Corruption within UN peacekeeping missions

Introduction
The United Nations (UN) was established in October 1945 in the immediate aftermath of World War II with the overarching mission to prevent future international conflicts. To this end, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was formed just 3 years later in response to the emerging conflict between India and Pakistan. Since that time – and to their credit -- UN peacekeepers operating under the auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations have completed hundreds of missions in Africa, Central and South America, Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The behaviors of the UN peacekeepers, though, have not always been exemplary and in some cases have even risen to the level of corruption and even worse. To determine the facts about the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, this study systematically reviews the relevant literature concerning UN peacekeeping missions in general and those that have been marred by corruption and other criminal activities such as those that took place in Haiti following the massive earthquake in 2010 in particular. Finally, a summary of the research and important findings about the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and its track record in the field are provided in the study’s conclusion.
Review and Analysis
Overview of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is responsible for the provision of executive and political directions for all global UN peacekeeping operations in coordination with the UN Security Council as well as Member States that contribute monetary support and military forces to these operations. The DPKO is also tasked with maintaining open lines of communication with the conflicts parties during its peacekeeping operations.[footnoteRef:2] In addition, the DPKO also serves in an advisory capacity for other UN peacebuilding missions and political initiatives.[footnoteRef:3] [2: “Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]” (2017). United Nations. [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/, p. 1.] [3: DPKO, p. 1.]

The first peacekeeping mission performed by the UN in 1948 in response to the partition of India and Pakistan under the purview of the UN Office of Special Political Affairs which retained control of UN peacekeeping operations until 1992 when the DPKO was formally established during the tenure of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.[footnoteRef:4] At present, the DPKO consists of four main offices as set forth in Table 1 below. [4: DPKO, p. 2.]

Table 1
Four main offices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Office
Description

Office of Operations
The main role of the Office of Operations is to provide political and strategic policy and operational guidance and support to the missions.

Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI)
The OROLSI) was established in 2007 to strengthen the links and coordinate the Department’s activities in the areas of police, justice and corrections, mine action, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and security sector reform.

Office of Military Affairs (OMA)
The OMA works to deploy the most appropriate military capability in support of United Nations objectives; and to enhance performance and improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of military components in United Nations Peacekeeping missions.

Policy Evaluation and Training Division (PET)
The PET Division provides an integrated capacity to develop and disseminate policy and doctrine; to develop, coordinate and deliver standardized training; to evaluate mission progress towards mandate implementation; and to develop policies and operational frameworks for strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.



Source: Adapted from Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2017
As of May 31, 2017, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was comprised of the following resources:
· 83,499 serving troops and military observers
· 12,494 police personnel;
· 5,043 international civilian personnel;
· 10,276 local civilian staff;
· 1,599 UN Volunteers.
· 124 countries contributed military and police personnel.[footnoteRef:5] [5: “About Us.” (2017). UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/, p. 1.]

Because the UN does not maintain a police force, peacekeeping missions are performed by military or law enforcement representatives that are contributed by Member States. It is also noteworthy that in recent years, UN peacekeepers have been tasked with nation-building activities such as: (a) assisting in political processes; (b) reforming judicial systems; (c) training law enforcement and police forces; (d) disarming and reintegrating former combatants; and (e) supporting the return of internally displaced persons and refugees.[footnoteRef:6] Some indication of the enormity of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations can be easily discerned from the map of past and current peacekeeping missions shown in Figure 1 below. [6: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, p. 3.]


Figure 1. Past and current UN peacekeeping missions
Source: http://s.telegraph.co.uk/graphics/MobileSwitcher/v2/images/1413-1436432920 426954207.png
Corruption and Other Criminal Activities within UN Peacekeeping Missions
Besides frequently lacking sufficient peacekeeping personnel to effectively perform their missions, UN peacekeeping operations are also hampered by qualitative issues as well. For instance, one of the major constraints to maintaining a global peacekeeping force comprised of contributions from UN Member States is the vast diversity of the peacekeeping forces in terms of their respective levels of training and experience as well as profound cross-cultural differences.[footnoteRef:7] These constraints have adversely affected relationships between UN peacekeeping forces and local law enforcement authorities in the past as well as their ability to achieve their strategic objectives.[footnoteRef:8] [7: Harvey Langholtz and Boris Kondoch (2005). International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 96.] [8: Langholtz and Kondoch, p. 96.]

