ECB's Tools and Strategies

ECB’s Role in Stabilizing the Euro: Literature Review

Introduction

In 1999, the European Central Bank (ECB) took on the role of overseeing the monetary policy for the EU to ensure a stable currency. During the nearly two decades that have passed since, the ECB has faced two significant economic crises: the first very early on its new role, and the second approximately half a decade later when the Great Economic Crisis sent waves throughout the global economy. In order to understand the uniqueness of the ECB’s challenge in overseeing monetary policy in order to ensure stability in the Euro, is that the EU is not one nation but several nations, distinct in culture and economy, brought together under one umbrella monetary management system as it were. Navigating the widespread differences and establishing a policy to manage them so that both Germans and Greeks, for example, can share in the benefits of the Euro, has proven to be problematic—mainly because of the dysfunctional nature of the Eurozone itself, as De Grauewe and Ji (2015) point out. Nonetheless, understanding the main strategies and tools that the ECB has used to bring the Euro to its current position is worth knowing if only to understand the methods used by the central bank and what they portend for the future.

Purpose of the ECB

According to its statute, the ECB’s primary purpose is to ensure price stability of the Euro throughout the Eurozone over the medium term. The common expectation of price stability is inflation of 2% or lower—i.e., a low but stable rise in inflation over time. As Hall, Swamy and Taylas (2012) note, to achieve this objective, the ECB gives more focus “to the longer-term relationship between money growth and inflation than most, if not all, other major central banks” (p. 153). The goal of the central bank is not to influence the financial choices of individuals and businesses but rather to free them to apply the Euro as they see fit (Poole & Wheelock, 2008). Why is stability important for a currency—particular a currency like the Euro, which is relatively new among the world’s currencies and represents nearly two dozen different European economies? The reason is simple: “uncertainty about the price level makes it difficult for firms and households to determine whether changes in individual prices reflect fundamental shifts in supply and demand or merely changes in the overall rate of inflation. By eliminating this uncertainty, a monetary policy that maintains long-run price stability eliminates a potential drag on the efficient allocation of resources and, hence, on economic growth” (Poole & Wheelock, 2008, p. 6). Indeed, the most powerful tool of the ECB to stimulate growth in the economy is price stability—and this is the implicit reason for the ECB’s focus on the stability of the Euro as its main raison d’être.

Tools and Strategies

Price stability as the primary tool of the ECB reflects the central bank’s overall strategy of cross-checking monetary trend analysis with economic analysis. The monetary policy strategy that the ECB constructs and implements is then based on the overall assessment of the risks identified by the central bank to price stability of the Euro. As the main goal of the ECB is to ensure that the Euro is stable, it pays close attention to monetary and economic trends and has thus been highly reactive, rather than proactive, in its character (Hall et al., 2012).

A critical aspect of the ECB’s strategy of Euro stability is located in identifying the effects of inflation differentials among the various states of eurozone. The Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) is the main indicator used to monitor Euro stability. The HICP is a consumer price index compiled of data from among the EU members using the Euro currency. By making sure HICP is below but close to 2% over the medium term, the ECB is said to fulfill its objective. Price stability is not only conducive to promoting economic growth (the secondary aim of the ECB in the sense that it aims to support the EU’s economic policies), it is also conducive to aiding in “the reduction of fluctuations in real economic activity and the management of financial and/or liquidity crises” (Poole & Wheelock, 2008, p. 6). The way the ECB does this is different from the American central bank, which adds liquidity by purchasing Treasuries. The ECB adds liquidity by lending to the national banks based on creditworthiness.

