Negligence and Strict Liability the

Negligence and Strict Liability The issue in Krasnecky v. Meffen involves the killing of seven sheep by two dogs on April 24, 1993. The defendants' dogs entered the plaintiffs' residential property when they were away for an out-of-State trip. The basis of the plaintiffs' claim was damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship and society, as they considered the sheep companion animals, rather than livestock held for economic gain.

The complaint contained six counts: 1) seeking damages for violation; 2) claiming strict liability under the common law, seeking damages for emotional distress and permanent loss of the sheep in terms of companionship and society -- this demand precludes any market value or nominal damages; 3) trespass to real estate; 4 & 5) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and recklessness. The plaintiffs refused discovery requests in terms of market value for the sheep.

The reason for this was the plaintiff's regard for the animals as their pets, and indeed family members, rather than livestock. For this reason, the plaintiff's regarded it as morally inappropriate to seek market value damages for animals that they regard as equally important as human family members. Instead, testimony and documentary evidence established that the death of the sheep caused severe emotional distress and associated physical problems to the plaintiffs.

The outcome of the case was, however, a decision that the plaintiffs had no legal claim to emotional distress, which was therefore precluded from the case. Final judgment dismissed counts 2 and 6. Count 1 resulted in the amount of 1 dollar nominal compensation. The plaintiffs appealed this judgment, arguing that they were entitled to noneconomic damages for counts 1, 2 and 6. As mentioned, the basis of the issue is the consideration of the sheep as companion animals. In this regard, the plaintiffs argued that "companion animals" are not limited to cats and dogs.

Indeed, there was evidence suggesting that the plaintiffs treated the sheep as much more than mere livestock; the sheep received names, birthday celebrations with special food and balloons, and displays of affection such as pats, hugs, brushes and snacks. Young sheep were brought into the plaintiffs' home for four weeks at a time to be bottle fed and treated for all practical purposes as pets or even "children." This was the basis of the claim for emotional distress.

The final outcome of the appeal was that the sheep owners could not claim for emotional distress, they had not cognizable claim for loss of companionship and society, and that there was not sufficient evidence to suggest trespass. Rule According to the law, persons who may recover damages in tort form emotional distress becaue of an injury to a third party include only parents or a person closely related to the person who has been directly injured.

In other words, emotional distress can only be claimed for injury to a human being, regardless of the status of an animal as "companion." Therefore, the "wrongful death" tort requires the death of a person, not an animal. In response, the plaintiffs cited Sullivan v. Boston Gas Co. (1993), where motional distress was granted on the basis of two persons witnessing the destruction of their home, which was not a person but property. In such cases, damages can only be claimed when the injury is witnessed in progress. In Cohen v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1983), for example, emotional distress was denied because the plaintiff learned of her son's death only seven hours after the fact. There was no direct witness to the event, nor did the plaintiff become aware of it immediately after the fact.

Based on this, the rule is that 1) the death of sheep, however closely and affectionately held in the plaintiffs' regard, is not regarded as wrongful death and cannot be used for emotional distress claims and 2) the fact that the destruction was witnessed only hours after the fact precludes emotional distress as a result of the loss of property. The tort for companionship and society is, by law, only applicable to persons and not to animals, regardless of their regard as companion animals or not.

As for the trespass tort, it was found that insufficient evidence was available to prove wrongdoing by the plaintiffs. There was no evidence to suggest how the dogs entered the plaintiffs' property. Evidence of neglect was not sufficient, according to the court. Analysis I was somewhat surprised by the court's ruling, since at first sight the negligence was clearly on the part of the dog owners.

Furthermore, the fact that the dogs had already killed another neighbor's rabbits should have emphasized the necessity of providing more secure premises for the animals. It could therefore be said that the dog owners had a duty to all their neighbors to keep their dogs securely within a limited environment, where they could not cause damage to the property of others. Letting the animals roam free in such a way as to cause the damage involved was clearly a breach of duty.

The likelihood of damage was very high by letting the dogs roam free. On the other hand, it could also be said that the plaintiffs had a duty to secure their sheep from harm, particularly during their time away from the property. Once again the damage to the rabbits should have been sufficient warning that the dogs could potentially cause harm to the plaintiffs' sheep. It could therefore be argued that they should have taken reasonable measures against this.

While the actual cause of the damage could therefore be said to be the responsibility of the dog owners, the sheep owners could have foreseen the proximate cause of the damage as a result of the dogs entering the property. They should have taken reasonable measures against this. Finally, the damage, as offered by the court, is not of such a nature as to.