Response to 9/11 Creation of the DNI DHS and Iraq Invasion

The Failures of the Intelligence Community Leading to 9/11

Introduction

The investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks revealed a massive failure of the U.S. intelligence community. Despite numerous signs pointing to an impending terrorist attack, the intelligence community failed to prevent the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil. One of the main issues was the lack of coordination and seriousness among the various branches of US intelligence. This paper discusses these failures and also what lessons were learned and changes made by the US intelligence community.

Failures Leading up to 9/11

There are several key areas where the intelligence community, notably the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), failed to cooperate effectively with other law enforcement agencies leading up to 9/11.

The communication and coordination problem between intelligence agencies has been widely discussed in reports and academic literature about the pre-9/11 intelligence failures.[footnoteRef:1] This lack of communication was a significant systemic issue that inhibited an effective response to the growing terrorist threat. The reason for it was the siloing of information within agencies, which meant that critical pieces of information were not shared or linked effectively. [1: Kimbra L. Fishel, "Intelligence Reform." American Intelligence Journal 37, no. 1 (2020): 54-61.]

A significant instance of this problem was the failure of the CIA to inform the FBI about the presence of future hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in the United States in 2000.[footnoteRef:2] These two individuals were known to have attended an al-Qaeda meeting in Malaysia, yet their arrival in the US was not relayed to domestic law enforcement agencies in time. Had this information been shared appropriately, it might have been possible for the FBI to locate these individuals and disrupt the 9/11 plot.[footnoteRef:3] [2: Kevin Michael Derksen, "Commentary: The logistics of actionable intelligence leading to 9/11." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 253-268.] [3: Kevin Michael Derksen, "Commentary: The logistics of actionable intelligence leading to 9/11." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005): 253-268.]

This problem was highlighted by the 9/11 Commission panel, which noted that "in late August, the Moussaoui arrest was briefed to the DCI and other top CIA officials under the heading 'Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.'…the news had no evident effect on warning."[footnoteRef:4] Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen of Moroccan descent, was in the United States in the months leading up to the 9/11 attacks, attending flight school in Minnesota. His behavior raised suspicions, leading to his arrest by the FBI in mid-August 2001 on immigration charges. At the time, the FBI suspected he could be planning a terrorist act involving a commercial airplane, but they were unable to secure a warrant to search his belongings due to insufficient evidence linking him to a foreign terrorist group. [4: Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau, “Threats and Responses: The Overview,” The New York Times, April 15, 2004. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/15/us/threats-responses-overview-sept-11-panel-cites-cia-for-failures-terror-case.html]

The report points out that while Moussaoui's arrest was indeed briefed to top CIA officials, it failed to set off alarms as it should have. The report implies that the intelligence community failed to connect the dots between Moussaoui's behavior and the broader threat of a terrorist attack. The title of the briefing, "Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly," should have drawn attention to the possibility of a terrorist attack involving planes, especially given the intelligence the community had received indicating such a threat.

The intelligence community's failure to respond effectively to the information on Moussaoui was symptomatic of a larger systemic issue. As the 9/11 Commission Report points out, the system was not "tuned" to recognize and respond to the significance of such information. The agencies had the pieces of the puzzle but failed to put them together, primarily due to communication and coordination problems. The Moussaoui case, among others, shows that more effective inter-agency communication and collaboration could have potentially prevented the 9/11 attacks.

There were also several warnings from foreign intelligence services about a potential large-scale attack by al-Qaeda. These included specific warnings from the intelligence services of Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco that something big was being planned inside the United States. However, these warnings were not adequately prioritized or followed up.[footnoteRef:5] It was as though the intelligence community was simply not interested in or lacked sufficient concern with respect to the seriousness of these reports. [5: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Commission Report 911. WW Norton & Company, 2004.]

In addition, there was the problem of the fact that intelligence had essentially ignored the 'Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US' Brief that appeared in August 2001. That month President George W. Bush received a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB) titled "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," warning that Osama bin Laden was planning to exploit his operatives' access to the U.S. to mount a terrorist strike. While the brief did not specify when or where these attacks might occur, it was one of the most direct warnings of the 9/11 attacks.[footnoteRef:6] The intelligence community essentially ignored these warnings and virtually held the door open for the attackers. [6: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. Commission Report 911. WW Norton & Company, 2004.]

