911 Commission Report Intelligence and Information Sharing

Intelligence, Information Sharing, and the 9/11 Commission Report Intelligence versus information There two terms are fundamentally different for a number of reasons. The reason the terms are different can be decoded by investigating the ‘why’ from the information gathered. According to Lance (2017) the ‘how’ or ‘what’ is not important in decoding intelligence information. The resource needed to produce valued and true intelligence is by understanding why.

The sole purpose any entity receives finished intelligence is to make it possible for the entity to make strategic, operational and tactical decisions with the information received. The media takes information received and takes steps towards transforming this information into stories hence creating actionable intelligence. In essence, according to Lance (2017) intelligence changes the how and what in information into when and why in the process of decision making. Information only becomes finished intelligence through detailed analysis of that information.

Tallmadge (2016) defines information as knowledge that is communicated concerning a circumstance or particular fact. On intelligence, Tallmadge (2016) defines it as the process of seeking information, determining what that information means, and following this up by using the information to take strategic action. Information is available everywhere from sources such as newspapers, daily news, blogs, one on one conversations etc. Intelligence on the other hand often details the information that is not necessarily readily and freely available. Intelligence information may not be found within public domains (Tallmadge, 2016).

Intelligence as perceived by the public is privileged information which is intended to be consumed by specific audiences (Mostly security officials). Intelligence is an art of gathering the protected and privileged information and using it to the benefit of the public. From the perspective of Goldfarb (2016), the principle difference between intelligence and information is data. Data does not have any context by itself. It would not be helpful to anyone in trying to solve a particular problem. In determining the difference between data and intelligence context is very important.

Some of the questions that one must ask themselves in order to understand the difference include: At what stage of an attack would the data be fundamental? What is the activity related to the data? What is the date for the activity? What business does the activity affect? Contextual details are important in differentiating intelligence from information. These contextual details are quite few. It is only the information that has an associated context that can qualify to be considered as intelligence (Goldfarb, 2016).

In the absence of context this is just data. Intelligence can only demonstrate its true power if it is applied effectively on real world situations. The effectiveness and value of intelligence can only be realized through an excellent strategic plan and a risk based strategy to security. Intelligence must be mapped onto relevant priorities and goals the come out of strategic approach to security (Goldfarb, 2016). This way, organizations become more strategic and selective in their clamor for intelligence.

The iterations and metrics of intelligence are defined by continued re-assessment and recapitulations. Successful intelligence information utilizes continuous reassessments, tune ups and updates depending on the challenges, risks and threats that must be mitigated. The bottom-line is that context is everything when it comes to intelligence (Goldfarb, 2016). It is only under the right context that data can be viewed as intelligence instead of it simply being viewed as information. Intelligence also becomes valuable if the correct framework under which it is applied is actualized.

Organizations that have a good understanding of this are able to benefit more from the value that the intelligence provides. Based on this understanding it can be deduced that information can be freely shared between agencies and organizations. However, the value attached to intelligence would make it difficult for the institutions that hold it to share it without some kind of understanding. For instance, Facebook holds intelligence information about consumer trends.

These consumer trends can be very helpful to some business entities that would use it to reposition themselves and capitalize on the given segments of the population with an objective of expanding their customer base. Facebook is never willing to share this information freely. Google, Apple, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsoft are some of the technology companies that are not quite amenable to the sharing of information. National governments will also not share privileged security information freely without some form of regulation.

The multinational technology companies probably have more data on their users than any government could have. A company like Google would want to guard its own interests. The US 4th amendment was put in place to guard the people against unreasonable seizures and searches (Whittaker, 2013). Google is not fully subject to this regulation. These multinational technology companies use consumer information to make money (Whittaker, 2013). These companies work hard to restrict the government from accessing their cloud information.

Google for instance is working hard to enforce measures aimed at restricting the government from accessing its digital communication information. The US government requests information from these multinational technology companies (Google, Apple, Yahoo, Facebook and Microsoft). The companies safeguard their own interests by holding onto their data and refusing to handover pertinent privileged data. This data would turn into intelligence for the government in their pursuit of criminal and terrorist elements that use online platforms to communicate.

To the technology companies they are eager to comply with the privacy policy that safeguards their users against unauthorized private information access. If consumers knew that the government had access to the information the technology firms would lose many subscribers and they do not want that to happen. 3 significant information-sharing problems and challenges reported in the 9/11 Commission Report 1. Peoples unwillingness to share information: 2. Operational failures 3. Imagination The systemic and human unwillingness to share information made it possible for Al Qaeda to outsmart authorities.

Al Qaeda had mastered the ability to approve, evaluate, monitor, direct and plan major operations (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2011). Their personnel were able to recruit, indoctrinate, vet and train terrorists. Their communication systems were adequate enough for them to plan and coordinate operations. Their intelligence was strong enough to identify enemy weaknesses and capitalize on them. Al Qaeda also had an ability to move people to far distances and the ability to raise resources to finance any attack.

On the other hand information linking Mihdhar to the Cole attack, failure to put Mihdhar and Hazmi on the terror watch list, failure to coordinate and arrest Zacarias Moussaoui, failure to flag false visa application assessments, failure to detect passport manipulation, failure to include terror watch list in the no-fly category etc. were all mistakes done by the government (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2011). This helped Al Qaeda to have an easy time planning and executing their terror mission. Travers (2009) considers that failure to include Mihdhar, Khalid, Hazmi etc.

on the terror watch list was not to the 9/11 attack but the broken/dysfunctional screening process was. According to Travers (2009) there were already four classified databases entailing the suspected and known terrorists that were not accessible universally nor inter-operational. It was this that made systematic failure inevitable. Although this is true to some level it is also true that the government may have underestimated the lengths to which the Al Qaeda operatives would go to in their mission to send terror.

The use of name based database systems presents inherent limitations Travers, 2009). Travers (2009) proposes the use of centralized databases for the whole government that captures finer details like biometrics. Travers is right in this regard. On operational failures it has been seen that Al Qaeda was resourceful and flexible enough to execute any terror activity they wished to. According to the 9/11 commission report it is not possible to know whether any measures would have been enough to defeat the terrorists (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2011).

It is clear though that none of the adopted measures from between 1998 and 2001 by the American government derailed the efforts of the terrorists. The government failed in policy, imagination, management, and capabilities. Travers (2009) concedes that the poor screening was to blame. The lack of.