Unconventional Monetary Policy: Quantitative Easing (QE)

Since the Great Economic Crisis, which has defined the past decade in terms of how monetary policy is conducted, the ECB has engaged in a strategic policy of quantitative easing, designed to send “trillions of euros into the eurozone’s financial system” (Van Lerven, 2016, p. 237). While QE tends to prop up market prices, the expected outcome on currency is one of devaluation: it is a simple theory—the injection of liquidity into the market leads to an increase in the supply of the currency. A rapid increase in the supply of money leads to inflation. The more money that is pumped into a system, the less value it has: it is the basic principle of supply and demand. However, in spite of this principle, it appears that the Euro has indeed not lost value but has rather stabilized mid-range between its historical extremes, judging by its value against the premier reserve currency of the world—the USD.

Questions remain, however, as Van Lerven (2016) notes: “after more than a year since its initial inception, a review of the programme’s impact reveals that policy makers should think twice before further expanding the programme–and could benefit from considering more direct ways of increasing spending in the real economy” (p. 237). Does this mean that the ECB’s monetary policy tool of quantitative easing, applied to help the eurozone absorb the shocks of the Great Economic Crisis, has been successful in stabilizing the Euro? Or does it mean that the Euro has simply kept track with the other currencies of the world mainly because all of the biggest central banks of the world were engaging in the exact same QE strategy—from the Federal Reserve in the US to the BOE to the BOJ to the PBOC? Had the ECB not used QE as a tool, it is highly likely that the Euro’s value would be much higher with respect to the USD, the pound, the renminbi, and so on (Haitsma, Unalmis & de Haan, 2016).

Though this might benefit European importers, it would be hard on European exporters—and thus this fact is kept in mind by the ECB, which aims for stability overall. Yet, there remains another problem to consider. Though in stabilizing the Euro, it would appear that the ECB’s strategy has been effective; however, an elephant in the room scenario exists, which is the ECB’s balance sheet: it has increased dramatically as a result of QE (Reis, 2017). What is the ECB to do with this balance sheet engorgement? Enlarging the balance sheet is meant to have the effect of stimulating the economy, but at some point that balance sheet will have to unwound and the question of whether the eurozone can absorb that unwinding is one that remains to be answered.

The other consideration that should be made with respect to the ECB’s QE tool is that it suppresses interest rates, which increase the incentive to borrow but which can lead to an over-leveraged economy that can be a considerable challenge for pension funds or insurance companies, who require a defined yield in order to meet liabilities that they face in the future. QE may have stabilized the Euro in the short to medium-term, but in the long term the question of just how the Euro will fair when the pain of permanently low interest rates begins to be felt by large segments of the EU will be another story completely.

Analysis

Whatever It Takes?

The study by Gencer and Musgolu (2014) explains how the ECB’s below but close to 2% inflation target rate in the medium term, via a “whatever it takes” approach using QE is ultimately a time bomb for the currency—i.e., a strategy that will ultimately result in “a massive erosion of the value” of the Euro (p. 247). While currently the EUR USD index sits within the midrange of its near-two decade span (range bound between 1 and 1.5 approximately), this range is likely to be supported by the ECB through continual usage of a QE policy strategy. However, with some assessment of the marketplace, the price or value of assets, the spillover from debt purchases (which the ECB has engaged in by buying corporate bonds of all things), one sees that a trigger mechanism is in effect whereby central bank intervention leads to inflation across asset classes that are not necessarily detectable by HICP (Haitsma et al., 2016). The Euro currency, in other words, remains stable in comparison with other currencies such as the USD, where a similar devaluation process or strategy is underway, but in comparison with asset class prices the stability of the currency is certainly not the case.

One need only examine the Euronext 100 IDX, which has risen nearly 50% over the past five years during which the ECB’s policy of QE has been enacted. Or one can look at the DAX, which is up more than 60% over the same time period. Or there is the CAC 40, which is up more than 40% over this time frame as well. One may look to the US to find the same situation, with the S&P 500 up over 60% since QE. Were the Euro also up in value between 40% and 60% compared to the world’s premier reserve currency, there would be no problem. But it is not. It is essentially where it was when it was introduced to the eurozone nearly two decades ago. The cost of assets has risen dramatically—because that is what happens when a central bank like the ECB dramatically increases the money supply by trillions within a short span of time: the currency loses purchasing power. Should the Euro truly be considered a stable currency in this respect? The Euro may have stabilized in one sense (i.e., in comparison to other currencies), but it has declined substantially if one is to measure its purchasing power in terms of the price of equities.

