Employee privacy in the workplace

Employee Privacy

The objective of this study is to read the case Deal V. Spears United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 980 F. 2D 1153 (1992) and to answer the questions of whether it is lawful to monitor the telephone conversation of an employee if the employee has given prior consent and to answer if in this case whether Deal give her employer consent in this case? This study will additionally examine whether due to the recent burglary of the store, whether the employer had a legitimate business reason to record and review the employee's phone calls made or received at work. Finally, this study will consider what, under the Watkins precedent, is the extent to which an employer can monitor personal phone calls to employees within the ordinary course of business exemption of the federal wiretapping law where is no evidence of express consent here.

Background

The basis of the complaint filed in case Deal V. Spears United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 980 F. 2D 1153 (1992) is Title II of the Omnibus Crime control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2520 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). It is reported that the Plaintiff, Sibbie Deal, and Calvin Lucas seek damages against Deal's former employers, namely the defendants, Newell, and Juanita Spears dba the White Oak Package Store, for the "intentional interception and disclosure of plaintiff's telephone." (United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1992) Following a bench trial in this case, the District Court made a statutory award to Plaintiffs in the amount of $40,000 and the request for attorney fees in accordance with Title III's fee-shifting provision was granted. The Plaintiff cross-appealed the case on the issue of the court having refused to award punitive damages. The decision was affirmed by the higher court.

The Issues & The Decision of the Court

It was decided by the court in hearing this case that the consent of the Deal's could not be implied "from the circumstances relied upon in the Spears' arguments. Deal was not informed by the Spears that they were monitoring the telephone but instead only threatened to do so attempting to cut down on the personal telephone calls from work. Furthermore, the couple appeared clearly convicted that Deal would not know they the phone was being monitored and that they had hoped to catch her admitting some part in the store robbery that had occurred. Deal stated that whenever the Spears picked up on the telephone line that she knew someone was on the line because there was a click that could be clearly heard when they did pick up the telephone receiver. The court stated in its opinion of the case "Given these circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that the Spears have failed to show Deal's consent to the interception and recording of her conversations." (United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1991) The Spears failed to learn anything of the store burglary but did learn that Deal was having an affair with Newell and that Deal had sold Newell some beer at cost, which was strictly prohibited by store policy. It was for this act that Deal was fired on August 13, 1990. Mike Deal stated in his testimony that Juanita Spears had divulged information that was general in nature about the tapes. Pam Lucas stated in her testimony that Spears had related the tape contents to her but only after, she was specifically asked. Pam additionally stated in her testimony that Juanita Spears had told Sibbie Deal that she had better drop a worker's compensation claim she had made against the store lest things get really ugly. Interestingly Pam also stated that Spears never told her what was on the tapes and she testified that the tapes were discussed in general terms only. The Spears challenged the court's finding of liability and admitted taping however stated their content that the facts in this case bring their actions "under two statutory exceptions to civil liability. Further, Juanita Spears alleges that she did not disclose information learned from the tapes, thus the statutory damages assessed against her on that ground was improper. For their part Deal and Lucas challenge the court's failure to award them punitive damages as permitted by statute." (United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1992) In order that there be a violation of the wire and electronic communications interception provisions (Title III) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, this violation is a criminal offense according to 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988). Under the relevant provisions of the statute, criminal liability attaches and a federal civil cause of action arises when a person intentionally intercepts a wire or electronic communication or intentionally discloses the contents of the interception. Id. § 2511(1)(a), (c), 2520(a) (1988). The successful civil plaintiff may recover actual damages plus any profits made by the violator. If statutory damages will result in a larger recovery than actual damages, the violator must pay the plaintiff "the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000."5 Id. § 2520(c)(2)(B) (1988). Further, punitive damages, attorney fees, and "other litigation costs reasonably incurred" are allowed. Id. § 2520(b)(2), (3) (1988)." (United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1992) It was the claim of the Spears that they were exempt from civil liability since Deal consented to the calls being intercepted made and intercepted from the business phone. The Court stated, "Under the statute, it is not unlawful

"to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication ... where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception," 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d), and thus no civil liability is incurred. The Spears contend that Deal's consent may be implied because Newell Spears had mentioned that he might be forced to monitor calls or restrict telephone privileges if abuse of the store's telephone for personal calls continued. They further argue that the extension in their home gave actual notice to Deal that her calls could be overheard, and that this notice resulted in her implied consent to interception. We find these arguments unpersuasive." (United States Court Of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1992)