Emergency Operations Center EOC Disaster Preparedness Evaluation

Disaster Management Evaluation

Introduction

An Emergency Operations Center (EOC) refers to a specifically selected centralized facility where administrators and officers have meetings face-to-face to facilitate the coordination and direction of a jurisdiction’s general disaster response and recovery endeavors in rendering support to operations in the field (University of Washington, 2020). The EOC operates as a fundamental and central point for the management of positioning personnel and resources for the alleviation, preparedness, response, and recovery from disaster in the field (Dave, 2018). This paper carries out an extensive analysis of the Emergency Operations Center during the tornado outbreak of April 2011.

Preparedness is one of the key elements in the disaster management cycle. Overall, emergency management is the incessant process in which all people, groups, and communities as a whole partake in the management of hazards in an endeavor to evade or mitigate the effect of disasters emanating from the hazards. In the preparedness stage of the cycle, emergency managers are tasked with the responsibility of developing plans of action when the disaster takes place (Dave, 2018).

An effective preparedness measure is an EOC in tandem with a proficient guideline across the region for the management of emergencies. An additional preparedness measure encompassed the development of volunteer response capacity amongst the civilian populace. Taking into consideration that response from volunteers is not at all times as foreseeable and easily planned as a response from professionals and expert personnel, the deployment of volunteers is usually done at the edge of an emergency except if they are a verified and reputable volunteer organization with benchmarks and training (Fagel, 2010).

Type of Disaster, Affected Area, and Vulnerable Populations

On April 27, 2011, a series of tornados devastated the southeastern region of the United States that emanated in Mississippi, overwhelming and causing so much distraught in Georgia and Alabama, and diminishing into Tennessee. The disaster was natural, and it is approximated that the losses experienced were approximately $6 billion in terms of losses that have been insured and total losses amounting to more than $10 billion. Following statistics obtained from Storm Data, the tornado aftermath resulted in the demise of 64 people, injuries to over 1,500 persons, and immediately caused property damage surpassing $2 billion. In general, the Tornado traversed approximately over 130 kilometers, and its rating on the Enhanced Fujita Scale was EF-4, which is on the high end (Marshall, Davis, and Runnels, 2012).

Tuscaloosa is regularly hit by hurricanes that travel across the southeastern region of the United States. Statistics indicate that in the years between 1952 and 2012, the country experienced 69 tornadoes (Harvard Kennedy School, 2013). The Tornado that took place in April was not solely a one-off occurring event, but instead was a sequence of numerous tornados that reproduced in two different waves. Worsening the natural hazard and threat that is posed by tornados, 16 percent of the citizens living in Alabama reside in manufactured housing, with the majority of the lacking some sort of basement or area to seek out refuge (USFA, 2012).

In Alabama, the aftermath of the natural disaster resulted in the demise of 239 people out of a population of 4.7 million, with approximately 2,500 people injured necessitating medical treatment. In total terms of the loss, this series of tornados in April is ranked as being the fifth most fatal Tornado in the history of the United States. The long-standing economic detriment to the state and the region as a whole was massive. For instance, several towns lost virtually all of their commercial businesses (USFA, 2012).

Design and Location of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is a fundamental constituent of an efficacious disaster response center. Within a city, it is the responsibility of the mayor and the support members of staff to coordinate and manage the frequent functioning of the municipality on an everyday basis and also fortify the organizational structure for effective management of a serious disaster (Fagel, 2010). The EOC is expected to operate from a shared physical location, pinpoint representatives for the pandemic response division, and incorporate numerous leaders at the municipality and also disaster response personnel. Moreover, the EOC is expected to act as the main hub for all planning and response activities during a pandemic, ensure the authorities are fully and constantly informed about the status of the disaster, the response activities, and the available resources, in addition to supporting all of the responders’ needs (Dasgupta, 2007).

The EOC for Tuscaloosa County was situated in the basement of a building that was demolished. Consequently, they were forced to remove themselves and relocate to an alternative location instantaneously. This resulted in the loss of EOC communications for disaster response for several hours. Public Works and fire department communications were momentarily banged off the air. Also, the local American Red Cross (ARC) and Salvation Army facilities were demolished. All over the region, residents fell back on their fire departments for aid, direction, and support. Fire organizations concentrated on firefighting and rescue undertakings. Other locations were converted into communal kitchens, the family locating systems, points of public assembly, housing centers, logistics centers, distribution locations, and several more (USFA, 2012).

The Alabama Fire Police (AFC) played a fundamental role in the emergency response, and recovery endeavors carried out after the tornados hit. The location and infrastructure of the Alabama Fire Police, situated towards the south of where the Tornado struck, was considered to be suitable and ideal. The building is comprised of the firm and rigid stands, the equipment has ns, in addition to classrooms and lavatories. Consequently, they were able to host and provide support to numerous disaster response agencies and teams, personnel, incidence management team, emergency response support team, and also newly repositioned Tuscaloosa County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Notably, AFC called off classes and emphasize facilitating disaster support. Numerous students slated within the organization were deployed in response and recovery procedures close to their home populations or supporting organizations.

