to manage the three programs, with responsibility divided between academic affairs and admissions (eight persons) and career development and public relations (three persons). All staff were required to speak fluent English when communicating with international students, faculty, and external contacts, though Korean remained acceptable for internal daily communications.
The creation of the Curriculum Committee, a subcommittee of the GSB Faculty Board, proved highly influential on organizational decisions. The committee's mission was to develop and supervise implementation of new MBA curricula. Young staff members were encouraged to voice opinions alongside senior professors, and most new ideas were accepted without significant objection, creating a more dynamic organizational culture than traditional Korean universities typically fostered.
Despite strategic vision and careful planning, SNU encountered substantial barriers in implementing its transformation. The most immediate challenge was financial: hiring prominent international faculty required significant salary investment. By 2009, distinguished professors from institutions such as Columbia, INSEAD, Duke, Cornell, Wharton, Stern, Yale, and UCLA were paid $30,000 for thirty-hour lectures—equivalent to $1,000 per hour—plus business class tickets and hotel accommodations. This rate paralleled executive education pricing at top American schools and placed substantial pressure on the GSB budget.
The more profound challenge was organizational and cultural: the MBA program triggered "competition within" the institution. Historically, SNU granted tenure to faculty after a few years of service as a rightful reward for academic achievement and dedicated labor. However, the rapid pace of change exceeded faculty adaptation capacity, and increased performance pressure took a heavy toll on professors. New program implementations meant additional teaching loads, and the North American management practices underlying the MBA program threatened the secured positions of senior academics.
The most controversial change was the decision to publicly release course evaluation results. Every instructor was evaluated by students, and results were made transparent to all. This practice was considered highly unusual and even offensive in Korean academic society. As an old Korean saying expresses it, nobody could dare to "step into the shadow of the teacher," reflecting the Confucian tradition where scholars were inherently revered. The practice was so novel that other Korean universities only began contemplating similar approaches after SNU pioneered it.
Faculty resistance to this system was understandable within its cultural context. Prior to the MBA program, Korean professors did not imagine being compared with one another. In Confucian culture, where scholars held elevated social status, a professor deserved respect based on position and achievement, not on student satisfaction metrics. Yet despite this unfavorable atmosphere, SNU proceeded with public evaluations as a mechanism to drive continuous improvement and maintain accountability to students.
"Tuition reform, course restructuring, faculty globalization, government engagement"
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