The Problem of Too Much Intervention

Indeed, the combination of policy and correlation between asset classes with regard to GARCH may be taken as the cumulative expression of a marketplace that is entirely consumed with how central bank interventions will be interpreted and acted upon by market players. In the year 2018, central banking intervention in the form of unconventional monetary policy (QE) is a fact, as Mario Draghi, head of the ECB, has shown again and again. How the average fund manager is meant to obtain the assumed rate of return for his fund in an environment that is anything but normal (judging by historical guidelines) remains a particular problem—and a practical problem as well (seeing as how pension plans are dependent upon the assumed rate of return being a consistent average over 5 years). The study by Eser and Schwaab (2013) is also essential in understanding the ECB’s problem, as it examines the impact on yield of asset purchases by Draghi’s ECB and its Securities Markets Programme. The findings show that, not surprisingly, “bond yield volatility is lower on intervention days for most SMP countries, due to less extreme movements occurring when the Eurosystem is active as a buyer” (Schwaab & Eser, 2013, p. 1). What this reveals is that when the market knows that there is a buyer of bonds, volatility collapses, which likewise bears on the value of the Euro in the sense that when the market knows an influx of cash is on its way, the market responds by frontrunning the central bank. Prices rise. The value of the EUR declines. The sense in today’s market, if one judges from a suppressed volatility in the markets (until recently, that is), is that the central banks will continue to be buyers of assets even while the central banks hint at tightening, or, in the ECB’s case, as Draghi hints at tapering. The studies by Neuenkirch (2012) and Rosa (2016) confirm as much, among others, and help serve as the basis for explaining why it is important to consider the effect of QE as an unconventional monetary policy in the real value decline of the Euro—which, ultimately, is not good for the currency’s long-term stability.

The measure of these arguments may be taken by analyzing GARCH charts of stock and bond markets along with precious metals (as an assumed safe haven in times of instability) and oil (as an indicator of overall market movement). A potential “wrench” that could be thrown into this mix might be the rise of crypto-currencies, such as Bitcoin (BTC), Bitcoin Cash (BCC), Ethereum (ETH) and myriad others. The rise of crypto-currencies is relatively new and could be indicative of yet another bubble or of a market weary of markets that are manipulated on several fronts, where price discovery is next to impossible because of the emergence of a command economy under the guise of central bank strategic policy. Comparing GARCH models with assets against BTC, BCC or ETH could show precisely how the ECB’s monetary policy tools have ultimately failed to stabilize the EUR, as other alternative stores of wealth emerge to attract investors and compel them to abandon the currency of the EU: and this is precisely what researchers have shown, from Katsiampa (2017) to Cermak (2017) and Wang and Vergne (2017). The rise of cryptocurrency in and of itself may be interpreted as a signal that abnormal changes in the marketplace as a result of unconventional monetary policy are causing investors to seek assets that are out of the hands of central banking control. Such a movement in market sentiment may also act as an indicator of future fluctuations, especially if political, economic and social turmoil continue to build (Blundell-Wignell, 2014). Measuring the spillover between stocks and bonds in the light of this development could yield some potentially useful financial analysis relevant to forecasting—especially where assumptions about the market are concerned. But in terms of how the ECB has been in providing real stability for the Euro, the evidence suggests that QE is but a short-term patch that will only accelerate the decline of the Euro’s value in comparison to real assets.