Moreover, some UN peacekeepers simply lack the professional expertise and experience that are required to adequately respond to violent conflicts in multinational settings. For example, Langholtz and Kondoch (2009) emphasize that, “Many [UN] police officers lack the basic prerequisites for an international mission: They do not speak English, they have no mastery of weapon use (necessary in armed executive missions) and cannot drive the all-terrain vehicles of the UN police.”[footnoteRef:9] Certainly, these limitations are not insurmountable but they do underscore the lack of preparation and training afforded UN peacekeeping missions, due in part to the urgency of their deployment. For example, Grey-Johnson (2006) emphasizes that: [9: Langholtz and Kondoch, p. 96.]

UN peacekeeping missions in internal conflicts are mounted when there has been a near-total breakdown of law and order: Governments have lost control; civilians are at the mercy of the warring parties; women, children and other vulnerable groups face extreme hardships; and there appears to be no end in sight.[footnoteRef:10] [10: Grispin Grey-Johnson (2006, March-May). “Beyond Peacekeeping: The Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Africa.” UN Chronicle, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 8.]

In these types of situations, UN peacekeeping forces are required to perform most or all of civilian law enforcement operations as well as restoring security to public institutions. Other short-term priorities for UN peacekeeping missions include: (a) stop the hostilities; (b) protect the civilian population; (c) demobilize combatants; (d) restore state authority; (e) relaunch democratic governance processes; and (f) organize multiparty elections.[footnoteRef:11] Taken together, it is apparent that UN peacekeepers are faced with a truly daunting enterprise when they are deployed to these types of global hot spots, but the aforementioned urgency involved means that in far too many cases, UN peacekeepers lack the training and guidance they need to address highly complex social and political situations. [11: Grey-Johnson, p. 8.]

Furthermore, and more troubling still, however, have been the contributions of peacekeeping forces by developing nations that have poor human rights track records and which lack the resources to adequately train their peacekeepers, many of whom have been involuntarily drafted into these roles by their governments. While it is reasonable to suggest that the majority of these forces behave in a professional manner during their missions, the potential for corruption and even worse becomes more acute when peacekeepers from countries with a poor human rights record and high levels of corruption themselves are involved. As a result, Langholtz and Kondoch point out that, “Their behavior in missions is therefore often unsatisfactory. Although few, there are even cases of gross misconduct (torturing of detainees) and misbehavior (black-marketeering, corruption, promotion of prostitution) involving UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) officers.” [footnoteRef:12] It is important to note, though, that not all instances of corruption and other criminal activities committed by UN peacekeeping forces have been limited to representative from developing nations, and in far too many cases even the most professional and well-intentioned officers and civilians lack the specific training needed for complex UN peacekeeping missions.[footnoteRef:13] [12: Langholtz and Kondoch, p. 96.] [13: Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams (2000). Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, p. 256.]

Furthermore, rampant corruption within the public and private sectors of many countries was responsible in varying degrees for causing the social and political problems that resulted in the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in the first place, meaning that peacekeepers are compelled to work with public and private officials who are actively involved in these criminal activities as part of their operations. [footnoteRef:14] In this regard, Berman and Sams report that, “Peacekeeping missions are seriously affected by corruption and the fact that corruption is often endemic in mission areas. Peacekeeping missions may have no option but to work with local actors known to be involved in corruption in order to help stabilize a particular region.”[footnoteRef:15] Likewise, Transparency International’s Office of Defense and Security (2017) also emphasizes that, “Conflict environments are difficult, and the fact that corruption is often rife complicates the work of the UN and other international organizations immensely. Powerful local stakeholders are often corrupt, but cannot be ignored by peacekeepers and policymakers.”[footnoteRef:16] [14: “Corruption in Peacekeeping” (2016, February 12). Transparency International. [online] available: http://futurepeaceops.org/2016/02/12/corruption-in-peacekeeping/, p. 2.] [15: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 2.] [16: “Corruption & peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the UN” (2017). Transparency International. [online] available: defence.org/publications/corruption-peacekeeping-strengthening-peacekeeping-and-the-un/, p. 1.]

Moreover, this already untenable situation is further complicated when peacekeepers ignore the corruption taking place around them or even become unwitting and unaware accomplices in corrupt practices.[footnoteRef:17] As serious as these issues are, they are further exacerbated by a profound lack of training and guidance for peacekeepers deployed to countries where corruption is endemic. As the analysts at Transparency International point out, “Indeed, the complexities of international military operations, including peacekeeping, are poorly understood.” [footnoteRef:18] [17: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 3.] [18: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 3.]

Some indication of the extent of corruption routinely encountered by UN peacekeeping forces can be discerned from the findings of a 2013 Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index that evaluates corruption risk levels which showed that the average integrity score for international military operations in 82 different countries was just 28%; a dismal figure that reinforces the need for timely and specialized training and guidance for UN peacekeeping operations.[footnoteRef:19] This additional investment in time and effort will invariably make UN peacekeeping operations more complex during their early phases but will facilitate achieving the mission’s objectives over the long term.[footnoteRef:20] As the analysts at Transparency International conclude, “There is a need to ensure that peacekeeping missions have the necessary guidance and training to understand the multi-faceted ways in which corruption manifests itself in today’s crisis situations and are equipped with the necessary tools to tackle it.”[footnoteRef:21] [19: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 3.] [20: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 4.] [21: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 4.]

Despite the urgency that is characteristic of many UN peacekeeping mission deployments, it is essential to take the potential for corruption into account from the outset in order to avoid perpetuating the conditions that sparked the mission in the first place. In this regard, the consultants at Transparency International emphasize that, “Failing to take account of the threat of corruption during peacekeeping operations can come at a high cost. In the long run, the entire success of an international intervention can be put in jeopardy if corruption is not addressed early on in the process.”[footnoteRef:22] [22: “UN Peacekeeping Missions Must Tackle Corruption” (2013, October 9). Transparency International [online] available: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/un_peacekeeping_missions_must_ tackle_corruption, p. 2.]

The implications of these constraints on UN peacekeeping missions have become readily apparent in recent years as instances of criminal behavior become widely publicized around the world. For example, Haitians demonstrated against UN peacekeeping forces from Uruguay that purportedly sexually abused a Haitian citizen, charges that emerged during a period in which the UN was already struggling to shore up its damaged image as the result of the release of the move, “The Whistleblower” that exposed UN peacekeepers culpability in Bosnian human trafficking.[footnoteRef:23] According to Warah (2011), “’The Whistleblower’ is based on the true story of a former UN peacekeeper who, while serving in Bosnia during 1999-2000, stumbled upon a horrific human trafficking ring that involved her colleagues in the UN and a cartel of local traffickers.”[footnoteRef:24] When the UN peacekeeper brought the matter to the attention of her superiors at the UN, they were more concerned with protecting the UN peacekeeping image than they were in saving the people who were being trafficked and she was discharged from the UN peacekeeping mission in return for her efforts to stop the practice.[footnoteRef:25] [23: Rasna Warah (2011, November). “Lords of Impunity ... Why Whistleblowing at the UN Is a Waste of Time: Until the United Nations Can Show That It Has a Credible Record of Protecting Whistleblowers, Employees Who Are Aware of Sexual Exploitation or Other Human Rights Abuses in Peacekeeping Operations Are Likely to Remain Silent Writes Rasna Warah, a Former UN Staff Member.” New African, no. 511, p. 72.] [24: Warah, p. 73.] [25: Warah, p. 73.]

The sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers in Haiti occurred despite a press release from the UN Department of Public Information prior to the release of “The Whistleblowers” that made is clear the UN has a “zero tolerance policy” concerning sexual abuse and exploitation by its peacekeepers. As the coverage in “The Whistleblowers” and a video of the Haitian man being sexually abused by UN peacekeepers posted on the Internet made clear, though, “The UN is already showing signs that it has high levels of tolerance for sexual and other kinds of abuse by its peacekeepers.”[footnoteRef:26] The release of the movie and infamous video online were followed by the publication of Warah’s book, UNsilenced: UNmasking the United Nations' Culture of Cover-ups, Corruption and Impunity, which concludes that, “The corruption and lawlessness across the UN appears to be systemic. Some of the cases described in the book make the scandals she exposed and the retaliation she suffered seem mild by comparison.”[footnoteRef:27] [26: Warah, p. 73.] [27: Alex Newman (2016, November 1). “The New American.” Government Accountability Project. [online] available: https://www.whistleblower.org/multimedia/new-american-unsilenced-whistleblower-exposes-un-culture-corruption.]

Another example of UN peacekeeping force complicity in corrupt practices was the case of former UN peacekeeper Ismail Ahmed who was punished for exposing corruption in the UN food program in Somalia. In sharp contrast to the other high-profile examples cited above and in “The Whistleblower” and UNSilinced text wherein the UN Development Program (UNDP) essentially ignored such complaints, the UNDP took action in March 2010 and upheld Ahmed’s charges. It is noteworthy, however, that this action was only taken following the release of a report from the UN Monitoring Group assigned to Somalia that found as much as 50% of all food aid provided to the Somalia people was being diverted by a cabal of local UN employees, militia members and transportation contractors.[footnoteRef:28] Furthermore, despite the findings by the UN Monitoring Group, a follow-up study conducted by the Associated Press determined that much of the food aid provided by the World Food Program continued to be stolen despite continuing denials by UN authorities to the contrary.[footnoteRef:29] [28: Warah, p. 74.] [29: Warah, p. 75.]

The most recent example of criminal activities by UN peacekeeping forces is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (known by its French acronym MINUSTAH) which was authorized in June 2004 by the UN Security Council. This peacekeeping mission was in response to the earthquake that devastated Haiti in January 2010 causing 220,000 deaths, a figure that includes 96 UN peacekeepers who were supporting the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) by was deployed in February 2004 following then-President Bertrand Aristide’s exile following an armed nationwide uprising.[footnoteRef:30] [30: “United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti” (2017). United Nations. [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/]

Notwithstanding the humanitarian goals of these peacekeeping missions to Haiti, the Haitian people themselves believe that UN peacekeepers are doing more harm than good. In this regard, Beaubein (2017) recently observed that, “To say that the UN's peacekeeping mission in Haiti has been controversial is an understatement. The peacekeepers are blamed for bringing cholera to the island nation for the first time. They were accused of sexually abusing locals.”[footnoteRef:31] Likewise, the Haitian people essentially view UN peacekeeping forces as an “occupying army,” a view that is reinforced by the fact that Haiti is the nation in which UN peacekeepers operate under a UN Chapter VII mandate that allows peacekeepers to use force.[footnoteRef:32] This unique status and growing discontent with UN peacekeepers resulted in a nationwide "Haiti No MINUSTAH" public campaign that rejects the notion of “Haiti being used as a laboratory for new forms of intervention and control in Latin America, noting that Brazilian soldiers returning from Haiti are already being used for pacification programs in the slums of Rio de Janeiro.”[footnoteRef:33] [31: Jason Beaubien (2017, April 22) “UN to Pull Controversial Peacekeepers from Haiti.” National Public Radio. [online] available: http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/04/22/525113236/u-n-to-pull-controversial-peacekeepers-from-haiti, p. 2.] [32: Rebecca Burns (2011, December). “Haitians to U.N.: Please Leave.” In These Times, vol. 35, no. 12, p. 8.] [33: Burns, p. 9.]

