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This relationship was seen in New Zealand in 1995 however it may not be always be correct to increase controls and investment in controls if we want it to be Pareto efficiency. This concept says that allocation from one set of goods to another should only be made when this transfer would make the other set richer but the first set not any worse off. This however is not possible under the form of governance and control seen in New Zealand. The other example is that of heavy regulation as found in the U.S. And the UK. This sort of regulation results in increased controls and governance because heavy regulation doesn't lead to reduced controls and this would again lead to heavy investment in controls. This heavy investment is undesirable since it becomes Pareto inefficient. The general affect of regulation is to restrict the variation in demand for controls while simultaneously raising investment level in an otherwise unregulated environment like New Zealand.

The problem with this study is that it has some limitations which may have been affecting the results. For one we did not have full access to publicly available information and thus we may not have assessed controls effectively. This is particularly true in the case of internal auditing activities since we did not have access to full information on those. Further research would be needed to correct these possible errors and fill the gaps. Secondly we were also limited by the lack of knowledge about the quality of internal controls being used. Since the quality was unknown, this may have affected the relevance of our results to the overall issue.

Despite these limitations, we have managed to discover a complex link between risks and controls and this finding merits further research. It would be interesting to discover how this relationship works in a heavily regulated environment especially under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.