The ECB and Sector Forces

It is also worth pointing out that there is significant pressure from sector forces on economies, which is another focus of the ECB as it determines how to implement monetary policy. Industries struggle within splintering socio-political climates that impact economics on a global scale—and this is happening in Europe as well as across much of the rest of the world. The chemicals industry, for example, like other sectors, is dependent upon both economic growth overseas and commodity prices that can impact economic growth, which in turn impacts how the ECB chooses to conduct monetary policy (Blundell-Wignell, 2014). In addition, governmental policies and changes can impact industries, as is seen in virtually all countries, where various “region’s development policies that privilege industrialization as the route to economic growth” are currently implemented (Schreiber, Ermel, Figueiredo & Zeni, 2016, p. 58). The ECB is sensitive to such policies as well, as they in turn impact the stability of the Euro. The policies of governments and political situations are a direct impact on currency movement, which is why it is so challenging in one regard for the ECB to stabilize the Euro in the face of so many different nations operating to some degree autonomously from one another (Blundell-Wignell, 2014). Likewise, the growth of consumer pressure adds to the demand for product, and where there is demand there is foreseeable upside. Industries have benefited from demand-side support in regions where government policies help to shore up agricultural investment and/or industrialization, both of which provide a market for other sectors. But when consumer pressure wanes, so too does the demand in each of these markets, which drives the global economy towards recession and negatively impacts the ability of industries to produce sales.

In such a climate, the ECB is left with limited options and, having now engaged in QE, may have no other choice but to continue to use QE as the only policy tool that can be prop up markets in order to sustain some semblance of order and stability. The markets impact the Euro and vice versa—and that is the problem. As Rogers, Scotti and Wright (2014) show, unconventional monetary policy as utilized by the ECB has impacted equity markets, bond markets and exchange rates. Their study indicates, moreover, that spillover from the QE purchases throughout the global marketplace is a much stronger unidirectional flow than spillover from the global marketplace to the domestic markets. In other words, the money is going elsewhere—not where the ECB intends it, which is right at home in European markets. Rogers et al. (2014) shows that unconventional monetary policy correlates with yield curve development in recent years, which has been found to be impacted by central bank policy, as well. The importance of these findings is that they imply a certain relation between central banking intervention and market movement. It is estimated that there will be some correlation between market intervention and spillover, and the ECB’s monetary tools are the main culprit today.

In short, the role of unconventional monetary policy since the Great Recession is clear. It has inflated the prices of commodities and equities. In a global economy, every economy is interconnected. Thus, the ECB, the BOJ, the BOE and so on have all been participating in the propping up of economic systems through unconventional monetary policy. If the central banks ever begin to de-leverage, what will happen? Bubbles will pop and GDP will return to reality (Heller, 2017). This is already being seen in the explosion of volatility earlier this year and the consumer price index indicating that inflation is running hot. QE all over the world has devalued currency and caused commodities to explode in price. None of this bodes well for the Euro and none of it should be taken as evidence of a stable currency.

The ECB’s Unconventional—Now Conventional—Monetary Policy: The Only Option?

With QE continuing to have a place in the ECB’s monetary policy, it is only reasonable that it be viewed as a now conventional tool of the central bank in stabilizing the Euro. However, this does not make it any better of a tool. On the contrary, the research shows that the longer the ECB relies on QE, the worse it will be for the Euro in the end.

Global economic prosperity does not depend upon collective action and international cooperation. Collective action and international cooperation is readily seen in the Brexit and the Grexit dramas, as the Troika throws its weight around. The action on the part of the ECB, EU, and IMF is collective. Yet economic prosperity there is not—unless one is talking about the prosperity of shareholders. The system of the world’s banking cartel is responsible to no one and is designed to benefit banks—nothing else, and this has been pointed out again and again (Heller, 2017). Krugman (2009) speaks of contemporary economic crises using terms like “new incurable strains” and “new prophylactic regimens” as though the system of economic philosophy (state-sponsored usury) were not in and of itself to blame (p. 5). Krugman imagines that the “new incurable strains” affecting the global economy today are like a mutant flu that no one could have predicted and that now must be dealt with by drumming up new medicine. The predicament of the global economy however has not gone unforeseen. As early as 1912, Crozier saw it quite clearly when he warned against the dangers of handing over the coining of money to a handful of bankers—or, rather, the banking cartel. The member nations of the EU have essentially done the same thing with the ECB, and the end result of nearly two decades of ECB intervention in the marketplace has been a currently “stable” Euro but a not-so-stable marketplace with rising asset prices going through the roof. Bubbles abound—and today’s crisis is no different except that it is global. It is also systemic, and no Keynesian economist can change that unless he demolishes the system of state-sponsored usury (known as banking today) which fuels the machine.