What can be done?
Given the complexity and multinational composition of UN peacekeeping operations, identifying ways to enforce the UN’s zero tolerance policy towards criminal practices among its UN peacekeepers will require more than half measures, but a good place to start would be to provide the peacekeepers with the training and guidance they need to “hit the ground running” in international hot spots, a need that is currently going unfulfilled. For instance, analysts at Transparency International point out that:
Corruption in conflict can perpetuate violence and opens the door to organized crime. Yet guidance on preventing corruption is largely absent from almost everything to do with peacekeeping. There is no general UN policy relating to corruption in post-conflict situations and peacekeeping mandates rarely, if ever, mention it. Peacekeeping training centers do not include guidance on it.[footnoteRef:34] [34: “UN Peacekeeping Missions Must Tackle Corruption,” p. 4. ]

In response to this need, consultants at Transparency International conduct a series of training courses and workshops for military and civilians who are being deployed on international missions. According to Transparency International: These training courses have been successfully delivered to over 1000 participants from more than 26 countries. These courses would be immensely helpful to troops, police and civilians that deploy to peacekeeping missions, enabling them to identify the specific corruption risks that arise in crisis situations and learn effective ways of tackling them.[footnoteRef:35] [35: “Corruption in Peacekeeping,” p. 4.]

Other steps that can help reduce the incidence of criminal behaviors among UN peacekeeping forces include identifying cross-cultural differences that can affect the manner in which these forces respond to exigencies in the field. In addition, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations can assign members who have already completed the Transparency International training programs and workshops as instructors during future peacekeeping operations who can then serve as consultants for the mission and provide on-the-spot guidance when needed.
Conclusion
With more than 110,000 military and civilians from 124 different countries currently assigned to various UN peacekeeping operations around the world, it is discouraging but perhaps not surprising that there have been some “rotten apples” that have spoiled the UN image and reputation. Unfortunately, the research was consistent in showing that in far too many instances, charges of corruption and even more severe criminal activities on the part of UN military and civilian peacekeeping forces have largely been ignored by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and reports from the field continue to expose fresh examples. Indeed, there were instances of elaborate criminal networks between UN peacekeeping personnel and local civilian criminal organizations. Finally, a recurrent theme that quickly emerged from the research concerned the fundamental need for training and evidence-based guidance for UN peacekeepers, a need that remains unsatisfied by current UN training programs but which could be helped by having UN peacekeeping personnel complete the workshops and training programs developed by Transparency International.


References
“About Us.” (2017). UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/, p. 1.
Berman, Eric G. and Sams, Katie E. (2000). Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Beaubien, Jason (2017, April 22) “UN to Pull Controversial Peacekeepers from Haiti.” National Public Radio. [online] available: http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2017/04/22/ 525113236/u-n-to-pull-controversial-peacekeepers-from-haiti.
Burns, Rebecca (2011, December). “Haitians to U.N.: Please Leave.” In These Times, vol. 35, no. 12, pp. 8-11.
Corruption & peacekeeping: Strengthening peacekeeping and the UN” (2017). Transparency International. [online] available: defence.org/publications/corruption-peacekeeping-strengthening-peacekeeping-and-the-un/.
“Corruption in Peacekeeping” (2016, February 12). Transparency International. [online] available: http://futurepeaceops.org/2016/02/12/corruption-in-peacekeeping/.
“Department of Peacekeeping Operations [DPKO]” (2017). United Nations. [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/.
Grey-Johnson, Grispin (2006, March-May). “Beyond Peacekeeping: The Challenges of Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding in Africa.” UN Chronicle, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 8-13.
Langholtz, Harvey and Kondoch, Boris. (2005). International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff.
Newman, Alex (2016, November 1). “The New American.” Government Accountability Project. [online] available: https://www.whistleblower.org/multimedia/new-american-unsilenced-whistleblower-exposes-un-culture-corruption.
“UN Peacekeeping Missions Must Tackle Corruption” (2013, October 9). Transparency International. [online] available: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/ un_peacekeeping_missions_must_ tackle_corruption.
“United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti” (2017). United Nations. [online] available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/.
Warah, Rasna (2011, November). “Lords of Impunity ... Why Whistleblowing at the UN Is a Waste of Time: Until the United Nations Can Show That It Has a Credible Record of Protecting Whistleblowers, Employees Who Are Aware of Sexual Exploitation or Other Human Rights Abuses in Peacekeeping Operations Are Likely to Remain Silent Writes Rasna Warah, a Former UN Staff Member.” New African, no. 511, pp. 72-75.