Effectiveness of the Emergency Preparedness Plan for the Hazard

The emergency response operations and activities lasted up to three days after the event in several communities and, owing to its overwhelming impact, ended up exhausting the resources provided by the local and mutual-aid organizations. In Alabama, after the activation of Incident Command Centers for a sequence of winter storms and also a tornado hitting the EF3 level on the Enhanced Fujita Scale hit the city mid-April, the mayor realized that personnel started being more at ease with the command structure that had two incident command centers, which facilitated effective operation. A lack of proper preparation came in the form that when the city was notified of the likelihood that a tornado would hit, the mayor failed to activate the ICS up until its onset. This had adverse impacts in terms of slowing down the city emergency response to more than 100 families whose homes were damaged (Harvard Kennedy School, 2013).

On April 27, the National Weather Service dispensed a cautioning that there was a solid likelihood that communities throughout the state, as well as Tuscaloosa, would be hit by tornadoes in the day. Consequently, the governor of the State of Alabama affirmed a state of Emergency, facilitating the National Guard to initiate and trigger 1,000 personnel. At the same time, in Tuscaloosa, where weather forecasts pointed out that there was a 45 percent likelihood of a tornado taking place, the mayor, despite some hesitation, decided to instigate the Incident Command of the city as a form of preparation for a conceivable significant event (Harvard Kennedy School, 2013).

Tuscaloosa was the biggest community severely impacted across the region with this succession of tornados. Imperatively, it was one of the communities that had better preparedness amongst the communities that experienced significant damages and losses. At the time, the city as a whole employed the usage of Incident Command Center (ICS) in terms of planning and also in the course of emergency incidences. The city’s headship is knowledgeable and proficient with the system, and all high-ranking personnel in every single agency are conversant with the system and accustomed to the language. At the onset of April, in the course of the initial success of serious weather happenings, they had employed ICS for the management of a massive concert. When tornados endangered that event, the Incident Commander (IC) annulled the performance at a $250,000 loss to the municipal. They implanted Section and Branch Chiefs from outside the fire unit to staff their command structure centered on the occasion, proficiency, and accessibility (USFA, 2012).

The Tornado crossed Tuscaloosa on April 27, arriving through the southwest region and traversing through a trail of destruction that encompassed a six-mile stretch that was more than one mile wide. This storm caused significant detriment, resulting in the demise of 52 people and rigorously damaging just about everything that was situated in the area, which made up more than 12 percent of the city. This damage includes the destruction of the building in which the Emergency Operations Center was located, the main local center of operations for the Red Cross, and also for the Salvation Army, police stations and fire stations, and also thousands of homes and developments. Notably, the detriment caused to the Emergency Operations Center of the county momentarily hampered its capability as both a responder and coordinator. The further destruction to the control center buildings for Red Cross further hampered the capacity of the emergency management personnel (Harvard Kennedy School, 2013).

The happenings of April 27, 2011, were shattering and lethal. There had been adequate notification and warning for the majority of the citizens to seek shelter, and for public safety, workforces to gain awareness of the imminent happenings. Nevertheless, the scope of the tornados surpassed most personnel’s experience and anticipations in addition to their organization’s competences. Plenty of them was able to recover and were swiftly able to render services to their populations (USFA, 2012). Just about all of them were impelled to take up responsibility for assignments outside of their usual responsibilities. They largely embarked on the responsibilities with some nervousness assorted with a life-force of enthusiastic service, and they regularly had a good performance (USFA, 2012). Even though numerous responders underwent personal losses, they continued to render services as necessitated by their populations. Irrespective of planning, enrollment, training, and equipment, these sequences of events surpassed practically every community’s self-reliance. The State EMAs, mutual-aid establishments, a well-timed FEMA response, and most importantly, tough and dedicated effort by local responders and residents all contributed to local achievements (USFA, 2012).

The populations that were vulnerable and affected by the Tornado included the people living in Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, which are the regions through which the Tornado moved. The emergency preparedness plan for the hazard was effective initially but overwhelmed, making it even harder to cope with the Tornado. A sequence of meetings was conducted later on to examine and assess the activities carried out by the fire department in addition to emergency medical services organizations in the course of the tornados in the States of Alabama and Georgia. Five perceptible issues were ascertained to indicate the lack of total effective preparedness plan, including the following:

1. Lack of preparedness for the hazard and disaster

Whereas several communities had better preparation in comparison to others, there was hardly any emergency operations planning or maintenance. Numerous responders acknowledged and disclosed that they lacked insight regarding the details of the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) set out for their community. There were notable exemptions, typically from communities with manned emergency management offices, strategic planning, in addition to a training program. This is notable that there was a lack of sufficient training and focus from leaders (USFA, 2012).

2. Lack of adequate disaster management training

All of the representatives that attended the meetings pinpointed needs for additional training and exercise, in addition to the establishment of requirements for operations training. There was a need for personnel to undergo process training for documentation necessitated for recovery of costs and also job aids to help them while carrying out these jobs (USFA, 2012).