The consequences of collective, centralized banking are evident everywhere one looks, whether in the East or in the West. QE has leveraged banks to the hilt and beyond. Funabashi (2009) argues for a new system different from Bretton Woods—one that pivots East and concentrates on “the careful cultivation of trilateralism,” as though that would solve the global insolvency that is currently only sustained by a scheme that would make Ponzi proud (p. 8). Bretton Woods was concocted in the West as a way to loot and control what WW2 was in the process of dismantling. There is no “humanitarian” service being provided by the EU leadership or the ECB or the IMF or anything that can rightly be called a stabilizing process. Instead, these are the entities buying up the “assets” that no one else wants so as to maintain growth targets or give the impression that the economy is in recovery mode (Heller, 2017). As Heller (2017) points out, the only alternative to QE is a lessening of global demand—call it recession, or depression—which will happen soon enough at any rate—and the cracks in the global economy, for the present being filled by fiat breaking wider and deeper. But what happens at that point? Political instability? Domestic turmoil? Revolution? Military coup? All of this is quite possible and appears to be on the verge of happening in many places, not the least being the Middle East. Europe will find itself right in the middle of the action, too, as Mohammad bin Salman visits with French President Macron and both Macron and May of the UK pledge to support an unwarranted attack on Syria (and by extension Russia), which could trigger exactly the kind of destabilizing war that would send the Euro into a tailspin.

An Alternate Solution?

Without strong leadership based squarely on an economic policy that does not endorse state-sponsored devaluations, the same conclusion will be seen in the wake of the systemic collapse. The ECB has been too accommodative with countries like Greece and Ireland, in hopes of controlling the rising inflation, but these strategies are only patchwork and do not address the underlying systemic issues that are causing the Euro to move one way or the other. Therefore, it is unlikely that the sort of global leadership and policy coordination necessary to restore global economic prosperity will be seen from the ECB in the coming years.

Draghi’s decision to do “whatever it takes” may be the last great effort of the ECB to control inflation before it sets off finally and takes the Euro down with it. For the world’s central banks it will indeed be a race to the bottom as every nation attempts to export its inflation. Prosperity, ala the kind that Europe once enjoyed before the EU solved everything, was temporary. Today, it is a talking point for the political elite. Is the ECB really able to stabilize the Euro in the long-term? No. That is why it only looks to keep inflation below but close to 2% in the medium-term: it knows there is no chance of keeping up this illusion of 2% inflation over the long-term. The rise in asset prices will betray the reality.

Summing up the ECB’s Monetary Strategy and Tools

By monitoring inflation and shooting for price stability, the ECB manipulates liquidity by lending to nation banks and increasing the money supply. This can help to put pressure on the Euro to keep it from rising to sharply in comparison with the USD. It is a strategy that works so long as the other central banks of the world are engaging in the exact same strategy. Should the U.S. Fed decide to no longer use QE (and currently it is in the process of tightening, raising interest rates—so as not to expose the myth of low inflation to the reality that hyper-inflation is what will be knocking on the door soon enough as a result of QE), the ECB will have to follow suit or else risk seeing the Euro lose value in comparison to USD. Though this would make exporters happy, it would cause problems for importers. The trick for the ECB is to find the right balance, because in balance is stability. The problem, of course, is that ECB’s tools are all meant for a short-term duration and a medium-term longevity at best. The ECB cannot control inflation for the long term and it knows it and that is why it does not describe this as its overall policy.