Washington Rules: America\'s Path to Permanent War
Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War
Washington rules: America's path to permanent war is an indictment of the Washington consensus that positions the U.S. as the World's Big Brother and Policeman. Commencing with the Truman Administration, Bacevich traces the birth, development and maintenance of the Washington consensus built on a credo in which the United States alone must "lead, save, liberate, and ultimately transform the world," along with the "trinity" of global military presence, global power projection and global interventionism. Based on these two elements of credo and trinity, along with the complacency of the American people, the United States has spread its military might around the globe in a so-called "flexible response" thrusting us "into a condition approximating perpetual war" that is costing the country dearly in human and nonhuman resources. Bacevich then suggests solutions in the form of a new credo in which the United States becomes a model of the ideals set forth in our Constitution and Declaration of Independence. He also suggests a new trinity in which America shifts from: a large professional military constantly prepared for war to more of a citizen-warrior force; use of our military for world domination to use of the military for defense and vital interests only; global occupation to withdrawal from areas in which the cost clearly outweighs the benefit.
Bacevich's book is widely praised, though problems have been noted. Though chiefly praising Bacevich's book, Gary J. Bass takes issue with: at least one of Bacevich's severe analogies between our policymakers and possibly Hitler; Bacevich's exclusion of examples in which American leaders and the American public acted against the foregone conclusion of the Washington consensus. Gerard De Groot also praises Bacevich's book but believes that Bacevich's belief that the American public can change the current situation is too optimistic. In addition to the criticisms posed by Bass and De Groot, it appears that Bacevich's suggestion of eliminating our large, well-armed professional military is an invitation to a disaster that we were fortunate to miss during World War II. Finally, Bacevich's suggestion of defense-only and vital interest-only use of our military raises significant issues about what constitutes "defense" and "vital interest," as well as the important issue of who will decide what constitutes "defense" and "vital interest." In sum, Bacevich's book raises important perspectives and historical examples that compel the reader to examine and challenge the current Washington consensus; however, the book is also somewhat flawed and/or incomplete.