Campbell

Freedom and Want

The concept of freedom involves being able to make a choice, which Campbell recognizes when he writes that moral freedom means that you could have done otherwise in a certain situation, all variables remaining equal. For example, I remember a situation in grade school on the playground. I pushed a girl into the mud. I pretended like it was an accident, and everyone believed me, but it was not. I had pushed her on purpose. Campbell would say that I was free to make the decision to push or not to push, and I decided to push. In the same situation, I could have made the choice not to push. This is freedom. Soft determinists, however, would say that one variable changes this -- the variable of want. I could only have chosen not to push the girl if I had wanted to refrain from pushing her. I wanted to push her. I remember that clearly. Was I free not to push her despite that want? Yes.

Campbell's view can explain my decision much better than the soft determinist view. I remember, in the instant that I pushed the girl, thinking about it, and making a conscious choice. I remember making that decision to push her, as awful as it might seem. I do not know what possessed me to want to push her, but I know that, whether or not I wanted to, I did push her, and I could have done otherwise. True freedom means being able to make a choice in spite of all variables -- want being one of them. There are many times that we want to do something, but it is not good for us, so we choose to do what is more positive for us in the long run than what we want to do right now. We are free to make that choice, as is exemplified by the times that we choose to do what we want to do over what is right or what would serve us better in the long run. Freedom must mean we have the ability to choose from at least two choices in any given situation. Thus, Campbell's view is sufficient.