All of these instances underscore the systemic problems within the intelligence community, including insufficient inter-agency coordination, failure to prioritize and follow up on warnings, and the lack of a comprehensive strategy to counter the growing non-state terrorist threat. However, these findings led to significant changes within the U.S. intelligence community, including the establishment of the Director of National Intelligence to oversee and coordinate all intelligence agencies and improve information sharing.

Lessons Learned and Changes Made

In the wake of 9/11, international counter-terrorism cooperation has significantly increased. U.S. intelligence has established more robust relationships with foreign intelligence agencies, leading to the sharing of critical information and collaborative operations. These efforts reflect the concept of liberal institutionalism in international relations, where international institutions and regimes are utilized to manage their cooperation. Whereas before 9/11, international collaboration was not as intensive, today it is far more robust with formal relations established across a wide spectrum of nations. The most recent establishment of formal relations that appeared to be groundbreaking was the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel, brokered in part by the US.

Domestically, the lessons learned from intelligence agencies’ failures led to big changes in the U.S. These changes were aimed at overseeing intelligence and counter-terrorism efforts. The goal was to bring everything into a more centralized protocol. However, not all of these changes have been met with overwhelming praise or approval.

Creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

In 2002, the DHS was created to centralize and coordinate domestic security efforts. This department now oversees 22 federal agencies, including the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Coast Guard.[footnoteRef:7] The DHS now handles counterterrorism, border security, cybersecurity, disaster response, and transportation security. However, it is a behemoth of a department and it is unclear whether this level of bureaucratic centralization is helpful. The DHS was widely criticized in the wake of the lackluster response to the damage done in New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina, for instance. [7: Haddal, Chad C. "Border security: key agencies and their missions." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2009.]

Creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)

The position of DNI was created in 2004 to oversee the entire intelligence community and to facilitate inter-agency communication and cooperation. This was a direct response to the lack of communication that had contributed to the 9/11 attacks. The DNI heads up the whole of the United States Intelligence Community (IC), which comprises 17 separate agencies, each with their own roles. The DNI is meant to bring coherence to an intelligence community that lacked integration leading up to 9/11. It is a massive job and it is yet unclear as to whether it, too, is effective, as numerous terror attacks—like the Boston Bombing—have occurred since then.

Increased Focus on Counter-terrorism

Post-9/11, there was also dramatic shift in focus towards counter-terrorism efforts. This included increasing resources devoted to intelligence and counter-terrorism, both domestically and internationally. The fact that the US had a negligent posture towards Bin Laden and to Islamic terrorism in the lead-up suggested that new focus was warranted. However, in the wake of the attack on Iraq, based on faulty intelligence that said Saddam Hussein had mobile weapons labs and weapons of mass destruction, it seemed the lesson was not immediately learned. Ostensibly, there was an increased emphasis on data analysis and intelligence-sharing technologies, which were designed to help sift through the vast amounts of data to identify credible threats. But the NSA's controversial mass surveillance programs was also part of these efforts, and that culminated with the Snowden whistleblowing event, which shocked US citizens and led to concerns about privacy invasions.

Fusion Centers

Fusion centers were also developed in response to the communication and coordination failures that were identified after the 9/11 attacks. These centers were designed to facilitate information sharing among various agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. Their goal has been to better facilitate the sharing of threat-related information among partners. There are now several fusion centers across the United States, each of which focuses on a specific geographical area. Fusion centers are one of the best examples of how intelligence communities have responded to the problem of the siloing of information within agencies and between different levels of government.[footnoteRef:8] By bringing together agencies and allowing them to work more closely, it's much easier to connect the dots between different pieces of information and to identify potential threats. [8: Masse, Todd, Siobhan O'Neil, and John Rollins. "Fusion centers: Issues and options for Congress." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2007.]