Epistemology and Meta-Theory the World

¶ … Epistemology and Meta-Theory

The world is a mysterious and frequently dangerous place. It is little wonder, then, that humankind has always been in search of better ways of understanding this wild and threatening environment in an attempt to improve their chances of survival. As the immediate dangers became better known and understood, the same methods that were used to understand them were applied to the more esoteric aspects of humanity, with some mixed results. While the scientific method, correctly applied, allows researchers to replicate the work of others and refine it, these same techniques cannot be readily used in most day-to-day situations. What is called for, then, is a way of understanding the world and its attributes and dangers in such a way that effectively and efficiently provides the observer with the information required for the survival of both the mind and the body, which is the topic of the selected readings reviewed below. A summary of the research is provided in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

The theory of knowledge, or epistemology, has been the subject of much attention and debate over the centuries. The focus of much of this work has been on discovering what it "the truth," a quest that has assumed epic proportions for many of its adherents. Today, though, most epistemologists would seem to have taken a lesson from Karl R. Popper, who simply suggests in his book, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, that "Truth may perhaps be veiled. But it may reveal itself. And if it does not reveal itself, it may be revealed by us. Removing the veil may not be easy. But once the naked truth stands revealed before our eyes, we have the power to see it, to distinguish it from falsehood, and to know that it is truth" (1962, p. 5). Determining the difference between what is true and what is not always as easy as removing a veil, though, and even when this has been accomplished to the satisfaction of the veil-remover, what is revealed may not be "the truth."

For example, in his book, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, Michael Polanyi (1997) makes the interesting point that while humans perceive the world around them through their various senses, these perceptions are only limited and incomplete versions of reality because people necessarily base them on a worldview colored by personal experiences and beliefs that naturally affect their ability to objectively analyze what they perceive. These unique interpretations are absolutely required, though, because this is the method universally used by all people, who are also an inextricable element in the analysis. Indeed, Polanyi points out that "As human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying within ourselves and speak about it in terms of a human language shaped by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to eliminate our human perspective from our picture of the world must lead to absurdity" (p. 3). In this vast sea of subjectivity, then, true objectivity assumes some elusive qualities that may escape some observers; however, Polanyi assures these individuals that it is possible to "bridge the gap" between individual subjectivity and universal objectivity if certain steps are followed. "The act of knowing includes an appraisal," he says, "and this personal coefficient, which shapes all factual knowledge, bridges in doing so the disjunction between subjectivity and objectivity. It implies the claim that man can transcend his own subjectivity by striving passionately to fulfill his personal obligations to universal standards" (emphasis added) (p. 17). Unfortunately, these "universal standards" have also been the subject of much debate over the centuries; according to Polanyi, "Could that ideal be fully achieved, all truth and all error could henceforth be ascribed to an exact theory of the universe, while we who accept this theory would be relieved of any occasion for exercising our personal judgment: we should only have to follow the rules faithfully" (p. 18). The author, though, assures increasingly nervous readers at this point that help is available if they do not blindly accept the theories that have been promulgated by the various exact sciences to the exclusion of their own personal knowledge about the world around them. This level of awareness does not come quickly or easily to most people, though, and Polanyi insists that there must be a concomitant deep appreciation for what is true and a firm commitment to achieve this knowledge to succeed. "We recognize intellectual beauty as a guide to discovery and as a mark of truth," he notes, and the "love of truth operates on all levels of mental achievement" (Polanyi, p. 300). In this regard, the author distinguishes between personal and subjective states; in the subjective state, people merely "endure their feelings" while the personal state is neither subjective nor objective, but provides people with the ability to "transcend the disjunction between subjective and objective" (p. 300). In his book, The Explanation of Behavior, Taylor (1964) also makes the point that there is a fundamental need for a desire for understanding on the part of the individual in order to succeed in achieving it.

Because the personal state is primarily controlled by individual decisions to various levels of commitment to knowing what is true and to achieving this, the personal state is the framework Polanyi suggests can be used to better understand the intricate interplay between the powerful external forces in people's lives and the personal decisions that guide their day-to-day decisions, values and perceptions. To the extent that what is perceived conforms to this personal state, though, is most likely the extent to which the individual will believe what is being perceived is true and will tend to further reinforce these frameworks; unfortunately, it would seem that many people may not be interested or otherwise capable of devoting a sufficient amount of their conscious thought processes to these intricate processes to achieve this level of informed transcendence, and simply "endure their feelings." Taken together, these issues mean that people absolutely must depend upon the knowledge that has been accumulated by others, but they also must interpret it in such a fashion that provides them with an understanding that approximates reality and adequately satisfies the needs of their individual "personal states." In fact, theorists such as Taylor have envisioned a more "gonzo" learning style that recognizes the inextricable role of the individual in a mutually reactive process.

Today, a common refrain among business management gurus is to "Think outside the box." Likewise, the target of Paul Feyerabend's book, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, was a specific epistemological (self-)understanding of the sciences. According to Lamb, Munevar and Preston (2000), this specific self-understanding of the sciences reduces the special quality of scientific knowledge to the strict application of rules for "doing" science. "Strict rules to achieve a certain target are called 'methods,'" the authors advise. "The rules of practicing science are respectively called 'scientific methods', or summarily 'The Scientific Method.' In his book, Feyerabend questioned the existence of such strictly binding scientific methods. Thus the title Against Method and its subtitle that contains the concept of anarchism: anarchism as antithesis to the unconditional reign of one or more methods" (Lamb et al., p. 11). While Feyerabend's work in some cases assumed a "no-holds barred" approach to practicing science and understanding that many critics questioned, the author's original intent was to suggest that it was impossible to provide a one-size-fits-all approach to every situation that a researcher could reasonably be expected to encounter, and to do so was at the detriment of the progress of science and therefore knowledge itself (Lamb et al., 2000). In this regard, Popper makes the point that both classical empiricism and rationalism are also "mistaken" because both are insufficient in and of themselves to achieve comprehensive understanding and informed knowledge: